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Section It STRAfSON, IDENTIFYING REFERENCE, AND STATEMENTS (p.l)
I argue that Strawson's claim that one cannot use the same expres¬
sion to make identifying reference to an object and, at the same
time, to state that such an object exists, is vitiated by a failure
to distinguish the statement which a speaker make3 from the infor¬
mation which he intends to convey.
Section lit NEGATION AND TRUTH VALUE (9)
Considering the question whether definite descriptions which fail
of reference result in falsity or a 'truth value gap', I explore
some of the ways in which suoh a question might be of interest to
philosophers. Some points about negation and the nature of logical
analysis result from the discussion.
Section Hit ANALYSIS (25)
The question of analysis is continued. I argue that a notion of a
statement, or a proposition, is needed for paraphrase and indirect
quotation.
Section IVi SOME PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES (53)
I argue that we should make careful distinctions among different
kinds of propositional attitudes.
Section Vx DO PROPER NAMES HAVE SENSE? (58)
Against Ryla and Vendler, I argue that proper names have sense.
Section VIx PROPER NAMES, A PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION, AND SOME
REMARKS ABOUT CONTEXT (7l)
Making use of a distinction between statement and assertion, I
attempt to solve a problem of communication which arises from a
doctrine of Russell's. The notion of the context of an utterance
becomes important. I try to go some way towards clarifying this
notion.
Section VIIx PARSING PROPER NAMES (88)
I argue that Quine ought to parse "Cerberus" not as "(7x) (x is-
Cerberus)" but as something like "(7x) (x Cerberizes)", making a
distinction between the proper name and what goes into predicate
position in its analysis.
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Section VIII: IS THE SENSE OF A PROPER NAME THAT OF A COMPLETE
DESCRIPTION OF ITS OBJECT? (91)
Against some attacks suggested by Searle, I defend the doctrine
that the sense of a proper name is that of a complete description
of its object.
Section IX: REFERENTIAL OCCURRENCE (103)
Returning to the subject of Section I, I attempt to develop a
notion of referenoe whioh corresponds, in many respects, to Russell's
denoting. This sort of reference is distinguished from what I call
"Strawsonian reference". I give a preliminary definition of "re¬
ferential occurrence".
Section X: LINSKY AND 'PURE REFERENCE' (123)
I argue that Linsky's attack on Quine is the result of a misunder¬
standing. The importance of Quine's expression, "not purely re¬
ferential", is emphasized.
Section XI: SOME MORE ABOUT REFERENTIAL OCCURRENCE (139)
I go some way towards tightening up the definition of "referential
occurrence" which was suggested in Section IX. I discuss both the
referential occurrence of a proper name or definite description and
the referential occurrence of a "that"-clause. I stress the im¬
portance of distinguishing among expressions whose occurrence is
purely referential, expressions whose occurrence is referential but
not purely referential, and expressions whose occurrence is not
referential at all.
Section XII: THE LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE CRITERION OF PR0PC8ITI0NAL
IDENTITY (163)
I attempt to defend the logical equivalence criterion against some
attackers. I argue that when we regard a "that"-clause as referring
to a proposition, we must distinguish between the purely referential
occurrence of a "that"-olause and the referential but not purely
referential occurrence of a "that"-clause. I consider, in outline,
two theories of belieff and I attempt to show how such theories may
be made consistent with the logical equivalence criterion.
Section XIII: CONCLUDING REMARK (204)





I shall use double quotes in order to •mention' expressions,
(words, strings of words, sentences, strings of sentences, etc.)»
which serve as examples for the discussion at hand or which express
the doctrines of other philosophers. Sometimes, when I am actually
•using' the words of some philosopher, I shall enclose these words
within double quotes in order to make it clear that the words be¬
long to the philosopher in question. Relatively long passages from
other philosophers will not be put within quotes but will be single-
spaced and set off from the text by triple-spacing. Within such
passages, however, I shall impose my convention of using double
quotes for •mention'.
Relatively important expressions will often be set off from
the text by triple-spacing and prefixed by numbers within parenthe¬
ses. Such expressions will not be put within quotes. For examples
(l) The King of France in 1905 is bald.
I allow myself a good deal of freedom in my use of expressions of
the form* "(n)". "(l)"» for example, might, in some contexts, be
used to refer to the proposition that the King of France in 1905
is bald} and the same expression might, in other contexts, be used
to refer to the sentence: "The King of France in 1905 is bald".
Generally, the context will clarify what I am referring to by means
of such an expression. But sometimes, in cases where nice distinc¬
tions are apt to result in more complication than illumination, my
use of such an expression will be intentionally ambiguous.
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I shall use single quotes as scare quotest in order to
suggest that I feel a certain amount of uneasiness in my use of
an expression.
My conventions for bibliographical references are stated
at the beginning of my bibliography.
I deolare that this thesis has been composed by rae and that
the work is my own.
SECTION Ii STRAWSON, IDENTIFYING REFERENCE, AND
STATEMENTS1
Consider the following well-worn questions:
(1) If someone, today, were to say: "The present King of France is
bald", would that person be saying something false, or would he
rather be saying something which has no truth value?
(2) If someone, today, were to say: "The present King of France is
bald", would that person be stating, in part, that the present King
of France exists? (i.e., would he be stating, in part, what I, in
this Section, shall call an "existential-uniqueness proposition"?)
Rusaellians argue that, of the alternatives presented by
question (l), the former is the correct one. They also argue that
the answer to question (2) is "yes". I shall call these the "Rus-
sellian answers" to these questions.
Strawson, in "On Referring", maintained that the latter alter¬
native presented by (l) is the correct one. He also maintained that
the answer to question (2) is "no". I shall call these the "Straw-
sonian answers" to these questions.
In a mora recant article, ("Identifying Reference and Truth-
Values"), Strawson presents his new views on the matter. He now
maintains, (p.106), that it is not important to come down on one
side or the other in the dispute presented by (l). He says that the
two sides emphasize different kinds of philosophical interests, and
that "each has its own merits".
But he argues that it is important to disentangle (l) from (2).
He says that regardless of the position whioh one takes on question
(l), the Strawsonian position on question (2) "remains a deoisive
objection" to Russell's Theory of Descriptions, (p.107). There is
1. This Section is a slightly altered version of my: "On Strawson's
Revised Position on Identifying Reference".
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at least the following truth in this: one can be a Strawsonian on
question (2) and, not inconsistently, take either side on question
(1).
Strawson further indicates, (p. 108), that if one takes the
Russellian position on (2), one is bound to accept the Russellian
position on (l). This is quite correct. If part of what one
states when he says: "The present King of France is bald", is an
existential-uniqueness proposition, then, if that existential-uni¬
queness proposition is false, he is making a false statement. But
Strawson does not give much consideration to this way of being for¬
ced into agreeing with Russell. He rather maintains that question
(2) is "uncontroversial", and that the Strawsonian answer to it is
"undeniable".
It is my intention to bring question (2) into controversy by
arguing that the Strawsonian answer to it is ill-founded. My aim
is not to prove the Russellian position. It would be extremely dif¬
ficult to prove that given that someone has produced a certain ut¬
terance he has made a certain statement. Such a proof would pre¬
suppose a quite sophisticated semantic theory which included a ri¬
gorous procedure for deciding what illocutionary act someone has
performed on the basis of the utterance he has produced and the
linguistio and extra-linguistic context in which he produced it. I
am not prepared to present such a theory, for my aim is only the
modest one of establishing that Strawson's argument in favour of
his position on (2) is ill-founded.
Strawson's argument is contained in the following quotation:
How one thing that is absolutely clear is that it can be no part of
the speaker's intention in the case of such utterances [as "The King
of France is bald"] to inform the audience of the existence of a
particular item bearing the name or answering to the description and
distinguished by that fact, or by that fact plus something else known
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to the audience, from any other. On the contrary, the very task of
identifying reference, as described, can be undertaken only by a
speaker who knows or presumes his audience to be already in posses¬
sion of such knowledge of existence and uniqueness as this, The
task of identifying reference is defined in terms of a type of spea¬
ker-intention which rules out ascription to the speaker of the in¬
tention to impart the existence-and-uniqueness information in ques¬
tion.... Thus, that there exists a particular item to which the
name or description is applicable and which, if not unique in this
respect, satisfies some uniqueness-condition known to the hearer
(and satisfies some uniqueness-condition known to the speaker) is
no part of what the speaker asserts in an utterance in which the
name or description is used to perform the function of identifying
reference; it is, rather, a pre3upposition of his asserting- what
he asserts. (pp.lOlf.)
Now it should be noticed that Strawson makes use of the word,
"asserts", in the above passage. In so doing, he makes his position
sound slightly more plausible than it ought to sound by making (?.)
into a question not about whether certain propositions are stated
in certain circumstances, but rather about whether these proposi¬
tions are asserted in these circumstances. He does this, by the way,
notwithstanding the fact that by the use of the expression, "falsity
in statement", (p. 97)» at the beginning of his article, he has in¬
troduced the question as a question about statements and not as a
question about assertions. Although I think that, in the long run,
Strawson's position is not made any stronger by the shift from state¬
ments to assertions, I think that it will make things less complica¬
ted if we delete assertion talk and insert statement talk in our
formulation of his position.1
It should also be noticed that Strawson is being at least mis¬
leading in saying, "the task of identifying reference is defined in
terms of a type of speaker-intention which rules out ascription to
the speaker of the intention to impart the existence-and-uniqueness
information in question." Actually, Strawson introduces the notion
1. I shall, however, 3ay something about "asserts" in the next foot¬
note.
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of identifying reference at the beginning of his artiole by defining
it as "the sub-task of designating sorae particular historical item
or items whioh the state of affairs [which is being reported] invol¬
ves," (p. 96). And it is an open question whether identifying refe¬
rence, so defined, rules out such a speaker-intention. Neither the
question of the speaker's intentions nor the question of what it is
that the speaker is stating is answered by the definition.
I think that the following are the main points in Strawson's
argument1
(3) A speaker can use an expression like "The present King of Prance"
to make identifying reference to an individual only if he knows or
presumes that his audience already knows that the individual to whioh
identifying reference is made exists, i.e., that a certain existen¬
tial-uniqueness proposition, p, is true.
(4) If a speaker knows or presumes that his audience already knows
that a certain proposition is true, it cannot be his intention to in¬
form his audience of the truth of that proposition.
Therefore, (5) if a speaker uses an expression like "The present King
of France" to make identifying reference to an individual, p can oe
no part of what the speaker states.
Now in the first place, as I shall show later by example, (3)
is false. We can use expressions of the form, "the so-and-so", to
make identifying references to individuals even when we know that our
audience does not know that the relevant existential-uniqueness pro¬
position is true. But let us, for the moment, assume the truth of
(3) in order to get Strawson's argument off the ground.
(4) exhibits a conceptual truth, and we shall let it stsnd.
Ruasellians believe that (5) is false. Although I shall not attempt
to prove that it is false, I shall point out the flaw in the infe¬
rence from (3) and (4) to (5)» showing that there is one less reason
for believing that (5) is true.
In the inference from (3) and (4) to (5), there is the suppressed
premiss:
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(£) If it is not the intention of a speaker to inform his audience
that p, by the use of an expression, e, then he cannot, by the use
of e, be stating that p.
(6) expresses a false assumption, often made by philosophers,
that the statement which a speaker makes by the use of an expression
is always a function of the information which the speaker intends to
convey to his audience. But although the concept of what we state
often coincides in extension with the concept of what information we
intend to convey, the two concepts are different and must not be con¬
fused. Giving information is only one of several reasons for which
one makes a statement. Others aret reminding, repeating for em¬
phasis, stating for the record, telling someone something he already
knows in order to bore or annoy him, (cf. my "Telling and Giving"),
etc. Frequently, we intentionally make a false statement in order
to convey true information. Speaking of someone under the influence
of LSD, I might state the false proposition that he sees God in order
to convey the true information that he is having a hallucinatory vi¬
sion of God. And in sarcasm, sometimes, what we state is a contrary
or the contradictory of the information we intend to convey.
Another purpose for which we sometimes make statements, and
whioh is relevant here, is to let the audience know what entity some
other statement is about, i.e., to perform the task of identifying
reference for that other statement. Suppose that you and I both know
that Britain has just one monarch. I might nonetheless have occasion
to say to you, "There is one and only one monarch of Britain. She is
a Windsor." In such a case, I use two sentences to make two state¬
ments. What I state by means of the second sentence happens to be
identical with the information I intend to convey to you. In the
case of the first sentence, however, I state something which I know
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you already know, and so, do not intend to oonvey that information
to you. My purpose, instead, is to let you know what entity the se¬
cond statement is about.
If we transform the two sentences into one, i.e., "There is one
and only one raonaroh of Britain, and she is a Windsor", the example
can be used to make a related anti-Strawsonian point, namely, that
we can use the same sentence-component to make identifying reference
to an entity and, at the same time, to state that that entity exists.
Here again, we tell someone something he already knows in order to
perform the task of identifying reference.
It is a plausible suggestion that the same thing often happens
when we say, "The so-and-so is such-and-such", to someone who we know
already knows that there exists just one so-and-so. It is not un¬
reasonable to think that in such cases we use one sentence to make
two statements* first, by our use of "The ao-and-so", telling some¬
one something he already knows for the purpose of identifying refe¬
rence, and then, by means of the rest of the sentence, making a se¬
cond statement for the purpose of conveying information. I am not
going to argue here for the truth of this suggestion, but it should
now be perfectly clear that the suggestion is not vitiated by cases
in which the speaker knows that the audienoe already knows that there
exists just one so-and-so. Therefore, even if (3) is true, we have
no good reason to believe that if someone says, "The present king of
France is bald", he is not stating an existential-uniqueness propo¬
sition.
Let us now attack (3). As a matter of fact, we frequently use
sentences of the form, "The so-and-so is such-and-such", in order
not only to report some state of affairs but also to Inform our audi¬
ence of the existence of some entity which that state of affairs in-
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volves, Suppose, for example, that you do not know that there are
any Thaleans in existence nowadays, I happen to know that there are
several, and that the foremost of them plays oheas. I might say to
youi
(7) The foremost living Thalean is a chess player,
reporting a state of affairs to you, and, at the same time, inten¬
tionally informing you of the existence of some item which that
state of affairs essentially involves, and giving you this existen¬
tial information in order to make identifying reference to that
item. It follows from (4), which we are accepting, that it can be
one's intention to inform someone that p only if he believes that
that person does not already know that p. So (3) is false.1
Someone concerned to defend Russell on (2) might be tempted to
make use of what has just been said to argue that since in some
cases a sentence of the forrai "The so-and-so is suoh-and-such", is
used with the intent of informing one's audience of the truth of an
existential-uniqueness proposition, in some oases, at least, such a
sentence is used to state such a proposition. But since, as we have
seen, the statement one makes does not always coincide with the in¬
formation one intends to convey, this line of defense is not yet
open. I am not denying that there is some important relationship
1. Since someone might want to use "asserts" to mean something diffe¬
rent from what I mean by "states", we ought to point outi that,
if "what one asserts" is taken to mean "what information one in¬
tends to oonvey", then one can use sentence (7) to assert that the
foremost living Thalean exists} and that, if "what one asserts" is
taken to mean "what thought one is expressing", then, since, on an
intuitive understanding of "the thought one is expressing", one
can use sentence (7) to express the thought that the foremost living
Thalean exists^ it is reasonable to say that one can use sentence
(7) to assert that the foremost living Thalean exists.
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which connects a speaker'3 intention to inform,the sentence he uses,
and the statement he makes. But so far as I know, this relationship
has not yet been given an adequate explanation. A successful theory
of how statements are made will give less importance to speakers' in¬
tentions to inform than philosophers have sometimes thought. We know
this because, as I have pointed out, we sometimes intentionally con¬
vey something other than what we actually state, because we sometimes,
when we give hints or clues, intentionally convey more than we actu¬
ally state, and because we sometimes, as a result of slips of the
tongue and lack of facility with the language, unintentionally fail
to state what we intend to convey. Speakers' intentions, on the
other hand, are not entirely unimportant. '."/hen someone uses an ambi¬
guous sentence or a sentence containing an indexical expression and
we want to know what proposition he is stating, and when the oontext
fails to decide the issue, the speaker's intentions are the court of
last resort. A theory which adequately accounts for these facts,
plus many others, must be developed before we can reasonably take
sides on question (2).
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SECTION Hi NEGATION AND TRUTH VALUE
At the beginning of Section I, I asked the reader to consider
two well-worn questions. Both of these had to do with the statement
one would be making were he to utter a certain sentence. The first
of these questions had to do with the truth value of the statement
in question. The second was a question about what statement the
statement in question would be. I spent some time arguing that the
second question is not so easy a question to answer as it appears at
first sight to be. Although it might appear that the second question
can be answered simply by specifying the information which we would
expect a user of the sentence in question to intend to convey, this
is not, in fact, the right way to go about answering the question.
I shall be coming baok to this second question again from time
to time. But I should now like to say something about the first
question, vizi
(l) If someone, today, were to sayi "The present King of France is
bald", would that person be saying something false, or would he
rather be saying something which has no truth value?
The interesting thing about this question is that it is very
difficult to see why philosophers should have ever found it interes¬
ting at all. In "Identifying Reference and Truth-Values", Strawson
goe3 to great pains to argue that the side which one takes on questi¬
on (l) will be a result of one's philosophical interests. But one
wonders why Strawson should have gone to the trouble. Is not questi¬
on (l) — as is suggested by Russell, (cf., My Philosophical Develop¬
ment. p. 243), — a purely verbal question? And is not the side
which one takes on question (l) simply a reflection of one's choice
of words, and no more than that? For suppose that someone 3aysi
(2) The present King of France is bald.
There are three possible states of affairs which would be relevant
to the evaluation of (2)1
(3) France has just one King, and he is bald,
(4) France has just one King, and he is not bald,
(5) France has no King, or France has more than one King.
Now if a Russellian and a Strawsonian should be asked to evaluate
the statement, (2), and if they should both happen to believe that
(3) is the case, they will agree that (2) is true. Again, if they
should both happen to believe that (4) is the case, they will agree
that (2) is false. But if they should both happen to believe that
(5) is the case, the Russellian will say that (2) is false while the
Strawsonian will say that (2) lacks a truth value. Now it looks,
prima facie, as if there were one important difference between the
flussellian and Strawsonian replies. The Russellian uses the same
expression, i.e., "false", to indicate his belief that (4) is the
case as he uses to indicate his belief that (5) is the case. The
Strawsonian, on the other hand, has two expressions1 one, i.e.,
"false", for indicating his belief that (4) is the case, and another,
i.e., "neither-true-nor-false", for indicating his belief that (5) is
the case. So it appears that the Strawsonian's terminology is superi
or to the Russellian's in that when the Strawsonian evaluates a state
ment like (2) his terminology lets us know whether he believes that
something like (4) is the case or whether he believes that something
like (5) is the case. But this is no important advantage over the
Russellian.1 The Russellian, if pressed, can simply state his rea¬
son for saying that the statement is false and, in 30 doing, let us
know whether he believes that something like (4) or that something
like (5) is the case. But if — to stick to our example — the
Russellian and the Strawsonian both believe that (5) i3 the case,
and if the Russellian says: "(2) is false because (5) is the case",
and if the Strawsonian says: "(2) lacks a truth-value because (5)
is the case", we shall be hard pressed to find any difference of
cash value between what the Russellian says and what the Strawsonian
says. They both might as well have just said that (5) is the case
and have been done with it.
In general, if someone has made a statement of the form: "The
so-and-so is such-and-such", and if two men who are asked to evalu¬
ate this statement both say that nothing is so-and-so, then we al¬
ready have their opinions on the matter. If one man goes on to say:
"The statement is false", and if the other man goes on to say: "The
statement is neither-true-nor-false", neither of these men is really
telling us any more than what he told us in the first place. Once
one has indicated, in response to a request to evaluate a statement
of the form in question, that he believes that nothing is so-and-so,
all he adds by saying that the statement is false or — as his wont
may be — lacking in truth value,is the information that he happens
1. In faot, it may be a definite advantage to have just the one word,
"false", for the two kinds of cases. If the Strawsonian and the
Russellian are asked to evaluate the statement: "The present King
of France has just bought a car with a rotary engine", and if nei¬
ther the Strawsonian nor the Russellian knows how France is now
governed, and if both the Strawsonian and the Russellian know that
such cars have not yet been made available even for royal purchase,
then the Russellian will be able to reply: "That's false", whereas
the Strawsonian will not be able to decide whether to reply that
the statement is false or that it lacks a truth value. In fact, he
will not even know whether or not 'the question arises'.
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to like Russell, or that he happens to like Strawson.
It would seem, now, that question (l) is a pretty silly ques¬
tion and that any further discussion of it can result in nothing but
boredom. This may be the case. But I am going to say more about
the question anyway. H.B. Hingert, who was my teacher at the Uni¬
versity of Toronto, once remarked that although he did not know whe¬
ther the medievals really disputed about the number of angels that
could sit on the point of a pin, he suspected that if they had dis¬
cussed that question, they might have made some interesting disco¬
veries about space. I am going to say more about question (l) in
the hope that my discussion will yield some interesting points in
philosophioal logic.
Let us have a look at what Quine has to say about this matter.
He is a defender of the Strawsonian view on questions like (l). And
he takes the distinction between the false and the neither-true-nor-
false quite seriously. He saysi
Sentences like "Mama sings" and "I saw the lion", which contain de¬
finite singular terms, may indeed be said to depend for their truth
on the existence of objects named by those terms, but the difference
is that they do not clearly become false (and their negations true)
failing such objects. Failing objects of reference for their defi¬
nite singular terras, such sentences are likely to be looked upon a3
neither true nor false but simply as uncalled for. (Word and Ob¬
ject, pp. 112f.)
And, a bit later on, he develops his position by saying}
Let it not be supposed that these various perplexities and compli¬
cations issue merely from a pedantic distinction between what is
false and what is neither true nor false. Nothing would be gained
by pooling these two categories under the head of the false; for
they are distinguished, under whatever names, in that the one cate¬
gory contains the negations of all its members while the other con¬
tains the negations of none of its members. (Word and Objeot, p.177)
I think Quine's view may be summed up as follows. Compare (2) with:
(6) The present President of the United States is bald.
Neither (2) nor (6) is true. It ?/ould seem that if something* is
not true, then it must be false. But if something is false, then
its negation must be true. Since (6) is false, its negation, i.e.:
(7) The present President of the United States is not bald,
is true. But the negation of (2), i.e.:
(8) The present King of Prance is not bald,
is not true. Neither (2) nor its negation is true. Therefore, (2)
cannot be reckoned as false. But (2) is not true either. There¬
fore, (2) is neither-true-nor-false. (6), however, i3 clearly
false. So the distinction between the false and the neither-true-
nor-false, i.e., the distinction between things like (6) and things
like (2), is more than pedantic.
One might take either of two lines of argument against Quine.
Taking the first line, one might argue that it is not clear that
(8) is not true. Quine apparently thinks that (8) is true just in
case (4) is the case, i.e., just in case France has just one King
and he is not bald. But, as Russell suggests, (cf. "On Denoting",
p* 53), (8) may be understood in such a way that we should regard
it as true in case it is false that there is an entity which is now
King of Franoe and is bald. This, one mi^it argue, is how one
ought to interpret (8); and one might conclude that Quine is just
wrong when he suggests that the negation of (2), i.e., (8), is not
true.
Taking the second line of argument, one might concede that (8)
is not true ~ i.e., deny that it may be understood in the way in
1. I use "something" here in order to avoid getting enmeshed in com¬
plications over the fact that whereas for Strawson it is a state¬
ment which bears (or lacks) a truth value, for Quine such bearers
and lackers are sentences. We shall have plenty of time for such
complications in the following Section.
which I have indicated — but argue that (8) is not the negation of
(2). That is, one might argue that (2) has more than one negations
(8), which, given the present political situation in France, is not
true, and s
(9) It is not the case that the present King of France is bald,
which is true just in case either there is no French King at present
or there is more than one French King at present, or there is at
present just one French King but he has a fine head of hair. One
who takes this line of argument will refuse to admit the principle
that if something is false, then its negation is true. He will say,
instead, that if something is false, then its contradictory is true.
And he will say that both (8) and (9) are negations of (2), but that
of the two, only (9) is the contradictory of (2). (8), he will say,
is merely a oontraxy of (2).
Taking either line of argument, we may avoid Quins's suggestion
that the distinction between the false and the neither-true-nor-
false is more than pedantic.
We have now hit upon a reason why question (l) might be consi¬
dered interesting. In discussing it, we are led to discuss negation.
And negation is interesting. Or, at any rate, it is less boring
than question (l) would be did it not lead us on to other questions.
So let us say something about negation.
There is not much point in trying to defend the first of the
two lines which I said one might want to take against Quine. This
line of argument depends upon our being able to interpret state¬
ments expressed in the fornn "The so-and-so is not such-and-such",
as true in oase it is false that there is an entity which is so-and-
so and such-and-such. But a great many people insist that such
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statements are true .just in case there exists just one entity which
is so-and-ao and that entity is not such-and-such. Sinoe it is
pointless to quarrel over linguistic intuitions, we might as well
just accept that such statements are true just in case there exists
just one entity which is so-and-ao and that entity is not
ouoh-and-suoh.
3ut the second line of argument seems unassailable. We grant
Quins his interpretation of (0), But we still have (9) as a nega¬
tion of (2). That (9) is a negation of (2) is something which no
one would deny. We say that (9) is the contradictory of (2). And
this again is something which no one would deny. Having granted
Quine his interpretation of (8), we conclude that statements like
(2) have at least two different kinds of negation.
That statements like (2) have more than one negation is a
point which has been recognized by Russell, ("On Denoting", loc.
cit.), and by Anscombe, (An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tracta-
tus, pp. 35f.» 62f.). Anscombe would call (8) an internal and (9)
the external negation of (2). But the distinction between what
Anscombe calls external and internal negation has, to my knowledge,
been more often denied or neglected than recognized. To cite one
example, Katz sayst
The negation of a sentence can be formed in a number of ways. We
can put the word not after the verb be, as in "The table is not an
antique." We oan put expressions suoh as "It is not the case that"
in front of full sentences, as in the sentence, "It is not the oase
that the table is an antique." We can prefix the sentence by that
and add is false to the end, as ir« "That it is so is false." We
shall consider only the type of negativization in which the negation
of a sentence is formed by adding not. Negations formed in other
ways, by virtue of being actual sentence negations, are synonymous
with the negations of the same sentences that are formed by adding
not. ("Analyticity and Contradiction in Hatural Language", pp. 534f«)
Such a view permits Katz to ignore external negation when treating
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the semantics of negation. To cite another neglecter of the distinc¬
tion, John Woods, (cf. "Fictionality and the Logic of Relations"),
reasons that ifi "Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street", is false,
then some 'natural alternative', like: "He only stayed there occasi¬
onal weekends", must be true. Woods, incidentally, shirks from a
Strawsonian position on the truth value of: "Sherlock Holmes lived
in Baker Street". He insists that this statement is true. This
leads him into complications too labyrinthian to discuss here.
It might be of interest, now, to say something about this dis¬
tinction which is so often neglected or denied. What I want to do
is to point out what I think might, for some people, be a 3trong
motivation for denying or neglecting this distinction. Consider
such locutions as: "It is true that the President of the United
States is bald", "It is the case that the President of the United
States is bald", and "It is a fact that the President of the Uni¬
ted States is bald". These locutions are meat for the metaphysici¬
an. For it is oertainly likely that an untrained observer would
think that the user of the first locution is saying that a philoso¬
phically interesting property, called "truth", belongs to some lin¬
guistic or cognitive entity whose name is: "that the President of
the United States is bald". And it is equally likely that such ob¬
servers would think that the users of the second and third locuti¬
ons are saying something or other about such philosophically inter¬
esting entities as a case and a fact. But it is good counsel to
avoid doing metaphysics whenever one can. And Ramsey has provided
us with a way to stop the metaphysician from making meat of our ex¬
amples. "There is no separate problem of truth", he says, "but me¬
rely a linguistic muddle", ("Pacts and Propositions", p. 142). The
users of our locutions appear to be 3aying things of philosophical
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interest; but really they are not. "It is true that the President
of the United States is bald", "It is the case that the President of
the United States is bald", and "It is a fact that the President of
the United States is bald", are merely stylistic variants of: "The
President of the United States is bald". We thought we wore talking
about such lofty items as truth, a case, and a fact. But we were
only talking about the American President and the state of his scalp.
We have just been expounding the doctrine that truth, cases, and
facts, (or better: "is true", "is the case", and "is a fact"), are
eliminable. This doctrine may be stated, in a loose way, as follows:
Give me a sentence which contains the expression, "is true", the ex¬
pression, "is the case", or the expression, "is a fact": I shall
give you, in return, a sentence which has the same meaning but which
contains none of these expressions.^"
But, if "is true", "is the case", and "is a fact" are eliminable,
then "is false", "is not the case", and "is not a fact" ought to be
eliminable too. And it appears to be among Ramsey's claims that
these latter expressions are eliminable. " "It is false that Caesar
was murdered" ", Ramsey says, "means no more than that Caesar was
not murdered". We may expect that a similar account should hold for
"is not the case" and "is not a fact".
But let us take the technique which Ramsey applied to the sen¬
tence about Caesar and apply it to (9)» i.e., to: "It is not the
case that the present King of Prance is bald". What we get, of course,
is (8), i.e., "The present King of Prance is not bald", of which we
must claim (9) to be a mere stylistic variant. It now appears that
1. And which contains no others — like "is the way things are" or
"characterizes reality" — of equal philosophical interest.
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if we accept the Ramsey eliminability thesis, then we must reject
the distinction between (3) and (9): we must reject the distinction
between internal and external negation. If we want to keep the dis¬
tinction, it seems that we must deny that the elirninability thesis
applies to negative sentences of (9)'e sort. But if we deny this,
we must, it seems, admit that people sometimes talk about falsity
and about failures to be the case and failures to be a fact. We
appear forced to either keep our distinction and do meta .physics or
avoid metaphysics and give up our distinction.
But perhaps there is a way out, No Raaiseyan was ever so simple-
minded as to claim that there is only one way to eliminate a philoso¬
phically puzzling expression. (8) is not the translation we want for
(9), But let us follow Ansconbe, (c.f. An Introduction to Wittgen¬
stein's Tractatua, p. 35)♦ and tryi
(10) Not* The present King of France is bald.
I find (10) pleasing to perfection; and I should be happy to stop
right here. The eliminabillty thesis is right. Hie "is not the
case" of (9) ia elimlnable. (8) is the wrong way to get rid of it.
(10) is the right way. We have our distinction between external and
internal negation. And w© have avoided metaphysics. But there are
people who would not aocept this result. We must not ignore the or¬
dinary language philosophers; and we can imagine their horrified
exclamation* "I do not understand (lo)i It is just not English!
(9) is a piece of fairly ordinary English. (10) is a philosopher's
construction. Eurely no piece of fairly ordinary English is a mere
stylistic variant of a philosopher's construction!" The answer to
this is that one cannot please all of the people all of the time.
But let us be conciliatory and see where it gets us. There is no
19
reason why the eliminationist's translation of (9) should he just a
matter of pulling out "It is not the case that" and sticking "not"
into the appropriate place. Let us use our intelligence and try*
(ll) There is nothing which is both the present King of France and
bald.
Surely the defenders of ordinary English can have no objection here,
(ll) is not, perhaps, the sort of thing which one might hear in the
queue at the greengrocer's. But,however Pickwickian it may look,
(11) does not deviate from English grammar. Perhaps (lO)is syntac¬
tically strange, (ll) is stilted at worst. So our troubles appear
to be over. We have saved the eliminability thesis, avoided meta¬
physics, and preserved the distinction between internal and exter¬
nal negation. But now we come to an interesting point. (9)» we
said, is the contradictory of (2). (9)» we are now saying, means
the same as (ll), i.e., (9) and (ll) are one and the same statement.
But (ll), clearly, is the contradictory of*
(12) There is something which is both the present King of France
and bald.
Now we said that (9) and (ll) are one and the same statement. Let
us call this statement "S". Now surely if p is the contradictory of
r and if q is the contradictory of r, then p must be the same state¬
ment as q. But (12) is the contradictory of 3 and (2) is the contra¬
dictory of S. Therefore, (12) and (2) are one and the same state¬
ment. But let us now recall question (2) of Section I, renumbered
here as*
(13) If someone, today, were to say* "The present King of France is
bald", would that person be stating, in part, that the present King
of France exists?
Now one undeniable thing is that if someone, today, were to say*
"The present King of France is bald", then that person would be sta-
i
ting that the present King of France is bald, i.e., he would be sta¬
ting (2). But since (2) is the same statement as (12), such a per¬
son would be stating (12). Anyone who states (12), however, states,
in parts
(14) There is something which is the present King of France,
which is surely a stylistic variant of»
(15) The present King of France exists.
So we have an answer to question (13). Yes, we may conclude, the
Kussellian of Section I is right.
One need not take this conclusion seriously if one does not
feel like it. It is clear that one is not forced to take all of
the steps which lead to it. But it might, for all that, be counted
as an interesting dividend of our musings.
We are discussing ways in which question (l) might be conside¬
red interesting. Let us return to Quine, to say something about the
relevance which the Strawsonian answer to question (l) has to his
philosophy. It bears upon his theory of analysis.
In From a Logical Point of View (see pp. 5ff»)» Quine condones
Russell's Theory of Descriptions. Again, Russell's theory is, on
the whole, endorsed in Word and Object. (See Sections 37-39) Singu¬
lar descriptions of the formi "the F", are interpreted ast "the ob¬
ject x such that...x...", and this latter is written as "(1.x) (...x
...)". (Word and Object, p. I64). " (7 x) (...x...) ", in turn,
is regarded as an abbreviation of "(3 y) (y » (?x) (...x...) and
——y—)", with —( ) " representing the rest of the sentence in
which "The F" originally appeared, (p. 189)» and with "«(7x) (...x...)
equated with "...y... and y only", (p. I84). And (2), in consequence
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will get analyzed as:
(!6) (ay) (y = (?x) (x ia present King of France) and y is bald).
This might be a cause for puzzlement. We observed that Quine
takes the Strawsonian position on question (l). A present day user
of sentence (2) would, according to Quine, be saying something
neither-true-nor-false. But now we see that Quine analyzes (2) as
(16). To state (16) is to state, in part, that the present King of
France exists.* And this, apparently, is to take the Russellian
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position on question (13). As we pointed out in Section I, the
Russellian position on question (13) commits one to the Russellian
position on question (l). If (l6) is the analysis of (2), then,
since (16) is clearly false, (2) must be false and not just innocent
of truth value.
In a book by a non-Quinean, such a combination of doctrines
would amount to inconsistency. But in Quine the inconsistency is
only apparent. And its appearance lends a good deal of force to one
of Quine's major claims. Although (16) is Quine's analysis of (2),
Quine has his own view of analysis!
We do not claim to make dear and explicit what the users of the tin-
clear expression had unconsciously in mind all along. We do not ex¬
pose hidden meanings, as the words "analysis" and "explication"
would suggest; we supply lacks. (Word and Object, p. 258)
Although (16) is Quins'8 analysis of (2), (16) is not, for Quine, an
exposition of the 'hidden meaning' behind (2). Instead, it is a
1* "(3y) (y = (?x) (...x...)", "(By) (...y...and y only)", "(3y) (x)
(...x...lf and only if x » y)", and "(?x) (...x...) exists" may
all be equated, (cf. Word and Object, pp. 183f.» 186ff.). A more
usual way of analyzing (2) might bei "(Bx) ((y) ((y is King of
France if and only if y - x)) and x is bald)", or again! "(3x)
((x is King of France) and ((y) (y is King of France only if y » x))
and x is bald)." But I use the form of (16) for the sake of brevity.
2. I.e., on question (2) of Section I.
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substitute, "clear and couched in terms to our liking", which fills
just those functions of (2) which "make it worth troubling about".
Those functions of (2) which are not worth troubling about are what
Quine calls the "don't cares". And among the "don't cares" is (2)'s
annoying truth-value gap, (cf. Word and Cb.lect, pp. 258f.). Closely
associated with this view of analysis is Quire's view of synonymy.
To say that (l6) is an exposition of the 'hidden meaning' of (2) is
just about to say that sentences (2) and (16) are synonymous, (or
30 it seems to appear to Quins). But according to Quine, "Synonymy,
for sentences generally, is not a notion that we can readily make
adequate sense of, " (Word and Qb.iect , p. 159)* Since there is
no uncovering of 'hidden meanings', Quine can claim (16) as his ana¬
lysis of (2) without thereby having to claim that (16) and (2) re¬
semble one another in all the respects in which one might be interes¬
ted. Quine 'doesn't care' about (2)'3 failure to have a truth
value; so he need not build such a feature into the analysis of (2).
Still more, since Quine does not care to expose the 'hidden meanings'
of the locutions of ordinary language, but is concerned instead with
the construction of a "canonical idiom" for "the statement of one's
scientific theory", (cf. Word and Qb.ieot. p. 228), in whioh he will
limn "the true and ultimate structure of reality", (of. Word and
Object, p. 221), he is pleased to produce an analysans which improves
upon, rather than an analysans which faithfully reflects his analy-
sandum.
Thus Quine does not really take the Russellian position on
question (13). He has no opinion on what statement a user of the
sentence in question would be making. (This is a good place to note
that it is not clear that what I call the "Russellian" position on
(13) i3 really Russell's position. Russell saysi "I was concerned
23
to find a more accurate and analyzed thought to replace the some¬
what confused thoughts which most people at most time3 have in their
heads," (My Philosophical Development, p. 243).)
The persuasive force which Quine gets from his claim that (2)
and such like are lacking in truth value should now he evident.
Quine has no opinion on what a user of the sentence in question
would be stating. And it might seem that he need not bother to
have any opinion as to whether or not the user of such a sentence
would be saying something with a truth value. He does not, in fact,
ever give us any good reasons for thinking that anything in parti¬
cular is lacking in truth value. His claim that there are truth
value gaps is just stated, never argued for.* But the rhetorical
value of being able to say repeatedly that (2) and such like are
lacking in truth value is enormous. As the logical analysis of (2),
(16) is here to stay. The theory which recommends such an analysis
is a paradigm of philosophy. What better way could there be to
show that analysis does not uncover meanings than to be able to
point out that the best logical analysans which it is likely that
we shall ever get for (2) differs from its analysandum in such a
fundamental respect?
Conversely, those of us who make bold to think that (16) does
uncover something not very much unlike a 'hidden meaning' of (2)
1. His statements "Failing objects of reference for their definite
singular terms, such sentences are likely to be looked upon as
neither true nor false but simply as uncalled for", is not an
argument. Quine would not, I am sure, claim that "A is B" follows
from "We are likely to look upon A as being B". Quins does, as
we have noted, argue for a distinction between the categories of
the false and the neither-true-nor-false. But it does not follow
from a distinction between categories that any objects fall in
either category.
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will profit by saying that (2) is false. In so doing, we shall
nullify one of Quine's most frequently cited differences between
analysans and analysandum. And, since there are no conclusive ar¬
guments either for or against the theory of truth value gaps, we
may feel free to opt against it.
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SECTION Ills ANALYSIS
I want to say more, now, about this question of analysis. In
recent pages, I have allowed myself to be fairly lax about the nice
distinction between a sentence and its intensional counterpart. Un¬
remitting precision about which of these entities one is talking
about results, more often than not, in fruitless complication. But
these distinctions are important for what I now want to say. And I
shall now try to be more precise. We pointed out earlier that where¬
as Strawson believes that statements bear and lack truth values,
Quine believes that it is sentences which do this bearing and lacking.
And when Quine does a piece of analysis, his materials are sentences.
Quine would analyze the sentences
(1) The present King of France is bald,
by 'substituting', for it, the sentences
(2) (3y) ( y - (ix) (x is present King of France) and y is bald.
This does not mean that he creeps around the Harvard University Lib¬
rary with a pair of scissors and a jar of paste, cutting out the sen¬
tences he does not like and substituting their canonical counterparts.^
Quine's 'substitution' is rather a matter of constructing a new sen¬
tence and recommending it as one which will fill the worthwhile func¬
tions of the original sentence while, at the same time, being more
"clear" and "couched" more "in terms to our liking", (cf. Word and Ob-
.iect, p. 259)• But Quine would not claim that sentence (l) and sen¬
tence (2) are so related that the latter uncovers any 'hidden meaning'
1. Nor does Qpine analyze sentences in the way in which Moore suggests
that an analysis of a verbal expression might go. (of. "A Reply to
my Critics", p. 66l)
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of the former. And one of Quine's reasons for not making such a
claim would be that to say something likes "Sentence (2) has the
same meaning as sentence (l), but sentence (2) shows its meaning
more clearly", is, apparently, to commit oneself to the undesi¬
rable claim that sentences (l) and (2) are synonymous. But, accor¬
ding to Quine, "there is no synonymy," (Word and Object, p. 242).
It does seem pretty clear that, on at least one reasonable way
of understanding "synonymy", even if there is such a relation, no
two sentenoes bear it to one another. Let us say that two expres¬
sions are synonymous if, and only if, they are interchangeable every¬
where, salva veritate. Let us then choose at random any semanticist
who has a theory of synonymy, (e.g., Carnap and his "intensional
isomorphism", (cf. Meaning and Necessity, Chapters 14 and 15), and
suppose that it follows from this semanticist'3 theory that senten¬
ces; "8" arid "T", are synonymous. But if there should happen to be
a person, say, Mr M, of whom it is true to say;
(3) Mr M does not doubt that whoever believes that S believes that 3,
but of whom it is false to sayi
(4) Mr M does not doubt that whoever believes that S believes that T,
our semantioist's theory will be false.1 Our semanticist might try
either of two ways out. If he is dogmatic, he will say that since
his theory of synonymy is the right one, nobody really doubts that
1. This argument is essentially Mates's, (cf. "Synonymity", p. 215),
but with a slight change. Mates's own argument depends upon the
claim that nobody doubts that whoever believes that S believes
that 3. But since someone might be perverse enough to argue that
someone might be perverse enough to doubt that whoever believes
that S believes that 3, I substitute "Mr M does not doubt" for
"Nobody doubts".
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whoever believes that S believes that T. Mr M may say that he has
this doubt, but he does not really have it.* But this way out is
indefensible. "Mr M" happens to be the name I use for Professor
Mates. But surely, given Professor Mates's philosophical views, (see
footnote l), there are no two sentences "S" and "T", for which it is
impossible that (3) be true and (4) false.
If the semanticist should counter by saying that even Mates
does not really doubt what he might say he doubts, we can point out
that whilet
(5) Mr M. has argued that, while nobody doubts that whoever believes
that S believes that S, someone might doubt that whoever believes
that S believes that T,
is true, the following:
(6) Mr M. has argued that while nobody doubts that whoever believes
that S believes that T, someone might doubt that whoever believes
that S believes that 3,
is false. (This last argument is an adaptation of one of Linsky's.
cf. Referring, p. 72)
The semanticist's other way out would be for him to argue that
substitutivity everywhere is too strong a criterion for synonymy.
(3)i (4)» (5)» and (6) exemplify multiple iterations of oratio obli-
qua. Perhaps we should weaken the criterion to substitutivity in
single oratio obliqua but not in iiterated oratio obliqua. Or per¬
haps we should weaken it still further and just demand substitutivity
in extensional and modal contexts, not bothering about oratio obli¬
qua. But the trouble now is that the concept we are trying to ex¬
plain is slipping through our fingers. We might have thought that we
1. Of two sentences, "D" and "D"', which are ruled synonymous by Car-
nap's theory, Carnap says: "If somebody responds affirmatively to
"D", but negatively to "i)'", we shall merely conclude that one of
his responses is non-indicative, perhaps due to his momentary con¬
fusion," (Meaning and Necessity, p. 231).
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all had a concept of synonymy and that the only difficulty lay in
explicating this concept. To use Mates's terminology, (cf. "Syno¬
nymity", p.215), substitutivity everywhere was the criterion for
synonymy, while Carnap's intensional isomorphism was one of several
competing explicata for synonymy. But if we throw out our oriterion,
we shall have no ooncept left to explicate.
This point aside, one who claims that analysis uncovers 'hid¬
den meanings' need not even make the claim that the analysans sen¬
tence and the analysandum sentence are interchangeable in all ex¬
tensions! contexts. As it happens, (l) and (2) do appear to be in¬
terchangeable in all extensional contexts, but consider*
(7) fey) (y - 0 x) (x is King of France at Midnight, 2 July, 19&9)
and y is bald),
which might very well be offered as an analysans for (l). Clearly
these two sentences are not interchangeable salva veritate in all
extensional contexts. Sentence (7)» (or the statement one would
be making by means of it), is false regardless of the time of utte¬
rance. Sentence (l), (or the statement one would be making by
means of it), is true at some times, false at others. So the two
sentences are not interchangeable, salva veritate, in all extensi¬
onal contexts. If we take substitutivity, salva veritate, in all
extensional contexts as a minimal necessary oondition for synonymy,
we need not argue with Quine's repeated assertion that analysis
carries no synonymy claim. But this need not interfere with the
view that analysis uncovers 'hidden meanings'. When we do a piece
of analysis, we must always imagine our analysandum sentence as
having been used in a particular context* at a particular time,
in a particular place, and by a particular person. A believer in
•hidden meanings' need not hold — as Quine seems to think that he
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must hold — that the two sentences have the same meaning in all
contexts. He need only hold that the analysans sentence, in the
context in which he is using it, has the meaning which the analysan-
dum sentence has in the context in which he imagines it to be used.
Let us say that the meaning which a sentence has on a parti¬
cular occasion of its use, the statement which one makes in using
that sentence on a particular occasion, and the proposition which
one uses that sentence to state on that particular occasion are one
and the same thing.* One who claims that sentence (7) uncovers the
•hidden meaning* of sentence (l) will not claim that sentence (7)
uncovers the meaning which sentence (l) will have on all occasions
of its use; he will not claim that it expresses the proposition
which sentence (l), always and everywhere, would be used to state;
he does not claim that it expresses the statement which sentence
(l), always and everywhere, would be used to make, what he claims
is that sentence (7) uncovers the meaning which he imagines sentence
(l) to have on a particular occasion of its use; that it expresses
the proposition which he imagines sentence (7) as being used to
state on a particular occasion; that it expresses the statement
which he imagines sentence (l) as being used to make on a particular
occasion.
My claim, that we may identify the meaning which a sentence
has on a particular occasion of its use with the statement which one
makes in using that sentence on that occasion and with the proposi¬
tion which one uses that sentence to state on that occasion, appears
to conflict with Strawson's claimi
1. I restrict myself to sentences in the indicative.
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The sentence may have a single meaning which is precisely what...
allows it to be used to make different statements. So it will not
do to identify the statement...with the meaning of the sentence.
(Introduction to Logical Theory, p. 4$ cf. Quine, Word and Object,
p. 201, for a similar remark.)
But, in the first place, I do not identify a statement with the mea¬
ning of a sentence, I identify a statement with a meaning of a sen¬
tence,1 In the second place, Strawson and I just happen to choose
to associate the word, "meaning", with different things. There is,
of course, some feature of the sentence, (2), which allows it to be
used to make the many different statements which it may be U3ed to
make on different occasions. Strawson chooses to apply the expres¬
sion, "meaning", to this feature of the sentence. I, on the other
hand, prefer to associate "meaning" with particular utterances.
Some philosophers, such as Fodor, (cf. Section V, below), give one
the impression that they tend to think that one can understand a
sentence perfectly well without knowing anything about the circum¬
stances in which the sentence is actually being used. But I should
prefer to associate "understanding", and nence "meaning", with what
happens on a particular occasion of utterance. It is a consequence
of my view that a sentence such as (2), or, to give a more obvious
is
examplei "This^red", is capable of having any of an extremely large
number of meanings. But I see nothing paradoxical about this. We
need not know about all of these meanings in order to understand the
sentence. We need only be able to discover the meaning which the
sentence has on the particular occasion on whioh it is used.
We may, for our purposes, regard (7) as a perfectly unambiguous
1. For simplicity of exposition, I sometimes pretend that certain
sentences are perfectly 'eternal' and unambiguous, and, hence,
that such a sentence has just one meaning. But such a pretense
does not commit me to the claim that any sentence actually has
one and only one meaning.
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sentence. Given that it is uttered with assertive intonation, there
is just one statement that the speaker can make by means of it.
(l), on the other hand, contains the indicator word, "present", and,
in consequence, is an ambiguous sentence. The statement one makes
by means of it varies with the time of utterance. If there is an
infinite number of possible times of utterance, then (l) has an in¬
finite number of meanings. But the meaning which (l) has on a par¬
ticular occasion of its use depends upon the context in which (l)
is used, (l) is ambiguous only over time.* And in the case of
(1) it is the time of its utterance which determines which meaning
it has on that utterance. If (l) is uttered at Midnight, 2 July,
1969, then its meaning, on that occasion, is identical with the
(only)^ meaning of (?)• If (l) is uttered at 2 P.M., 3 May, 1905,
then its meaning, on that occasion, i3 identical with the (only)
meaning ofi "(3y) (y - (ix) (x is King of Prance at 2 P.M., 3 May,
1905) and y ia bald)".
Since strong considerations have led us to doubt that, (on
at least one reasonable way of understanding "synonymous", anyway),
any two sen-fences are synonymous, we shall be reasonable to con¬
clude that (l) and (2) are not synonymous, (l) and (2) do not have
the same meaning simpliciter. They may not be substituted for one
1. Or at least this is what I assume hero.
2. This "only" needs some qualification. My claim that (l) is am¬
biguous only over time and my claim that (7) has just one mea¬
ning depend upon some convenient pretexts. 1 ignore the possible
ambiguity of the wordsi "King", "France", etc., and the possible
ambiguity of the logical apparatus in (7)* I also ignore all
uses of these sentences other than statement-making ones where
the sentence occurs on its own and not embedded within - quota¬
tion marks or oratio obliqua.
another wherever one of them is found.^ But just as there are many
contexts in which (7) and (l) are interchangeable, (i.e., any extan-
sional context at Midnight, 2 July, 1969)> we may point out that
(l) and (2) are interchangeable in many contexts, (i.e., in any ex-
tensional context in any year). Given any occurrence of (l) in an
extensions! context, if (2) had been used in that same context, then
one would have been making the statement he made by means of
(l). And we may say, on this basis, that although it is false that
the meaning of (l) is identical with the meaning of (2), it is true
that a meaning of (2) is identical with a meaning of (l). To bor¬
row some of Katz's terminology, an anlysans sentence and an analy-
sandum sentence need not be "fully synonymous". They need only be
"synonymous on a reading", (cf. Katz, The Philosophy of Language,
P. 171)
The interchangeability I am talking about now is not just in-
terchangeability with preservation of truth value. It is inter¬
changeability with preservation of statement. And this notion of a
statement is, of course, just what now needs to be explained.
Roughly speaking, a sentence is used to make a statement when that
sentence is uttered with assertive intonation. I assume that "as¬
sertive intonation" can be defined by the phoneticists. One might,
of course, utter a sentence with assertive intonation and be giving
a command, giving a promise, or reciting his lines in a play. But
I see nothing wrong with saying that we can, at one and the same
time and by means of one and the same sentence, give a command and
1. We may reinforce this point for (l) and (2) by pointing out that
(l) may not be substituted, salva veritate, for (2) on its occur¬
rence in» "Strawsonians argue that one can state that the pre¬
sent King of Prance is bald without stating that (3y) (y » (fx)
(x is present King of France) and y. is bald)".
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make a statement, make a promise"*" and make a statement, or recite
our line in a play and make a statement. According to the way in
which I use the word, "statement", someone has made a statement
whenever we may report that person's utterance by means of a locu¬
tion of the form: "He said that...". Since it is clear that we may
frequently use such a locution to report what is said when a command
is given, when a promise is made, and when dramatic lines are reci¬
ted, it is clear that the fact that someone is giving a command,
making a promise, or reciting dramatic lines on a particular occa¬
sion is not sufficient to make it false that that person is making
a statement on that occasion.
The most common and everyday way of reporting someone's
statement is by means of the common and everyday device of embedding
that person's words into an oratio obliqua sentence of the form:
"He said that...". In the most simple case, we simply say: "lie
said that", and then we repeat the speaker's original sentence. But
this simple technique cannot be performed with all sentences. If
you utter the sentence: "I am hungry", I cannot give a true report
of your statement by saying: "He said that I am hungry". But we
shall restrict ourselves to the more simple kind of case, of which
an utterance of (l) — given a certain qualification — would be an
example. If John, say, utters (l), then I can give a true report
of his statement by saying:
(3) John said that the present King of France is bald
The qualification, of course, is that John's original utterance must
have taken place during, roughly speaking, the same epoch as my
1. That one can, at one and the same time, and by means of one and
the same sentence, make a statement and make a promise has been
argued by P.3. 'Ardal, (cf. ""And That's a Promise"").
utterance of (0). In such a case, I give a true report of John's
statement. But if John's utterance of (l) had taken place in, say,
1623, then iay use of (8) would result in a false report of John's
statement. The case is similar to that of your utterance of "I am
hungry". The occurrence of the indicator word, "I", in your utter¬
ance lays down a restriction upon the use of your original sentence
in an oratio obliqua report of your statement. Roughly speaking,
your original sentence can be embedded without alteration into
oratio obliqua in a report of your statement just in those cases
where the context of the oratio obliqua report is sufficiently simi¬
lar to the context of your original utterance. What makes for suf¬
ficient similarity in the case of the indicator word, "I", is iden¬
tity of speaker. Supposing that your name is "Bill" and that you
have uttered the sentence, "I am hungry", you can sayj "Bill said
that I am hungry", but I cannot. What makes for sufficient simila¬
rity of context in the case of the indicator word, "present", is
identity of epoch. I leave "epoch" vague on purpose. For some
cases, an epoch might be counted as a second, or perhaps as an even
shorter period of time.
(8), I said, is a report of the statement which we are imagi¬
ning John to have made by uttering sentence (l) during the present
epoch. Sow this should help, to some extent, to bring our talk
about meanings, statements, and propositions down to earth. For to
say that John uttered a sentence which, in the context of his utter-
ance, meant that the present King of France is bald, to say that John
made the statement that the present King of France is bald, and to
say that John stated the proposition that the present King of France
is bald, are all just to say that John said that the present King of
France is bald.
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With (8), we reported John's statement by just embedding his
original sentence into oratio obliqua. But it is clear that often
we must deviate from the speaker's original sentence in giving a
report of his statement. And just as we often must deviate from
his original sentence, often we may deviate from his original sen¬
tence. Given that John has recently uttered sentence (l) with as¬
sertive intonation, it is clear that either of the following sen¬
tences will do as well as (8) as a device for reporting John's
statement!
(9) John said that the person who, at present, is King of France
i3 bald,
(10) John said that France's present King is bald.
And I doubt that very many people will disagree if I say that if
John's original utterance had taken place in 1969, and if we are
writing or speaking in the 21st century or if we are writing some¬
thing to be read by the people of the 21st century, there will be
absolutely nothing wrong with our reporting John's statement by
means of the sentence!
(11) John said that the King of France in 1969 is bald.
We have just seen that one i3 free to deviate from a speaker's
original sentence in giving a report of his statement. But one is
not completely free in this regard. I cam report John's statement
by means of sentences (8)-(ll), but I cannot report his statement
by means of sentence!
(12) John said that now is the time for all good men to come to the
aid of their party.
And this raises an important question! What are the constraints
upon our deviation from the speaker's original sentence when we give
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an oratio obliqua report of his statement? 3ut before we try to
reply to this question, let us make one observation. The constraints
upon our deviation from the speaker's original sentence when we give
an oratio obliqua report of his statement are Identical with the
constraints upon our deviation from the speaker's original sentence
when we give a philosophical analysis, or paraphrase of his state¬
ment. (This point is hinted at by Quine, cf. Word and Object, p.
208). We may use, say, (7)» as a logical analysans for the state¬
ment which John made on a particular occasion, just in case we may
make a true statement by sayings
(13) John said that (3y) (y = (?x) (x is King of France at Midnight,
2 July, 1969) and y is bald).
In both cases, the condition for correctness is that (7) be such
that an extensional use of it in present circumstances would result
in our making the same statement which John made by means of his
sentence in the circumstances in which he uttered his sentence.
Let us now say something about this question of constraints.
There are many reasons we might have for deviating from our spea¬
ker's original words when we give a report of his statement. Some¬
times, the speaker's use of an indicator word, like "I" or "present",
forces us to deviate. JcaaetimeB we have forgotten the speaker's
original words and remember only the gist of his utterance.* Some¬
times we wish to place special emphasis upon some aspect of the
speaker's statement. Sometimes, as in (13)» we wish to cast the
statement into logical notation in order to facilitate logical deduc¬
tion, and to make implications explicit. And sometimes, again as in
1. A psycholinguist friend, Dr. J.C. Marshall, has pointed out to me
that experimental evidence suggests that we retain the gist, or
meaning, of sentences we hear much more easily than we retain the
actual words.
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(13), we deviate from the original in order to forestall metaphysi¬
cal conclusions which some philosophers might be tempted to draw
from the original.
"Paraphrase", as Quine says, "depends on what we are trying
to prove or find out", (Word and Object, p. 183). There is no
"unique right analysis" for any given statement, (cf. Word and Ob¬
ject, p. 26o). For some purposes we rewrite a statement in one way.
For other purposes we rewrite it in another way. We are not bound
to any particular way of rewriting a statement. Even when we are
working within one particular kind of enquiry — say logical ana¬
lysis — we need not think there is one "unique right analysis".
(7) is one logical analysanS for John's statement. Another might
be:
(14) (3w) (3x) ((w =» (iy) (y = France)) and (x = (7 x) (z i3 rela¬
ted to w as King to Kingdom)) and x is bald).
And another, if we should happen to wish to fit John's statement
into an Aristotelian logic, might be:
(15) All which is the King of France is bald.
Any of these might be the 'right analysis', depending upon our pur¬
poses for doing the analysis.
3ut we must distinguish the claim that there is no unique
right analysis of a given statement from the claim that when we are
analysing or paraphrasing, there is no line to be drawn between
what is a right analysis and what is not. "Surely", Quine says,
"there is nothing approaching a fixed standard of how far indirect
quotation may deviate from the direct", (Word and Object, p. 218).
But surely there mu3t be some standards in this area. (8), (9),
(10), and, we might assume, (13), are all correct reports of the
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statement John made when he uttered (l). (12) is an incorrect re¬
port of John's statement. "On page 218 of Word and Object, Quine
said that there is nothing approaching a fixed standard of how far
indirect quotation may deviate from the direct" is a correct re¬
port of Quine's statement. "On page 218 of Word and Object, Quine
said that John Duns Scotus never committed a philosophical error"
is an incorrect report of Quine's statement. Surely there must be
some standard for distinguishing correct statement reports from in¬
correct statement reports.
Although Quine says that there is nothing approaching a fixed
standard of how far indirect quotation may deviate from the direct,
he does suggest what may be looked upon as guidelines for indireot
quotation and paraphrase. Let us have a look at these guidelines.
Quine says:
...in indirect quotation we project ourselves into what, from his
remarks and other indications, we imagine the speaker's state of
mind to have been, and then we say what, in our language, is natu¬
ral and relevant for us in the state thus feigned. (Word and Object,
p. 219).
The guideline here is what is natural and relevant for us to say in
what we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been. Now the
most natural way of interpreting what Quine says here is, it seems
to me, as follows. Suppose that someone makes a statement and that
you want to give an oratio obliqua report of what he said. Here is
what you should do: 'project' yourself into what, from his remarks
and other indications, you imagine his state of mind to have been;
construct a sentence, S, which is natural and relevant for you in
the state thus feigned} utter the expression: "He said that"} utter
S. But suppose, now, that our speaker is Cardinal Heenan, who is
quoted in the Guardian for 25 October, 1968, as having uttered the
sentence:
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(16) Priests are required in preaching, teaching, in the press, on
radio, television, or public platforms, to refrain from opposing
the teaching of the Pope in all matters of faith and morals.
But if we, who have been trained in the logic of such words as "all"
and "any", were in the state of mind in which we may imagine Heenan
to have been, the sentence we should have uttered would be:
(17) Priests are required in preaching, teaching, in the press, on
radio, television, or public platforms, to refrain from opposing
the teaching of the Pope in any matter of faith and morals.
So, according to Quine's guideline, we are entitled to say, of the
Cardinalt
(16) lie said that Priests are required in preaching, teaching, in
the press, on radio, television, or public platforms, to refrain
from opposing the teaching of the Pope in any matter of faith and
morals.
But, although what (13) says the Cardinal said is what the Cardi¬
nal ought to have said, the Cardinal did not say what he ought to
have said, and did not say what (18) says he said. The trouble
here is that since, as a result of our logical training, we are
better than the Cardinal is at manipulating such words as "all"
and "any", the sentence we should use to express the Cardinal's
state of mind better expresses his state of mind than doe3 the
sentence which the Cardinal, himself, used. We should have made
the statement which the Cardinal ought to have made. But the Car¬
dinal did not make the statement which he ought to have made.
A similar difficulty crops up with another of Quine's guide¬
lines. Talking of the result, 3', of paraphrasing & sentence, S,
of ordinary language into logical symbols, ;iuine sayas
Its relation to 3 is just that the particular business that the
speaker was on that occasion trying to get on with, with help of
3 among other things, can be managed well enough to suit him by
using 3' instead of 3. (.Word and Object, p. l6c)
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But suppose, now, that you and I are examiners, discussing a stu¬
dent's paper. I want to give him a good marie. You want to give
him a bad mark. You point to the sentences
(19) The author of the Traotatus Logico-Philosophicua published
"On Denoting" in 1932#
in the student's paper. And you says "Surely no one who wrote
such a thing deserves a good mark". I reply by saying that what
the student said may be correctly paraphrased into logical symbols
ass
(20) (3y) (y ■ (fx) (x is author of the Prinoiples of Mathematics)
and y published "On Denoting" in 1905).
If I am a Quinean, I nay defend (2) as a paraphrase of (19) by
simply pointing out that the particular business, i.e., getting a
good mark on the examination, that the student was on that occa¬
sion trying to get on with, with help of (19) among other things,
can be managed well enough to suit him by using (20) instead of
(19).
It might be pointed out here that when a speaker utters a
sentence, there are many correct answers to the question! "What
particular business was he, on that occasion, trying to get on
with?" The student was trying to get on with the particular busi¬
ness of getting a good mark. But he was also, on the same occa¬
sion, trying to get on with quite a few other particular pieces of
business. We might, therefore, want to say that the medium of pa¬
raphrase is not the piece of business that the speaker was trying
to get on with, but the relevant piece of business among the seve¬
ral pieces of business which the speaker was trying to get on with.
But we now face the difficulty of specifying what we want to count
as the relevant piece of business. Let us try 3ome formulations.
Y/e might say that the relation of 3* to 3 is that the busi¬
ness, of effeoting a response in his audience, that the speaker was,
on that occasion, trying to get on with, with help of S among other
things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using 3' instead
of 3. But this will not do for several reasons. Our student was
trying to get his examiners to respond by giving him a good mark.
So, on this criterion, (20) will do as a paraphrase of (19)* But
we do not want this to happen. Also,'*" people often write and utter
sentences without intending to effect any response in any audience
— for example, in a soliloquy, in a private notebook, or while
delerious with fever — but sentences so uttered or written are,
nonetheless, apt for paraphrase in oratio obliqua reports and in
logical analysis.
We might say that the relation of 3' to 3 is that the busi¬
ness, of conveying a piece of information, that the speaker was, on
that occasion, trying to get on with, with help of S among other
things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using S' instead
of S. But this is clearly useless. People often say things with¬
out intending to convey any information. And even when we say some¬
thing in order to convey information, what we say often differs from
what we intend to convey.
We might say that the relation of 3' to 3 is that the busi¬
ness, of recording a piece of information, that the speaker was, on
that occasion trying to get on with, with help of S among other
things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using 3' instead
of 3. Given a suitable interpretation of "recording", this is, to
my mind, the best suggestion so far. If John, say, utters sentence
(19) in a soliloquy or if he writes it in a private notebook, or if
he utterB it while delerious with fever, or, as in the case of the
1. The point which follows is adapted for my purposes from Ziff*s
"On H.P. Grice's Aocount of Meaning".
42
examination, if he writes it for the eyes of someone whom he be¬
lieves to already know that the author of the Tractatu3 Logico-
Philosophicus published "On Denoting" in 1932, John will not be
trying to convey any information. But we might say that he is,
nonetheless, trying to 'record', (however momentarily), a piece of
information. And we might say that any sentence, 5', which, on
the occasion on which John uttered (l9)» could have been used to
'record' the same piece of information which John was trying to
'record', may be used as a paraphrase of what John said. This sug¬
gestion gets us over the difficulties encountered by that of the
preceding paragraph. But it is still not good enough. When John
uttered (l9)> he may very well have been trying to 'record* the
piece of information that the author of the Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus published "On Referring" in 1932. As a result of momen¬
tary confusion, he said "Logico-Philosophicus" instead of "Theolo-
gico-Politicus" and "Denoting" instead of "Referring". The sentences
(21) The author of the Tractatus Theologlco-Politicus published
"On Referring" in 1932,
could have been used, on the occasion on which John uttered (19),
to 'record' the piece of information which John was trying to 're¬
cord'. But (21) will not do as a paraphrase of what John said.
We might veiy well says
(22) John meant, (on that occasion), that the author of the Trao-
tatus Theologico-Politicu3 published "On .ieferring" in 1932,
but we may not sayt
(23) John said, (on that occasion), that the author of the Trac¬
tatus Theologico-Politicus published "On Referring" in 1932.
This illustrates an obvious but important point. One and the same
utterance event may be reported in more than one way, and by means
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of a different verb of propositional attitude in each case. We
may report what John did by means of a sentence of the form» "John
said that..."; but we may also report what John did on the same
occasion by means of a sentence of the forms "John meant that..."
The conditions for the truth of these different reports may very
well be different.
We shall frequently return to points of this sort. But we
are here concerned with indirect quotation and paraphrase of what
people say. We have been trying formulations of the view that the
medium of indirect quotation and paraphrase is the piece of busi¬
ness that the speaker was trying to get on with. We have not yet
come up with a successful formulation. But I am not going to make
any more attempts. Possibly some genius will, some day, come up
with the formulation we have been seeking. But I have no idea of
how the formulation ought to go. I am quite unable to see how
what one says can be explained in terms of the piece of business
which that person is trying to get on with.
Talking about the paraphrase of a'non-eternal' sentence into
an'eternal'one, Quine saysi
...the eternal sentence will be one that the speaker could have
uttered in plaoe of his original utterance in those original cir¬
cumstances without detriment, so far as he could foresee, to the
project h® was bent on. I need hardly say that there is scope
here for refinement, but let it not be supposed that acquiescence
in talk of expressed propositions provides it. (Word and Object,
p. 208).
My oourse is that of acquiescence in talk of propositions. I shall
say that when a speaker has uttered a sentence, 8, and when we use
a sentence, 3', as a paraphrase in philosophical analysis or as a
clause following "that" in "He said that...", our paraphrase or
oratio obliqua report will be correct just in case 3' is such that
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an assertive use of 3' in the context in which we are using 3'
would be such as to state the proposition which 3 was used to
state on the original speaker's use of 3.* The proposition a
speaker states, i.e., the statement he makes, will be regarded as
an actual entity. I do not like aethereal entities any more than
Quine, or anyone else, does. But I ju3t do not know how to say
the things I want to say without including a few of them in my on¬
tology. At any rate, propositions are in a lot better shape than
Quine's equally aethereal businesses and projects.
Talking about the proposition someone actually stated gets
us around the problem of trying to give criteria for a correct re¬
port of what someone actually did in terms of what he was trying
to do. Our concept of a proposition stated, i.e., a statement
made, is that of something actually done. When someone writes a
1. Notice that the criterion is not that S' must be such that if
the original speaker had used it in place of 3, he would have
stated the saxae proposition as he stated by means of 3. You
sayi "I am hungry". I sayi "He said that he was hungry". If
you had uttered the sentence: "He was hungry", you would have
stated a proposition different from the one which you stated
when you uttered the sentence: "I am hungry". If, however, ,1
had said: "He was hungry", in the same circumstances as those
in which I said: "He said that he was hungry", then I should
have stated the same proposition as you stated when you said:
"I am hungry".
As it happens, though, if a speaker has uttered a 'non-
eternal' sentenoe, like "I am hungry now", and if we give a
correct paraphrase of what he said by means of an 'eternal sen¬
tence', like "Bill is hungry at time t", then the 'eternal sen¬
tence' will be such that if the original speaker had uttered it
in place of his original sentence, then he would have made the
same statement as he made by means of his original sentence.
But to give this as a criterion for paraphrase would allow us
to cover only those paraphrases where the new sentence is an
'eternal' one. My criterion allows me to cover both paraphrase
into an 'eternal sentence' and paraphrase into a 'non-eternal'
one.
My notion of 'circumstances' or 'context' is much more
vague than I should like it to be. I am tiying to be a3 precise
as I can in speaking of it, but I fall very short of the preci¬
sion I should like. The reader will find my most explicit treat¬
ment of context in the course of my discussion of proper names,
(see Section VI) But I shall not, even there, be able to clear
away very much of the fog.
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book, he makes a number of statements. Because of the finitude of
human intelligence, an author rarely makes just those statements
which he would like to make. But what he puts on record is what
he actually says. This point is, I think, recognized by (good)
historians of philosophy. We do not sayi "Hume's doctrine was...",
and then recite what we think Hume would have said if he had been
able to say what we think he really wanted to say. We sayi "Hume'3
doctrine was...", and then recite what we think Hume actually said.
Whatever concept other philosophers may express by the words,
"proposition" and "statement", my concept of a proposition stated,
a statement made, is not a mentalistic concept. The proposition one
states is the meaning which the sentence one uses has on the occa¬
sion on which one uses it. But the meaning which the sentence one
uses has on the occasion on which one uses it need not be identical
with what one means by the sentence he uses. One need not be able
to 'project' oneself into the speaker's mind in order to find out
what proposition he is stating. The proposition one states on a
particular occasion can usually be identified by anyone who under¬
stands the language in which the proposition is stated and who knows
the context of the utterance.1 We make true oratio obliqua reports
every day without looking into anyone's private mental goings on.
But we must now say something about the problem of identity
for propositions. There are at least three questions involved herei
1. Sometimes, indeed, the speaker's mind may be a factor in the con¬
text of the utterance. You might hear me sayi "That was a good
meal", and have no way of knowing what the referent is for "that"
unless you find out what meal I am thinking about. But, in the
usual case, the referent of an indexical expression is made clear
by the observable circumstances of the utterance.
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(24) How do we identify the proposition someone has stated on a
particular occasion?
(25) How do we find out whether or not the proposition stated on
one occasion is identical with the proposition stated on another
occasion?
(26) When is the proposition stated on one occasion identical with
the proposition stated on another occasion?
I take question (24) to be a question about how we actually go
about discovering what proposition someone has stated on a parti¬
cular occasion. This question admits of a short answer and a long
answer. The short answer is simply thisi We pay attention to the
sentence which was uttered or written? we pay attention to the con¬
text in which the sentence was uttered or written? we ask oursel-
vesi "What does that mean in that context?" After we take these
steps, it usually happens that something which might be called a
"process of understanding" takes place. As a result of this pro¬
cess, we know what proposition was stated. We may then give evi¬
dence that we have discovered what proposition was stated on that
occasion by reciting some sentence, other than the original,*
which expresses the same proposition, or by reciting a definite
description, likes "the same proposition as that which was stated
by means of the 856th sentence of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
("A" Edition)".
I shall not attempt to give the long answer to this question.
We want to know more about how this process of understanding takes
1. If one does not have a photographic memory, then he may, some¬
times, give evidence that he has identified the proposition
stated by means of such-and-such a sentence simply by reciting
that sentence, (without looking at it). For example, if I, who
do not have a photographic memory, can recite the first few
sentences of Hume's Treatise, then it is a pretty good bet that
I know what propositions Hume stated by means of those senten¬
ces, i.e., that I understand what he said.
47
place. Just what, in detail, connects our observation of a sen¬
tence in its context with our ability to come up with another sen¬
tence which expresses the same proposition? In order to answer
this question, we must take account of a great many factors.
These include! the phonetic or orthographic structure of the sen¬
tence; the syntactic structure of the sentence; the set of mean¬
ings which the sentence is capable of having, (what Katz would
call the set of "semantic readings" belonging to the sentence);
the contextual factors which determine which member of this set
of meanings is the meaning which the sentence has on the particu¬
lar occasion in question; the relations which these factors bear
to one another and to the workings of the brain; etc. I take the
task of working out these details to be the job of the linguist
and the psycholinguist, and not the job of the philosopher, (or
at least not the present job of this philosopher).^"
Whereas question (24) is a question about what, say, sen¬
tence S means, (I presuppose a particular oontext of utterance),
question (25) is a question about how we find out whether or not
what S means is identical with what, say, T means. Just as I can
know that Scott is the author of Waverley and that Sir Walter is
the author of Marmion without knowing that the author of Waverley
is the author of Marmion and without knowing that Scott is Sir
Walter, I can know that the meaning of S is the proposition that
p and that the meaning of T is the proposition that q without
knowing either that the proposition that p is the proposition that
q or that the meaning of S is the meaning of T. For example, I
1. Recent work in this area is available in Language, R.C. Old-
field and J.C. Marshall, eds.
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can know that the sentence:
(27) The number of the apostles is 7+5»
means that the number of the apostles is twelve, and know that the
sentence:
(28) The number of the apostles is the sum of the third and fourth
prime numbers,
means that the number of the apostles is the sum of the fourth and
third prime numbers, without knowing either that the proposition
that the number of the apostles is 12 is the same as the proposi¬
tion that the number of the apostles is the sum of the fourth and
third prime numbers or that the meaning of (27) is the same aa the
meaning of (28).
The best procedure that I know of for finding out whether or
not what, say, S means is identical with what, say, T means is the
procedure which philosophers have been using for years. We think
of what one says by means of sentence 3, and we think of what one
says by means of sentence T. We try to imagine a case in which
what one says in one of the two cases is true while what one says
in the other case is false. If we can imagine such a case, then
we conclude that the two sentences mean different propositions.
If we can imagine no such case, then we conclude that the two sen¬
tences mean the same proposition. (Or, being prudent philoso¬
phers, we conclude that it i3 not completely idiotic to put for¬
ward the tentative suggestion that it is fairly likely that the
two sentences express the same proposition.)
The point of the parenthetical remark is that we do not
have complete certitude in our judgements of propositions! iden¬
tity. If we can imagine no case in which the proposition meant
by 3 would have a different truth value from the proposition meant
by T, we might conclude that the two sentences mean the same propo¬
sition. But, if someone with better powers of imagination should
oome along and describe a case in which the proposition meant by
the one sentence has a truth value different from the proposition
meant by the other sentence, then we shall have to admit that we
were mistaken. To take just one example, it has often been thought
that propositions expressed by sentences of the form*
(29) John knows that p,
were identical with propositions expressed by sentences of the formj
(30) John believes that p, and John is justified in believing that
p, and p.
But people who thought this were refuted by Gettier, ("Is Justified
True Belief Knowledge?"), who, with his superior powers of imagina¬
tion, was able to construct examples in which propositions expressed
by sentences of the form, (30), would be true, while propositions
expressed by the corresponding sentences of the form, (29)» would
be false.
But the fact that we do not have complete certitude in these
matters should not cause despair. We do not have complete oerti-
tude in our judgments about the identity of material objects either.
I can err in thinking that the woman I see before me is my wife.
But, both for propositions and material objects, our skill at making
judgments of identity is sufficient to allow us to get along.
I can imagine no case in which the proposition which one
would state by means of a present day use of sentence (l) would be
false while the proposition which one would state by means of a
present day use of sentence (2) would be true. Nor can I imagine
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a case in which the former would be true and the latter false. I
conclude that it is not completely idiotic to put forward the ten¬
tative suggestion that the two sentences express the same proposi¬
tion. This suggestion will be adhered to throughout the rest of
the present work. It will be assumed that one who states (l)
states (2). The Russellian position on question (l) of Section I
will, therefore, be adhered to. I cannot prove this position.
But it seems to me to have nothing wrong with it. In Section I,
I mentioned a hypothetical semantic theory which would provide a
rigorous procedure for deciding what illocutionary act someone has
performed on the basis of the utterance he has produced and the
linguistic and extra-linguistic oontext in which he produced it.
I do not know whether or not such a theory is possible, nor do X
even know whether or not the idea of such a theory is coherent.
But ~ assuming the possibility of the theory and the coherence
of the idea — until we have such a theory we must rely upon our
intuitive understanding of sentences and our powers of imagina¬
tion when we make judgements of identity of statements and propo¬
sitions.
We now turn to question (26). Let "p" represent the pro¬
position stated by means of one sentence. Let "qH represent the
proposition stated by means of another sentence. Under what con¬
ditions is p identical with q? It seems to me that we shall do
best to take the most simple and obvious line on this question!
(31) p is identical with q just in case it is impossible for p
to be true and q false and it is impossible for q to be true and
p false.
(31) is based upon, but differs from, a statement of Lewis's. (See
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Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic, p. 124). He* lays down the
•defining relation', (I use Lewis's numbering):
(ll • 03) p « q. « » p -3 q . q -a p
"-3" is Lewis's sign for "strictly implies"; and "p strictly im¬
plies q" is defined by Lewis as: "It is false that it is possible
that p should be true and q false". So Lewis's "p-9 q * q-3 p"
amounts to the same as the right hand side of my (31)• But Lewis
does not read "p - q" as "p is identical with q". He reads it as
"p and q are equivalent". Thus, Lewis does not make the dispu¬
table claim that: "p-3 q • q -3 p"» states a necessary and suffi¬
cient condition for the identity of p and q.
To avoid confusion, I shall always use " » " to mean "is
identical with". For brevity, I shall often use "p and q are logi¬
cally equivalent" to mean "p-9 q . q^3 p". My claim, then, is
that logical equivalence is a necessary and sufficient condition
for propositional identity. And this is my answer to question (26).
It should be noticed that the answer to (26) differs from the ans¬
wer to (25). Although "(p and not q) is impossible" may, so far
as I know, entail: "I am unable to imagine (p and not q)", the
latter does not entail the former.
Although the criterion just given for propositional identity
is obvious and uncomplicated, it is, as I said, disputable. One
problem arises over the interpretation of the modal expression, "it
is impossible". The notion of impossibility needed for an inter¬
pretation of " ^3 " has got to be a notion of absolute impossibility,
at least where propositional identity is concerned. The psycholo-
1. Lewis takes the responsibility for Chapters I-VII and Appendix
II of the book. (cf. Symbolic Logic, "Preface")
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gical impossibility oft "I am unable to imagine", will not do for
a definition of propositional identity. But what is this absolute
impossibility. Cant "It is not possible that p", be defined with¬
out recourse to any other modal expression? I choose to avoid this
problem by ignoring it and assuming that there are modal 1inde-
finables*. I shall, however, take up some other problems. How,
for example, can one accept a criterion of propositional identity
which appears to oonflict with the fairly widely accepted doctrine
that» "p ■ q, and John believes that p" entails "John believes
that q"? And how oan one accept a criterion of propositional iden¬
tity whioh commits one to the view that there is just one true pro¬
position of logic? But, pressing as these problems are, we shall
not be able to discuss them until we get to Section XII. In that
Section, I shall try to go some way towards defending the logical
equivalence criterion of propositional identity against some ob¬
jections which have been put against it. But we shall not be pre¬
pared to disouss this question until we have learned a lot more
about reference and propositional attitudes. In the meantime, I
shall just assume that the logical equivalence criterion is correct.
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SECTION IVi SOME PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES
The importance of distinguishing the various things which go
on when utterances take place cannot he too highly stressed. >Ve
saw, in Seotion I, how Strawson got into trouble over identifying
reference by failing to distinguish properly between the statenent
one makes and the information one intends to convey. I now want
to argue that it can be equally misleading to identify the state¬
ment one makes with the thought which one is expressing hy means
of his utterance. The thought expressed by the speaker can, I
think, be identified with what the speaker has in mind when he
speaks and with the assertion made by the speaker, (or the propo¬
sition asserted). It can also be identified with what the spea¬
ker means, in at least one standard sense of "meaning"} but it
should not in general be identified with what the speaker's words
mean on the use which the speaker is making of them. This is not
to say that what the speaker means never coincides with what his
words mean. "Snow is white" means that snow is white; and I can
say« "Snow is white", and mean that snow is white. But I can
also, by slip of the tongue, say, "Snow is white", and mean that
snow is black. So we must say that this coincidence, when it
takes place, exemplifies a contingent rather than a necessary iden¬
tity. When we tell the truth, the thought we express is the same
as the belief we express; so, if we were all saints, then we could
always identify the thought which one is expressing with the be¬
lief which he is expressing. But this identity breaks down in the
case of a lie. When one lies, we can often identify the thought
he is expressing with the belief which he is trying to instill in
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his audience. Ikying should, I think, be characterized as intenti¬
onally making false statements. Not all cases of false statements
made intentionally are cases of deceit. Poets, as Hume said, are
"liars by profession," (A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 121)} and
we applaud those poets who skilfully practice their profession. Of
course not everything said in poetry or other kinds of fiction is
false. Historical novels constitute the standard example, and Sir
Arthur Evans's discoveries constitute evidence for another example
of true statements in works of fiction. Sinoe we know that some
statements in fiction are true, we might as well regard others as
false.* This makes liars out of poets, but I think it is easier
and more perspicuous to admit non-deceitful lying than to fish
around for a new definition of lying. Not all cases of the deceit¬
ful use of language are cases of lying either. A skillful con man
will insinuate false beliefs in the mind of his audience while
being extremely careful to avoid saying anything false.
Getting back to the expression of thought, an example, already
touched upon in Section III, will help to clarify the difference
1. It is sometimes said that the works of Shakespeare contain
false statements. This may be true of the Sonnets, but it is
false of the plays. When he wrote his plays, Shakespeare wrote
such things asi "Hamlet: To be or not to be, that is the
question," i.e., he gave stage directions which resemble some
commands in being neither true nor false. Richard Burton, how¬
ever, makes statements with truth values when he plays Hamlet
on the stage. When discussing commands, incidentally, we should
not be misled by the fact that commands have no truth value into
saying that when one gives a command he is saying nothing true
or false. If I say: "You will come here immediately", as a
command, then my command is neither true nor false; but I have
also stated that you will come here immediately, and my statement
is true if you will come hare immediately and false otherwise.
There is no reason whatsoever why one should not be able to per¬
form two illocutionary acts at once: and this is just what often
happens.
"between the thought one is expressing and the statement he is
making. The Guardian quoted Cardinal Heenan as sayingj "Priests
are required in preaching, teaching, in the press, on radio, tele¬
vision, or public platforms, to refrain from opposing the teaching
of the Pope in all matters of faith and morals". Now/ it is clear,
I think, that Heenan was expressing the thought, i.e., meant, that
there is no matter of faith and morals concerning which priests
may publicity oppose the Pope. But this is not what he actually
stated. What he actually stated was that priests may not publi¬
cly" oppose the Pope on all such matters. So we must distinguish
what he actually stated from the thought he was expressing. This
example also serves to reinforce our distinction between statement
made and information conveyed. Let us call what Heenan stated
"P" and the thought he expressed "Q". Now in the first place,
every one of us who read and understood Heenan's statement recei¬
ved the information that Q whereas what he stated was not that Q,
but that P. In the second place, to take another turn of thought,
all of us also received the information, R, that Heenan believes
that priests ought to refrain from publicly"- opposing the Pope
on any matter of faith and morals. Although some people might
want to be dogmatic and maintain that Heenan was actually stating
that R. A minority, however, will maintain a view similar to the
one which says that Heenan was stating that R. They will say,
(in hopes, I suspect, of solving Moore's 'paradox'), that when A
states that p he is also stating that A believes that p. I once
tried to argue against a member of this minority by pointing out
that A, B and C can all state precisely the same proposition,
(i.e., make the same statement), by saying "The cat is on the mat",
but that on my opponent's hypothesis this would be impossible
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because A, B and C would have to be stating different conjunctive
propositions of the form, "The cat is on the mat and x believes
that the cat is on the mat". But my opponent denied my premiss,
insisting that even if two people use the same sentence in the same
circumstances their statements must differ.
I can reply only by insisting dogmatically that what I state
when I say, e.g., "Snow is white" must be identical to what is
'hypothesized' in entailment statements of the form: "Necessarily,
if snow is white, then snow is not invisible". But it is not true
that necessarily, if snow is white then F.J.L. has at least one
true belief. But given my dogmatic doctrine, if what I state when
I sayi "Snow is white", iss "Snow is white and F.J.L. believes
that snow is white" then it is true that necessarily, if snow is
white then F.J.L. has at least one true belief. But since this
conclusion is unacceptable, I cannot go along with my opponent.
And I suggest that since when one says that p he is often giving
the information that he believes that p, without actually stating
that he believes that p, we have yet another example of divergence
between what one states and the information he conveys. The rea¬
son why it is paradoxical to aayt "p but I do not believe that
p", is that when one says that p, although he is not stating that
he believes that p, he often conveys the information that he be¬
lieves that p; and when one says that he does not believe that p
he is often both stating and conveying the information that he
does not believe that p. So one can, by sayingi "p and I do not
believe that p", both convey the information that he believes that
p and oonvey the information that he doe3 not believe that p.
When this happens we are presented with contradictory pieces of
information, not with oontradictory statements. We can imagine
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oases where "p but I do not believe that p" is not paradoxical.
These will be oases where saying that p does' not convey the infor¬
mation that one believes that p. Suppose, for example, that an
atheistic philosopher is hired by some small Ohio college whose
charter contains a clause requiring that all new members of the
philosophy staff must state, in the presence of the dean, that God
exists. Fortunately, the dean is an enlightened fellow who is not
concerned with his underlings' religious beliefs or lack thereof.
Knowing full well that the philosopher is an atheist, he hires him
but insists on the ceremony in order to avoid violating the regu¬
lations. The philosopher sayst "God exists", and, immediately
thereafter, says, "But I do not believe that God exists". In this
case, since the dean already knew that the philosopher did not be¬
lieve that God exists, the philosopher's stating that God exists
did not convey to the dean the information that the philosopher
believes that God exists, and no conflict of pieces of information
arose.
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SECTION V: DO PROPER NAMES HAVE SENSE?
An advocate of the view that proper naaes have no sense, but
only reference — in his way of putting it they "denote" but do not
"connote" — is Gilbert Ryle. I shall quote quite a long passage in
which Ryle puts forward his views on the matter. It seems to me
that Ryle's theory is false. But I think that in discussing the
ways in which Ryle went wrong we shall learn some important things
about proper names.
Mill got a further important point right about these genuine proper
names. He said that while most words and descriptive phrases both
denote or name and connote, proper names only denote and do not
connote. A dog may be called "Fido", but the word "Fido" conveys
no information...akmt the dog's qualities, career or whereabouts,
etc. There is, to enlarge this point, no question of the word
"Fido" being paraphrased, or correctly or incorrectly translated
into French. Dictionaries do not tell us what proper names mean
— for the simple reason that they do not mean anything. The word
"Fido" names or denotes a particular dog, 3ince it is what he is
called. But there is no room for anyone who hears the word "Fido"
to understand it or misunderstand it or fail to understand it.
There is nothing for which he can require an elucidation or a defi¬
nition. From the information that Sir Winston Churchill was Prime
Minister, a number of consequences follow, such as that he was the
leader of the majority party in Parliament. But from the fact that
yonder dog is Fido, no other truth about him follows at all. No
information is provided for anything to follow from. Using a proper
name is not committing oneself to any further assertions whatsoever.
Proper names are appellations and not descriptions; and descriptions
are descriptions and not appelations....Descriptions cany truths or
falsehoods and are not just arbitrary bestowals. Proper names are
arbitrary bestowals, and convey nothing true and nothing false, for
they convey nothing at all.
Chinese astronomers give the planets, stars and constellations
names quite different from those we give. But it does not follow
that a single proposition of Western astronomy is rejected by them,
or that a single astronomical proposition rejected by us is accepted
by them. Stellar nomenclature carries with it no astronomical truths
or falsehoods. Calling a star by a certain name is not saying any¬
thing about it, and saying something true or false about a star is not
naming it. Saying is not naming and naming is not saying.
("The Theory of Meaning", pp. 136f.)
Now in the first place, although there may — so far as I
know — be no French translation of "Fido", there does not appear
to be any important difference between the differences between
"Aristotle" and "Aristote", "Socrates" and "Socrate", "Plato" and
"Platon" and "London" and "Londres", on the one hand, and the dif¬
ferences between "horse" and "cheval", "car" and "voiture", "house"
and "raaison" and "bird" and "oiseau", on the other, other than the
fact that there is more morphological resemblance in the first
case than in the second. But since quite strong morphological re¬
semblance can be found between members of pairs of words, like
"philosopher" and "philosophe", which are not proper names, and
since pairs of proper names, like "Newfoundland" - "Terre-Neuve"
and "The English Channel" - "La Manche", can be found which carry
little morphological resemblance, this point counts for nought.
Zeno Vendler has tried to give some theoretical backing to
this Bylean view that there is no translation of proper names by
saying that " "Vienna" is the English version and not the English
translation of the German name "Wien" ", (Linguistics in Philo¬
sophy , p. 38). Vendler does not explain just what he means by
"version" as opposed to "translation"j but what he is trying to
get at is perhaps suggested by his statement that proper names
"do not require translation into another language". (The under¬
scoring is mine). What Vendler possibly has in mind is that al¬
though German-speakers usually say "Wien", and English-speakers
usually say "Vienna" when they are talking about the Austrian
capital, this is just a matter of regional preference and not a
matter of difference of language. Vendler might say, on this
basis, that:"Wien is in Austria", is a perfectly good English sen¬
tence.
I doubt, myself, thatt "Wien is in Austria",is a good English
sentence. And even if it is, it is unlikely that anyone who knows
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German would say that: "Vienna iat in Osterreich", is a good Ger¬
man sentence. But even if we grant that: "Wien is in Austria" is
a good English sentence, this teaches us nothing about proper
names. For if: "Wien is in Austria" is a good English sentence,
then so are: "I ate a toumedos", "We had a rendez-vous" and "I
don't like your Weltanschauung", all of which contain untranslated
foreign expressions which are not proper names.
As long as we are discussing Vendler, we might as well take
the opportunity at this point to discuss and dismiss Vendler's
own reason for holding that proper names have no sense. According
to Vendler, (loc.cit.), "proper names have no specific co-occur¬
rence restrictions". He asks us to consider the following senten¬
ces:
(1) I visited Providence,
(2) * I visited providence,
and he claims that the word, "providence", has co-occurrence res¬
trictions which render (2) deviant. (The asterisk is a device
used by grammarians to indicate that the author thinks there is
something wrong with a sentence.) But since (l) is not deviant,
Vendler suggests that something about the linguistic description
of "providence" but nothing about the linguistic description of
"Providence" prevents the word from going in the empty slot in:
"I visited ".
Not all philosphers, (and I hope not all linguists), will
agree with Vendler's claim that (2) is linguistically deviant.
But since a discussion of the matters, (e.g., categories), rele¬
vant to an adjudication of such a dispute would take us too far
afield, let us grant credence to the intuitions which mark (2)
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deviant and look at Vendler's elaboration of the point. He saysi
"Of course, our knowledge that Providence is, in fact, a city will
impose other restrictions. This piece of knowledge, however, be¬
longs to geography and not linguistics. That is to say, while it
belongs to the understanding of the word "providence" that it can¬
not occur in sentences like (2), it is not the understanding of the
name "Providence" that permits (l), but the knowledge that it
happens to be the name of a city, Fro^p a linguistic point of view,
proper names have no restrictions of occurrence beyond the broad
grammatical constraints governing noun phrases in general".(Lin¬
guistics in Philosphy, pp. 38f.)
This all seems to be quite unfounded. Vendler says that
since we know that Providence is a city we know that the name,
"Providence", has certain constraints. Now the sort of intuitions
which mark (2) deviant will, most likely, also mark the following
sentence devianti "Two plus Providence equals twenty-seven".
Vendler would have to say that this sentence is deviant in virtue
of geographical, rather than linguistic, considerations. But
this claim — even if Vendler can make it stick — fails to point
out any important differences between the devianoe of my sentence
and the deviance of Vendler's (2). For it can easily be argued
that just as my sentence is geographically deviant, (2) is theo¬
logically or metaphysically deviant. Since we know that Providence
is a city our intuitions balk at the occurrence of "Providence" in
certain slots in certain strings. Similarly, since we know that
providence is an abstract entity of a certain sort, or, perhaps
not an entity at all, our intuitions balk at certain occurrences
of "providence".
The main difficulty here is that Vendler relies upon an un-
)
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spelled-out distinction between knowledge of a language and know¬
ledge of, e.g., geography. I see no reason why we should not say
that a man's knowledge of his language is, in many respects, a func¬
tion of his knowledge of geography, history, metaphysics, mathema¬
tics, etc. The more history one knows, the better qualified he is
to understand what is said with sentences containing the expression,
"the King of France in 1628". The more metaphysics one knows, the
better qualified he is to understand what is said with "cause",
"entity", "relation", etc. And the more geography one knows, the
better he is likely to understand what is said with sentences con¬
taining "Providence". A good indication of one's understanding a
word is his ability to draw inferences from statements made with
sentences in which that word occurs. And clearly one who knows his
geography is much more likely than one who does not know geography
to infer, from:"The population of Providence is 248,000", that,
e.g., the capital of Rhode Island has 248,000 inhabitants, that at
least one city on Narragansett Bay has more than 200,000 inhabi¬
tants, that if no city in New Mexico has more than 175,000 inhabi¬
tants, then at least one city in Rhode Island has more inhabitants
than any city in New Mexico, etc.
This brings us back to another claim of Kyle's. Ryle says
that "there is no room for anyone who hears the word "Fido" to un¬
derstand it or misunderstand it or fail to understand it." In one
sense of "understand", what Ryle says is clearly false. It is
certainly possible for me to hear "Fido" but, because of bad accous-
tics, think I hear "Ryle" or "Mido", and so, misunderstand what I
hear, (it might be objected that if someone says "Fido" and I
think I hear "Mido" then, since "hear" is an 'achievement verb',
whatever I hear, I do not hear "Fido". And this point could be
argued. But, 3ince it is not an important point for our purposes,
I shall not argue it.) Ryle is also wrong in a more important sense
of "understand". One can hear sentences in which "Fido" occurs,
know that what one is hearing is "Fido" and not "Mido", and still
fail to understand what is being said. If the hearer understands
the words in the sentence other than "Fido" and if he has no diffi¬
culty in grasping the syntax of the sentence, then we must say that
the person fails to understand "Fido". If I own a dog named "Pido",
and if my wife says to me» "Fido is barking", I shall most likely
understand perfectly well what she is saying. I shall, for example,
be able to infer that my dog is barking, that at least one dog in
Edinburgh i3 barking, that a brown mammal is barking, etc. If
Smith, however, does not know of any particular dogs named "Fido",
he will fail to understand much that I succeed in understanding of
my wife's statement. If he knows that "Fido" is usually the name
of a dog, he will probably grasp that some dog is barking. (This
case would be similar to the case of someone who hears» "This
bottle contains aqua-ammoniae", does not understand "aqua-ammoniae"
but knows that "aqua" usually occurs in expressions for things con¬
taining water, and, thanks to this etymological fortuity, has his
guess that the bottle contains something which is part water ren¬
dered true.) If he knows that "Fido" is a name but not that it is
usually a dog's name, he will probably grasp at least that some¬
thing named "Fido" is barking. But he cannot be said to have a
good understanding of what my wife said. If Jones, on the other
hand, knows of only one dog named "Fido", namely his pekinese, it is
likely that he will misunderstand what my wife said. For while I
infer, say, that my chihuahua, out in the back garden, is barking,
Jones is likely to infer, say, that his pekinese, out in the car, is
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barking. If both Smith and Jones are clear about "is balking" and
about the syntax of the sentence, then their short-comings must be
said to be, respectively, a failure to understand and a misunder¬
standing of "Fido".
J.A. Fodor would deny my suggestion that one who knowsFido is
better qualified to understand "Fido" than one who does not know
Fido. Writing about the sentence: "Tom is a thief", Fodor says:
"I, a speaker who does not know Tom ... am perfectly capable of
grasping that sentence. It is clear what the story ought to be:
I know that "Tom" is a name ... and I therefore know that the sen¬
tence "Tom is a thief" claims that someone named Tom is a thief",
("Could Meaning be an r ?", P« 240| I have deleted material apply¬
ing to Mowrer's stimulus-response theory of meaning, which Fodor
is attacking and which need not concern us here.).
I want to suggest that Fodor is thinking of cases where a
sentence is written on a blackboard for consideration. One looks
at the sentence; and, if he knows English, he knows that the sen¬
tence would most likely be used to state, of someone named "Tom",
that he is a thief. This counts, I suppose, in one sense of "un¬
derstanding a sentence", as understanding a sentence. But if the
sentence is actually used to make a statement in Fodor's pre¬
sence, Fodor will actually grasp very little of what is said. If
he is lucky, his knowledge that "Tom" is usually the name of a
male human might allow him to draw some tentative inferences.
But, like Smith and Jones in regard to "Fido", he will be much
less capable of grasping what is said than will someone who knows
Tom.
We just allowed that "Tom is a thief" would most likely be
used to state, of 3omeone named "Tom'1, that he is a thief. This
does not entail the stronger position suggested by what Fodor says,
namely, that if someone says; "Tom is a thief", he is 3tating that
someone named "Tom" is a thief. But what about this stronger posi¬
tion? It is clear that, when someone saysi "N is such-and-such",
that someone named "N" is such-and-such cannot be all of what he
is stating. A statement made by means ofi "Aristotle owns air¬
planes", can be false while it is true that someone named "Aristotle"
owns airplanes. But it can be more plausibly maintained that when
someone sayst "N is such and such", part of what he is stating is
that someone named "N" is such-and-such. It is not clear, however,
that this more plausible contention is true of all cases of "N is
such-and-such". Suppose that a stranger comes into the neighbour¬
hood bar, orders a rye, and drinks it. '/.lien his glass is empty, a
generous drunk points to the stranger and says to the bartenders
"Sam, here, is drinking rye. Give him one on me." The drunk is
not mistaking the stranger for someone else named "Sam". He is
just calling him "Sam". Now it seems plausible to maintain that
it might be the case that what the drunk stated when he said, "Sam,
here, is drinking rye", is true while it is false that someone
named "Sam" is drinking rye. I am not sure what to say about this
matter. But, at any rate, even if the contention in question is
not true of all cases of "N is such-and-such", there seems to be
no good reason to deny that it is true of the more likely cases
of "N is such-and-such".
Let us return to Jones for a moment now. % wife saidi
"Fido is barking". I inferred that my chihuahua, out in the back
garden, is barking. Jones inferred that his pekinese, out in the
car, is barking. It is not unilluminating to say in such a case
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that Jones took "Fido" in one sense of the word, that I took it in
another sense, and that the sense in which I took it is the sense
in which my wife was using it. According to this view, a proper
name will he an ambiguous expression having as many senses as there
are different objects which have the name, (cf. Searlei "Both "bank"
and "John Smith" suffer from homonymy", "Proper Names and Descrip¬
tions", p.490).
If we adopt the view that I am arguing for, i.e., that proper
names have senses and that most of them, being ambiguous, have more
than one sense, it would be reasonable for us to expect dictionaries
to list at least the most important of the proper names of the lan¬
guage and to specify the most important senses of eaoh name. Ryle
claims that "dictionaries do not tell us what proper names mean".
But I suspect that Hyle's generalization is founded upon an inspec¬
tion of British dictionaries, which, indeed, fail to list proper
names. But a less insular inspection will reveal that American
dictionaries do list proper names, and that their listing of vari¬
ous senses follows the same format as their listing of various
senses for other ambiguous expressions. (See e.g., the entry for
"Churchill, Winston" in Webster's New World Dictionary of the Ame¬
rican Language, a standard reference work in the United States.)
It is surprising, incidentally, that Vendler should agree with
Hyle on this point, (Linguistics in Philosophy, p. 38). Although
Oxford English Dictionary is superior in many ways to every
Amerioan dictionary, those who adopt the view for which I am ar¬
guing will have to maintain that the O.S.D. has at least one short¬
coming.
I have discussed a case in which inferences are drawn from a
statement containing a proper name. Are these inferences real
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deductive inferences or are they just something like educated
guesses? According to Ryle, "From the fact that yonder dog is Fido,
no other truth about him follows at all". And since Ryle wants his
view to apply to all statements involving proper names, ("Using a
proper name is not committing oneself to any further assertions
whatsoever"), we can dispense with any inconvenience presented by
"yonder dog", and say that on his view, from the fact that this is
Fido nothing further about this follows at all. Let us suppose
that I have a brown chihuahua named "Fido", and that my wife tells
me, truly, that this is Fido. (She is perhaps pointing at some¬
thing which I barely see through the window), I make several in¬
ferences about this, namely, that he is brown, that he is a chihu¬
ahua, and that he is mine. Ryle would have to say that what I in¬
ferred does not follow from the fact that this is Fido; I say
that it does. How can we adjudicate this dispute?
Let us consider the following argument!
(3) P, This is Fido
Therefore, Q, This is a chihuahua.
Someone concerned to defend Ryle would probably say that the argu¬
ment contains a suppressed premiss, Ri "Fido is a chihuahua", and
that only with this added premiss do we have a valid argument.
(P,R,£ would not be of any of the Aristotelian Forms; but few will
deny that it is a valid argument.) I claim, on the other hand,
that R is not a premiss added to P but an elucidation of what is
already stated in P. I claim that (3) is like
(4) 3, Yonder human is a bachelor.
Therefore, T, Yonder human is unmarried.
Logicians, when they feel like being strict, will not admit (4) as
a valid deduction. They will claim, — rightly, I think — that
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there is no rule of inference which will allow one to derive T
from 3. In order to derive T from 3, either we must add the pre¬
miss, Ui "All bachelors are unmarried", or we must rewrite S as
8's "Yonder human is male and yonder human is unmarried". But
although such uses of U and 3' add a more perspicuous logical form
to the surface structure of the argument, few would claim that any
content is added by U or S'. U merely elucidates the meaning of
S, and S' is merely an alternative way of stating what is already
stated by S. Now my claim is that R is to P in (3) as U is to S
in (4).
Consider now another argumenti
(5) V, Yonder human is the author of feverlay.
Therefore, W, Yonder human is the author of Ivanhoe.
There is clearly a suppressed premiss here. (5) needs the pre¬
miss, X» "The author of Waverley is the author of Ivanhoe". And
there is no doubt about the status of X. X does more than contri¬
bute to the form of (5). It adds some content. To state V and X
is certainly more than to state V alone, for X expresses a purely
contingent truth. It could easily be the case that the author of
Waverley did not write Ivanhoe. Now a defender of Ryle would
claim that R is to P in (3) as X is to V in (5).
This is not an easy dispute to settle. The best I can offer
are some metaphysical considerations which, if acceptable, will
tend one towards the view that if not Q then at least some propo¬
sitions expressed by means of sentences of the formi "This is F",
must follow directly from: "This is Fido". I, who know Fido in¬
timately, find it incredible that this could be Fido without being
a chihuahua, brown, mine, etc. But let us suppose a pure Rylean
position. Nothing follows from the fact that this is Fido. This
can be Fido without being mine, a chihuahua, browni without having
any particular property whatsoever. On this view, Fido, along with
the rest of us bearers of proper names, will have to be a bare par¬
ticular, a substance of the sort in which Locke, (and sometimes the
•early' Wittgenstein"*"), is said by some philosophers to have be¬
lieved. Fido is just Fido. He may have some properties? but there
are no particular properties which he must have, and no particular
properties which he must fail to have in order to be Fido. He can
be square, triangular, millepeded, the author of Waverley, the
victor at Waterloo, the capital of Rhode Island, or anything else
you please, and still be Fido. Such a theory sounds strange —
and even stranger when, say, "Gilbert Ryle" or "Winston Churchill"
is substituted for "Fido" in the above context — but such is the
theory.
My metaphysical view is closer to one which is sometimes
attributed to Aristotle. Fido and the rest of us are not bare
particulars. There are certain properties which are essential to
2
us. This thing cannot be Winston Churchill without being a man;
this thing cannot be Fido without being a chihuahua, and so on.
The "cannot" is one of necessity. And because of my metaphysical
view, I can say that although (3) needs its form adjusted a bit,
no further content need be added to make it valid.
The trouble with using metaphysics to back up positions is
1. Lee Irving M. Copi, "Objects, Properties, and Relations in the
"Tractatus"", and G.bi.M. Anscombe, "Mr. Copi on Objects, Pro¬
perties, and Relations in the Tractatus", for a more detailed
discussion of hare particulars than I am giving here.
2. According to the 'Aristotelian' view there are other properties
which are "accidental" to us. It will be seen later on that
this latter point is one which I do not wholeheartedly adopt,
(See Section Vlll).
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that once one has got down to such fundamentals there is little
one can say in support of one's position. The theory of hare par¬
ticulars is a respectable one; and the opposing theory is respec¬
table too. I know of nothing on® can say to support one theory
and refute the other. All I can say is that I like my metaphysi¬
cal view and I shall try to make my theory of language accord with
it.
Let us climb down from the airy realm of metaphysics and
look at the last paragraph in the quotation from Ryle. The in¬
teresting thing about this paragraph is that even if everything
said in it is true, there is nothing in it to back up Hyle's view
that proper names have no sense. Of course the fact that the
Chinese use names different from those we use for the planets
points out no disagreement in astronomy between them and us. But
the fact that their predicate expressions differ from ours points
out no disagreement either. And perhaps, as Ryle says, "saying
is not naming and naming is not saying". Perhaps it can be main¬
tained that, when the priest sayss "I baptize thee "Parmenides"",
(or something of that sort), he is not saying anything true or
false. But, even if this could be maintained, it would not point
out anything peculiar about proper names. For it could, equally
well, be maintained that, when someone overtly coins a new expres¬
sion of any sort, (or overtly gives an expression of any sort a
new sense), he is not saying anything true or false either. Ryle's
mistake seems to be that, after having formed the opinion that no¬
thing is conveyed when something is given a certain name, he tried
to generalize this point to illuminate all uses of proper names.
And he ended up holding the false view that nothing is conveyed by
a proper name in any context.
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SECTION VIi PROPER NAMES, A PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION, AND
SOME REMARKS ABOUT CONTEXT
If we axe moved by the consideration of Section V to hold
that proper names have sense, then we shall be faced with the dif¬
ficulty of deciding how to characterize the sense of a proper name.
It would be natural to theorize that the sense of a proper name is
whatever description happens to be in the mind of the speaker who
uses the name. But true as it is that speakers generally have des¬
criptions in mind when they use proper names, a problem of communi¬
cation — suggested by Russell — arises if we identify the sense
which a proper name has when a speaker is using it with the descrip¬
tion in the mind of the speaker.
Let us say that the proposition which one asserts is a
'function' of what the speaker has in mind when he utters a sen¬
tence. This is a difficult matter to be precise about, but some
examples will get us going. If I say: "Socrates is bearded",and
if what I have in mind when uttering "Socrates" is the descrip¬
tion: the inventor of the theory of forms, then the proposition
which I am asserting is the proposition that the inventor of the
theory of forms is bearded. If, however, the description which I
have in mind is: the philosopher who drank the hemlock, then the
proposition I am asserting by uttering that sentence is the propo¬
sition that the philosopher who drank the hemlock is bearded. Now
I think it is quite dear, (if the reader will grant me this no¬
tion of 'what one has in mind'), that it often happens that two
speakers have different descriptions in mind when they use the same
proper name, in the same sentence, to refer to the same individual,
and that, for this reason, two speakers can be asserting different
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propositions while they are both using the same proper name, in
the same sentence, to refer to the same individual and to say the
same thing about him. And I also think it is clear that one person
can use a sentence with a proper name in it to refer to an indivi¬
dual and to ascribe a certain predicate to him and another person
can use the same sentence to deny the same predicate of the indi¬
vidual while what the first person asserts is neither the contra¬
dictor nor a contrary of what the second person asserts. Suppose
that John thinks of Socrates as the inventor of the theory of
forms, that Bill thinks of him as the philosopher who drank the
hemlock, and that Sam thinks of him as the wisest Athenian, and
that none of these men suspects that the descriptions in terms of
which the ethers think of Socrates are true of Socrates. Suppose,
now, that John, Bill, and Sam, respectively, utter the following
sentences while having their respective descriptions in minds
(J) Socrates is bearded,
(b) Socrates is bearded,
(S) It is false that Socrates is bearded.
Now the problem of communication arises as follows. We
should like to say that John and Bill are in agreement and that
John and Sam are in disagreement. But how can this be the case?
John asserted that the inventor of the theory of forms is bearded.
But Bill, in asserting that the philospher who drank the hemlock
is bearded, failed to assert anything which either entails or is
entailed by what John asserted. That the inventor of the theory
of forms is the philosopher who drank the hemlock is surely a con¬
tingent fact. So it is hard to see how John can be construed as
having expressed agreement with Bill. Sam, on the other hand,
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asserted that it is false that the wisest Athenian is bearded. And,
since what Sam asserted neither entails nor is entailed by the con¬
tradictory of what John asserted, it is hard to see how Sam and John
can be in disagreement.
It is true, of course, that what John asserts is materially
equivalent to what Bill asserts. But if asserting materially equi¬
valent propositions were enough to get people into agreement, Bill
may as well have agreed with John by asserting that snow is white.*
Similarly, what Sam asserts is materially equivalent to the contra¬
dictory of what John asserts, but this is not enough to get a disa¬
greement going either.
Russell tries to get communication going among users of pro¬
per names by saying, (in regard to "Bismarck")*
It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only
known by description, we often intend to make our statement, not
in the form involving the description, but about the actual thing
described. That is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck,
we should like, if we could, to make the judgement which Bismarck
alone can make, namely the judgement of which he himself is a con¬
stituent. In this we are necessarily defeated, since the actual
Bismarck is unknown to us. But we know that there is an object B
called Bismarck, and that B was an astute diplomatist. We can thus
desoribe the proposition we should like to affirm, namely, "B was
an astute diplomatist", where B is the object which wan Bismarck.
What enables us to communicate in spite of the varying descriptions
we employ is that we know there is a true proposition concerning
the actual Bismarck, and that, however we may vary the description
(so long as the description is correct), the proposition described
is still the same. This proposition, which is described and is
known to be true, is what interests usj but we are not acquainted
with the proposition itself, and do not know it_, though we know it
is true. ("Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description",
p. 205).
Linsky, (whose remarks on this topic led me to write the present
Section), attacks Russell by saying*
1. I use "is" tenselessly, and I assume that Socrates is bearded
What I find incoherent in this is the idea of a proposition which
we know to be true but which we cannot understand. This proposi¬
tion is the one we 'intend to make'. How can we intend to make a
proposition we cannot understand? How can we possibly know such a
proposition to be true? (Referring, p.6o).
I have no trouble, however, with the idea of a proposition which we
know to be true but which we cannot understand. I know, for ex¬
ample, that someone, I know not who, was calledi "the onlie beget¬
ter of these insuing sonnets, Mr So I know that there is a true
proposition which would be expressed by means of a sentence of the
forms "X was called "the onlie begetter of these insuing sonnets,
Mr W.H."", but since I do not know what proposition this is, I can
hardly be said to understand it.
There is, however, another difficulty with Russell's theory.
Russell, (if I understand him correctly), would say that we can
get agreement and disagreement going among John,Bill, and dam by
having them s&y:•
(Jl) The proposition which Socrates would assert to the effect
that he is bearded is true.
(Bl) The proposition which Socrates would assert to the effect
that he is bearded is true*
(51) It is false that the proposition which Socrates would assert
to the effect that he is bearded is true.
The difficulty with this solution is simply that the descriptions
peculiar to each man's way of thinking of Socrates are not got rid
of by the analysis. For what John, Bill, and Sam assert when they
use the sentences! (Jl), (Bl), and (Si), will have to bet
(J2) The proposition which the inventor of the theory of forms would
assart to the effect that he is bearded is true,
(B2) The proposition which the philosopher who drank the hemlock
would assert to the effect that he is bearded is true,
(52) It is false that the proposition which the wisest Athenian would
assert to the effect that he is bearded is true.
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But since (B2) neither entails nor is entailed by (J2), and since
(32) neither entails nor is entailed by the contradictory of (J2),
this solution does not set John and Bill in agreement and John and
Sam in disagreement.
I propose that we solve this problem by distinguishing what
one asserts, when he utters a sentence, from what he states by
means of that sentence. Although an assertion will be a private
thing, dependent upon what one has in mind, a statement will be a
public thing: the meaning of the sentence which one utters.
There will be no agreement or disagreement among the assertions
made by John, Bill, and Sam, but there will be agreement and dis¬
agreement among their statements.
We shall lead up to an application of this distinction to
our problem by considering some other examples. Suppose that Tom,
bemoaning the lack of facilities at our university, says: "Our
university does not have a Wilson cloud chamber". James replies:
"But our university has a Wilson cloud chamber". Now we may
suppose that Tom, an aesthetician quite ignorant of scientific
matters, does not really know what a Wilson cloud chamber is, al¬
though he has a slight suspicion that it might have something to
do with rain making. This fact gives us sufficient reason to say
that Tom does not knov> what the expression, "Wilson cloud chamber",
means. James, on the other hand, is a physicist who knows perfect¬
ly well what a Wilson oloud chamber is. He has a good understand¬
ing of the meaning of "Wilson cloud chamber". But, in spite of
this difference between Tom's and James's understanding of "Wilson
cloud chamber", we are not troubled in the way in which we were
troubled by John, Bill, Sam and "Socrates". The reason for our
laok of puzzlement in this case is that, although "Socrates" may
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be regarded as highly ambiguous, having as many senses as there are
things named "Socrates", we are confident that "Wilson cloud cham¬
ber" has only one sense in English. Since the expression has only
one sense, what is going on in Tom's mind when he uses the expres¬
sion can have no bearing on the contribution made by that expres¬
sion to the statement he is making. This is not to deny that Tom
can give the expression a new sense by stipulating that he is going
to use "Wilson cloud chamber" to mean, say, what "rain making de¬
vice invented by someone named "Wilson"" means. Were he to do so,
he would be effecting a ohange in the semantics of a dialect of
English, i.e., the dialect spoken by Tom. But before such a con¬
vention is decreed, Tom is working with English as it is. And the
semantics of English, as it is, give only one sense to "Wilson
cloud chamber". If the expression is used with any sense, then it
must be used with this sense. So far as I can see, the only alter¬
natives to the view that Tom was using the expression in its stan¬
dard English sense are (l) that his use of the expression was sense¬
less, and (2) that he was using the expression in the sense which
he thought it had. The first alternative is untenable because it
is clear that someone who does not know what "Wilson cloud cham¬
ber" means can, nonetheless, make a false statement by utterings
"Our university does not have a Wilson cloud chamber". The second
alternative is untenable for the same reason. If someone were to
say1 "Our university does not have a Wilson cloud chamber", and
if our university does have a Wilson oloud chamber, then this per¬
son would be making a false statement. If we discover that this
person thinks that "Wilson oloud chamber" means "rain making de¬
vice invented by someone named "Wilson", then we should not change
our minds and decide that he made a true statement after all. We
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should. 8ay that, because of the fact that he misunderstands "Wil¬
son cloud chamber", he made a false statement. I do not deny, of
course, that one can assert that our university does not have a
rain making device invented by someone named "Wilson" by uttering
the sentence! "Our university does not have a Wilson cloud cham¬
ber". What I am denying is that someone can state that our uni¬
versity does not have a rain making device invented by someone
named "Wilson" by uttering the sentence! "Our university does
not have a Wilson cloud chamber".
Had the expression in question more than one sense, i.e.,
were it ambiguous, the matter would be different. To take an
easy example, suppose that Tom, commenting on the lack of facili¬
ties in northern Alberta, saysi "There are no banks in the Peace
River Country". James, aghast, replies! "But there are banks in
the Peace River Country". Tom is thinking of financial institu¬
tions. James is thinking of the banks of the Peace River. In
this case, the word, "banks", has several senses in English. One
of these senses, the one in which the word is a verb meaning a
kind of aeronautical manoeuvre'1', is ruled out by the sentential
context! "There are (no) in the Peace River Country". 3ut,
in the given sentential context, the word can have either the
sense in which it means financial institutions of a certain kind
or the sense in which it means banks of a river. Although the
1. It might be held that a difference in syntactic description of
the order of a difference between noun and verb marks a differ¬
ence of words rather than a difference of senses of the same
word. According to my usage, however, tokens, (both word and
sentence), are assigned to types on the ba3is of phonological
and orthographic descriptions. I realize that there are prob¬
lems with this way of looking at things, but such is my present
usage.
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sentential context and the semantics of English restrict the number
of senses in which the word can be used, these factors fail to de¬
termine which of the permitted senses is the one in which it is actu¬
ally being used. The sense in which the word is actually being used
is, in this case, determined by the state of mind of the speaker.
Eince Tom had financial institutions of a certain kind in mind, the
word, "banks", in Tom's statement, meant financial institutions of
a certain kind. Since James had river banks in mind, the word,
"banks", in James's statement meant river banks. And, since the
Peace River Country can have river banks without having financial
institutions, and vice versa, James's statement does not contradict
Tom's statement.
Let us now look at another case. Suppose that Tom and James
are discussing Kant. Tom saysi "The transcendental aesthetic is
the science of all principles of a priori sensibility".^ James
saysj "The transcendental aesthetio is not the science of all prin¬
ciples of a priori sensibility". There are several ambiguous words
here, but we shall concentrate on just one, "sensibility", preten¬
ding that the rest are unambiguous. "Sensibility" has at least two
senses in English. It can mean delicate sensitiveness of taste, or
it can mean the power of sensation or perception. How I think it
is reasonable to say that even if Tom and James have no more than
the crudest grasp of what "sensibility" means in the sense last in¬
dicated, and even if Tom and James understand this word in somewhat
different ways, we can guarantee that these men are using the word
in the same sense and that their statements contradict one another.
What is required is that Tom and James understand the word along
the same lines. It is hard to be precise about what is necessary
1. The example is adapted from The Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp
Smith, tr., A21, B35. ' """"""" "
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for two men to understand such a word as "sensibility" along the
same lines, (we shall be able to be more precise about proper names).
But we can, at least, give an example. Even if both Tom and James
are first year students with only the foggiest notions of what
Kant*s philosophy can be about, if Tom and James intend to use this
word in the sens®, whatever it may be, which it has in Kantian phi¬
losophy, then I think this is sufficient for them to be using the
word in the same sense. low let us suppose that James happens to
think that "sensibility" applies only to visual perception, and
thinks, for some reason, that this word does not apply to tactile
perception. Tom, (who is blind) , happens to think that "sensibi¬
lity" applies only to tactile perception, and has no idea that it
applies to visual perception. Now it seems to me that even though
Teas and James understand "sensibility" in quit® different ways, the
fact that they both intend to use the word in the sense which it
has in Kantian philosophy is sufficient for them to understand it
along the same lines, and for them to be using it in the same sense.
We have just seen that the following sort of thing can take
place. Two speakers, A and B, use a word, w, with different things
in mind; w is an ambiguous expression having a set, s, of senses.
The linguistic context may restrict the senses in which the word
can be used to some sub-set of sj but this sub-set is not a unit
set. The fact that, although what A has in mind is not identical
to what B has in mind, what A has in mind is along the same lines
as what B has in mind ensures that A and B are using the word in
the same sense, and that communication, (here statements which con¬
tradict one another), can arise.
We may now turn to "Socrates". "Socrates" is an ambiguous
expression having an extremely large number of senses. It can mean
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Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato, but it can also mean any of a
large number of people, past, present and future, who have the name,
"Socrates". It can even mean cats, dogs, cities, motorcars, or any¬
thing else which anyone might choose to call "Socrates". But when
"Socrates" is used in a sentence to make a statement, it has just
one of these senses. It may happen that the observable context will
render one of these senses likely. For example, if I should happen
to sayi "Socrates did not invent the theory of forms, Plato did".
The sentential oontext, " did not invent the theory of forms,
Plato did", will make it likely that I am U3ing "Socrates" in the
sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato. Again,
if I should says "Socrates was a fine fellow", while addressing a
company of philosophers, although the sentential contexts "
was a fine fellow", will not make it any more likely that I am
using "Socrates" in the sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the
teaoher of Plato, than that I am using it to mean Socrates, i.e.,
the Greek fisherman I met last Summer, the fact that I am addres¬
sing a company of philosophers will make it more likely that I am
using the word to mean Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato, than
that I am using it in any other sense. But since the context only
renders a sense likely, but does not make one certain, the sense
in which I use the word will depend upon what I have in mind. If
what I have in mind is the description, the teaoher of Plato, then
I am using"Soorates"in the sense in which it means 3ocrates, i.e.,
the teacher of Plato. If what I have in mind is the description,
the Greek fisherman whom I. met last Summer, then I am using "Socra¬
tes" in the sense in which it means Soorates, i.e., the Greek
fisherman whom I met last Summer.
This is not to deny that the observable context cannot render
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it certain that one is using a proper name in some one sense. If I
say» "Socrates, the teacher of Plato and inventor of the theory of
forms, had a conversation one day with Parmenidea", then I am using
"Socrates" in the sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the teacher
of Plato. If I should, while uttering that sentence, happen to be
thinking of Socrates, i.e., the Greek fisherman, then I think that
this is just unfortunate for me. The sentential contexts " ,
the teacher of Plato and inventor of the theory of forms, had a
conversation with Paxraenides", guarantees that I am using "Socra¬
tes" in the sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the teacher of
Plato. Since I have uttered "Socrates" in that context, the matter
is no longer under the control of my mind.
Let us now go back to John, Bill, and Sam, who have uttered
sentencesi (j), (b), and (S):
(j) Socrates is bearded,
(B) Socrates is bearded,
(s) It is false that Socrates is bearded.
We shall assume that these sentences have been uttered 'out of the
blue1. Nothing in the observable context guarantees, or even makes
it likely, that "Soorates" is being used in one sense rather than
another. The sense, or senses, in which these men use "Socrates"
will depend solely upon what they have in mind. Now if, when John
uttered (J), he had been thinking of the Greek fisherman whom I
met last Summer, and if, when Bill uttered (b), he had been thin¬
king of the philosopher who drank the hemlock, then Bill and Sam
would have been both asserting and stating different propositions.
But let us assume that John, Bill, and Sam have in mind the descrip¬
tions which we mentioned before. John's description ist the inven¬
tor of the theory of forms. Bill's description iss the philosopher
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who drank the hemlock. And dam's description ist the wisest Athe¬
nian. In this case, I think we can say that, since all of those des-
criptions are along the same lines« John, Bill, and Sam are using
"Socrates" in the same sense. Although what John asserts is diffe¬
rent from what Bill asserts, John and Bill both state the same pro¬
position. Although what Sam asserts does not contradict what John
asserts, what Sam states does contradict what John states. In the
case of a proper name, what is needed in order that what two spea¬
kers have in mind be along the same lines is that what the speakers
have in mind be definite descriptions which happen to be satisfied
by the same individual.
The relation between the sense and the reference of a proper
name differs somewhat from the relation between the sense and the
reference of a definite description. If I says "The inventor of
the theory of forma is bearded", the sense of "the inventor of the
theory of forms" determines its reference, and the reference has
nothing to do with determining the sense. The theory of forms may
have been invented by Socrates, Plato, Thales, or anyone else$ but
the proposition which I state when I sayi "The inventor of the the¬
ory of forms is bearded".remains the same. In the case of a proper
name, however, there is a curious interchange between sense and re¬
ference. To anticipate a theory whioh will be discussed in Section
VIII, let us assume that, when "Socrates" is used to refer to Soc¬
rates, i.e., the inventor of the theory of forms, the sense of
"Socrates", on that occasion, is that of an expression of the form:
"(•) x)(s*)", i.e., "the individual, x, which S's", where "S" is an
abbreviated enumeration of all of Socrates's properties. How "Soc¬
rates" will, on a particular use of this expression, come to have
this sense as follows. If, when I sayj "Socrates is bearded", the
83
the description I have in mind isi the inventor of the theory of
forms, then, since Socrates - the inventor of the theory of forms,
I am using "Socrates" to refer to Soorates. But, since I am using
"Socrates" to refer to Socrates, "Socrates", on my use of it, comes
to have a sense which is determined by the properties of Socrates,
i.e., the sense of "( 7x)(Sx)". And, although what I assert is the
proposition that the inventor of the theory of forms is bearded,
what I state is the proposition that (7x)(Sx) is bearded. If, how¬
ever, it should happen that I sayi "Socrates is bearded", while
thinking of the Greek fisherman whom I met last Summer, then "Soc¬
rates", on my use of this expression, will come to have a sense,
say that of "( 7x)(Fx)", which will be determined by the properties
of that Greek fisherman. And the proposition I state will be the
proposition that ( 7x)(Fx) is bearded.
Before concluding this section, I want to say some more about
context. We may split the context of an expression up into the
speaker's mind, on the one hand, and the observable context on the
other. The observable oontext will include the non-linguistic
context and the linguistic context of the expression. The non-lin¬
guistic context of an expression will inolude the various things in
the vicinity of the speaker. For example, if I sayj "Bill, here,
is a philosopher", and if Bill Jones is standing right next to me,
then Bill Jones will form a part of the non-linguistic context of
"Bill", serving to make it quite likely, if not certain, that I am
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using "Bill" to refer to Bill Jones. The linguistic context will
include, on the one hand, the sentential context, e.g., " was a
fine fellow", and, on the other hand, the rest of the words in the
paragraph, page, book, 'discourse* or what-have-you, whioh surround
the expression.
The minds of other speakers may also be relevant. Suppose
that you and I both think of Socrates as the inventor of the theory
of forms, and that I sayi "Socrates is a good philosopher", and
you say; "I agree, Socrates is a good philosopher". On the theory
we hinted at above, we shall both be stating the proposition that
( 1 x) Sx) is a good philospher. But now our friend, Ernest, comes
into the room and says: "Socrates is not a good philosopher". Now,
if Ernest has in mind some definite description which is satisfied
by Socrates, e.g., the philosopher who drank the hemlock, Ernest
will have stated the proposition that ( u) Sx) is not a good philo¬
sopher. And he will have contradicted us. But suppose, now, that
Ernest is thinking of Socrates, i.e., the Greek fisherman. In this
case, although what we have in mind makes it likely that Ernest is
stating the proposition that ( 7 x) Sx) is not a good philosopher,
Ernest's mind overrides what we have in mind, and the proposition
he states turns out to be the proposition that ( 7 x) Fx) is not a
good philosopher} and Ernest is not contradicting us. But let us
take another case. Ernest has no description in mind. He has no
idea of who Socrates might be. He is just being contrary. In this
case, I think we may say that, since what we have in mind makes it
likely that Ernest is using "Socrates" in the sense in which it
means Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato, and since Ernest's mind
fails to supply a different sense, the sense which is made the most
likely by our minds is the sense in which Ernest was using the ex-
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preaslon. Ernest stated the proposition that ( 7x)(dx) is not a
good philosopher. And Ernest contradicted ua. Let us try to state
a general principle. If the observable context, (we may allow this
to include the ininda of other speakers), of an expression makes it
likely that that expression is being used in a certain sense, then,
if what the speaker, (or writer), has in mind is along the lines of
one of the senses which the expression may have in that context,
the speaker's mind can override the observable context. If, how¬
ever, the speaker has nothing in mind, or if what the speaker has
in mind is not along the lines of any of the senses which the ex¬
pression can have, then the sense rendered most likely by the ob¬
servable context is the sense in which the word is being used.
To take an example outside of the field of proper names,
suppose that I says "Plato is a realist". We shall assume that
the sense of "Plato" is determinate, and concentrate upon "realist".
This word may have either of at least two sensess the sense in
which it means a philosopher who quantifies over universals, and
the sense in which it means a hard headed fellow. The fomer sense
is rendered the most likely by the sentential contexti "Plato is
a But if, when I utter this sentence, what I have in mind
is a hard headed fallow, then my mind overrides the observable con¬
text and determines that I am stating the proposition that Plato
is a hard headed fellow. If,however, I recite the sentence with¬
out meaning anything by "realist" — suppose that I am regurgita¬
ting this sentence in an examination — then, since I have nothing
in mind, I am using the expression in the sense which iff rendered
most likely by the observable contexts I ara stating the proposition
that Plato is a philosopher who quantifies over universals. If,
finally, I intend to shock my reader by claiming that Plato is a
86
nominalist, but I write "realist" by a slip of the pen, then ~
assuming that X writ® nothing else to clarify ray intentions — since
what I hav® in mind is not along the lines of any of the senses
which "realist" is capable of having, the observable context takes
over and, unfortunately for me, I state the proposition that Plato
is a philosopher who quantifies over universale.
The importance of the speaker's mind may be illustrated by an
example which I adapt from Bar-Hillel, ("A Qemonstration of the Son-
feasibility of fully Automatic High Quality Translation"). For
simplicity, let us assume, as does Bar-Hillel, that "pan" has just
two senses in English* (1) a writing pen, and (2) a children's
playpen. How consider the sentence* "The box was in the pen", in
the linguistic context* "Little John was looking for his toy box.
Finally he found it. John was very happy". How
the linguistic context makes it quite likely that the word, "pen",
is being used in the seoond of its two senses. A reader with just
the given information at his disposal will, in all likelyhood,
take "pen" in sense (2). But he night be wrong, as can be seen by
supposing that the sentence and context quoted make up the first
paragraph of the second volume of a series} and that the author
has either written or intended to wrdto a first volume in which he
speaks of John having received a micro-miniature toy box and of
John's brother having found, in a cereal box, a 'spaceman's* pen,
equipped with a secret compartment for hiding things. (Such a pen
would still be a writing pen). As soon as we see that the first
volume need not actually have been written but may just be inten¬
ded or imagined by the author, it becomes olear that when we say
that the context renders a given sense likely, we should take
"likely" literally, and not read it as "actual".
07
None of this is intended to detract either from Bar-Hillel's
claim thatj
What makes an intelligent human reader grasp this meaning [i.e.,
sense (2)] so unhesitatingly is... [primarily] his knowledge that
the relative sizes of pens, in the sense of writing implements, toy
boxes, and pens, in the sense of playpens, are such that when some¬
one writes under ordinary circumstances and in something like the
given context, "The box was in the pen", he almost certainly refers
to a playpen and not to a writing pen. ("A Demonstration...," p. 176),
or from his claim, (loo. cit.), that "this knowledge is not at the
disposal of the electronic computer." I wish only to emphasize the
trivial faots that even the most intelligent human reader can take
.a word in a sense other than the one in which the writer or speaker
is using it, that the sense in which a word is being used is often
determined, simply, by the speaker's mind, and that even where the
observable context renders a given sense likely, the speaker can
often surprise us.
It is difficult to know how to draw the line between a case,
like the one just discussed, where the observable context renders
a given sense likely, and a case where the observable context makes
certain that a word is being used in a given sense. If the sen¬
tence! "Plato is a realist", is found in the middle of a technical
and knowledgeable treatise on ontology, it can be certain that that
sentence is being used to 3tate the proposition that Plato is a
philosopher who quantifies over universale. But it is hard to say
what can account for this certitude.
Incidentally, when I speak of the observable context making
it likely that an expression is being used in a given sense, the
reason why I use "likely", rather than, say, "probable", is to avoid
committing myself to any position on the question, (discussed in Bar-
Hillel, Language and Information), of whether any kind of statisti¬
cal method can be of any value in determining the relationship bet¬
ween sense and context.
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SECTION VIIi PASSING PROPER NAMES
Quine suggests that we may translate proper names into the
form: "(u) (Fx)", and that, where, for example, "Socrates", or
"Cerberus", is concerned, we need not hesitate to admit: "is-Soc-
rate3", or "is-Cerberue", as "the proper choice of "F"," (Methods
of Logic, p. 219)• On this view, "Cerberus" will be 'parsed* as
"(u) (x is-Cerberus)": and "is-Cerberus" will be regarded as a
predicate expression, a general term.
This suggestion of Quine's has led Geach to voice a quite
justifiable complaint:
Now suppose somebody chooses to call her dog "Cerberus", and intro¬
duces him under that name: "this is Cerberus". A follower of
Quine ' insists1' on parsing "Cerberus" as a predicate. Later on, he
says of another dog: "here is another Cerberus". On Quine's view,
this would be merely a factual mistake, which the owner could suit¬
ably correct by saying "No, there's only one Cerberus". Would it
not then be in place to ask the owner how she knows there is only
one Cerberus? and is not this plainly a silly question, in fact?
As the owner intended "Cerberus" to be used, such expressions as
"here is another Cerberus" or "there ere several Cerberuses" are
not just false statements — they are excluded altogether as moves
in the language-game played with "Cerberus". (Mental Acts, pp. 67f.)
In spite of the vagueness of the expression, "moves in the
language-game", and in spite of the doubt3 which one might have
about the relevance of dog-owners' intentions to logic, Geach has
a point here. There certainly is something logically odd about ad¬
mitting the possibility of there being several Cerberuses. But, if
"is-Cerberus" is a predicate expression, then there seems to be no
a priori reason why there should not be several Cerberuses. But the
objection is only a minor one, and holds only against treating "is-
Cerberus" as a predicate, not against parsing "Cerberus" as an in¬
stance of "(ix) (Fx)". There is, in fact, something else obviously
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wrong with allowing "is-Cerberus" as a value for "F" in "(ix) (Fx)".
We are told to translate "Cerberus" in the maimer of "(u) (Fx)",
and to plug "is-Cerberus" into the "F" slot. This results in "(n)
(x is-Cerberus)". But, since the doctrine requires us to translate
"Cerberus" into the formi "(tx) (Fx)", we are required to translate
the "Cerberus" in "(7x) (x is-Cerberus)" into the form! "(?x)
(Fx)", and on we go to infinity. But we may easily avoid the re¬
gress if our substituend for "F" is some predicate expression, such
as "Cerberizes", which is clearly not identical in meaning to "is-
Cerberus". (Quine does use "Pegasizes" sometimes.) This fairly
simple move both avoids the regress and permits a Quinean to answer
Geach's objection. Possibly more than one thing Cerberize3, (pace
Leibnizian laws). But it will be logically impossible for more
than one thing to be Cerberus. For to be Cerberus is to be (ix)
(x Cerberizes), i.e., the thing which Cerberizes. And, sincei "a
is (7x) (x Cerberizes)", is just a short way of saying! "(a x)
(x Cerberizes) & ((y) (y Cerberizes)(y - x)) & (a « x))",1 the
statement that a is Cerberus and b is Cerberus and a / b is logi¬
cally false.
In Word and Object, (p. 182), Quine proposes to deal with the
"feeling that in reparsing the names as general terms we forfeit
part of their meaning, viz. the purport of uniqueness," by sugges¬
ting that, just as the general term, "cousin", for example, obeys
the law of symmetry, so the notion of uniqueness might be recognized
to be implicit in the meaning of the general term, "Socrates". But
1. In previous places where I have discussed Quine, I have followed
his practice, of Word and Object, of using a good deal of 'Eng¬
lish' in logioal formulae. Since logioal formulae will, from
now on, appear a bit more frequently, it will help to Bave space
if, wherever convenient, I use standard logical symbols.
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this manoeuvre is, I think, rendered unnecessary if we recognize
that, when we translate "Socrates", for example, as "(? x) (Fx)", we
are not replacing "Soorates" just by "F", but by the whole expres¬
sion! "(?x) (Fx)".
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SECTION Villi IS THE SENSE OF A TROPES NAME THAT CP A COMPLETE
DESCRIPTION CP ITS OBJECT?
According to John Searle:
If we try to present a complete description of the object as the
sense of a proper name, odd consequences would ensue, e.g.i
(I) that any true statement about the object using the name as sub¬
ject would be analytic,
(II) any false one self-contradictory,
(III) that the meaning of the name (and perhaps the identity of the
object) would change every time there was any change at all in the
object,
(IV) that the name would have different meanings for different
people, etc. ("Proper Names", p. 157. I have inserted the Koman
numerals.
Searle has enumerated four propositions which he says would
follow "if we try to present a complete description of the object
as the sense of a proper name", and which he says are odd. If any¬
one ever tried to present a complete description of an object, (at
least of the sort of object to which proper names are usually given),
he would probably be frustrated by the limitations of his intelli¬
gence and the finitude of his life-span; and theoretical consequen¬
ces would not follow from such a try anyway. So I do not think that
we should take Searle too literally here. I do think, however, that
Searle has presented some strong objections to any theory which
claims that the sense of a proper name is that of"*" a complete des¬
cription of the object. And I doubt that it would be unfair to
1. The point of my "that of" is that, whereas it does not seem to
make sense to say that the sense of a name} is_ a description, it
does seem to make sense to say that the 3ense of a name, (on a
particular use of it, of oourse), is the same sense as the sense
of 3ome description.
92
Searle to read him as claiming that consequences, (i)-(lV) are en¬
tailed by any theory which makes such a claim, and that consequen¬
ces, (i)-(IV) are odd# I shall call any theory of the sort in
question a "CD theory", (for "complete description theory"). Need
a CD theory entail (i)-(lY)? And, of the consequences entailed by
a CD theory, which are odd? I shall treat (i)-(lV) in the orders
(IV), (III), (I), (II).
In one sense of "meaning", (IV) i8 odd, in another sense, it
is not. (IV) ia odd if it means that if I 3ays "Socrates is a
philosopher"*, and you say» "Yes, I agree, Socrates is a philo¬
sopher", then you and I must have stated different propositions.
(IV) is not odd if it means that, if I sayt "3ocrates is a philo¬
sopher", and if you say, "Yea, I agree, Socrates is a philospher",
2
you and I have a different set of Socratic properties in mind.
A CD theory need not entail the odd consequence. In fact, it seems
to me that a major point in favour of a CD theory is that, by say¬
ing, for example, that the sense of "Socrates" is that of a complete
description of Socrates, i.e., a description which enumerates all
of Soorates's properties, it guarantees that when you sayi "Soc¬
rates is a philosopher", you state the 3ame proposition as I state
1. Whenever a sentence ocoure as an example, it is to be assumed
that the sentence is actually being uttered by someone, on a
particular occasion, to make a statement. When a proper name
occurs in such a sentence, we shall assume that the user of that
sentence is using that name to refer to the most famous person
who bears the name. Thus, whenever "docrates" occurs in an ex¬
ample, it ia to be assumed that "Socrates" is being used by some¬
one to refer to Socrates, i.e., to the philosopher who invented
the theory of forma, taught Plato, made a nuisance of himself in
Athens, and drank the hemlock.
2. I shall use "properties" indiscriminately for both properties
and relations.
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when I say: "doorates is a philosopher", (assuming, of course, that
you and I are using: "is a philosopher", in the same sense), re¬
gardless of whether or not you and I have different sub-sets of the
set of Socrates's properties in mind, (or even, perhaps, a few odd
properties which are not members of that set).
As for the not-odd interpretation of (IV), althought a CD the¬
ory need not entail (IV), on this interpretation, it seems to me
that a CD theorist would do well to build it into his theory. For
it is quite a normal thing for two people to use the same proper
name to refer to the same person, but to have different descrip¬
tions in mind when they use this name.
Considering (ill) now, let us begin by ignoring the part
which dearie has in parentheses, (we shall come back to it in a
moment). (Ill)is a consequence of a CD theory only if (ill) is
built into the theory. If the CD theory says that, when "Soora¬
tes" is used at time, t, its sense is that of a description which
enumerates all and only those properties which Socrates has at t
or before t, then, if at a time, u, whioh is later than t, Socra¬
tes acquires a new property, "Socrates" will no longer have the
sense which it had at t. But a CD theorist does not have to build
(III) into his theory, We can say, instead, that the sense of
"Socrates", at any time at whioh it is used, is that of a descrip¬
tion which contains an extremely large list of *eternalized* pre¬
dicate expressions, e.g.: "invents the theory of forms at t",
"annoys Athenians at u", "drinks heralook at v", etc. These 'eter¬
nalized1 predicates will express all the properties whioh Socrates
has, has had, or ever will have. (I see no reason why future pro¬
perties should not be inoluded.) Since the list of properties will
be the same, regardless of the time at whioh "Socrates" is uttered,
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we need not say that there will be a change in the meaning of "Soc¬
rates" every time there is a change in Socrates. It will be noticed
that, on the way of looking at things just suggested, one could ne¬
ver, in practice, spell out the full sense of a proper name. But,
accustomed as philosophers are to finding themselves unable to spell
out the full sense of most of our everyday expressions, one should
not find this consequence unsettling.
I find Searle's parenthetical remark hard to understand. But
it might be based upon something like the following piece of con¬
torted reasoning. Aocording to the CD theory, when "Socrates" is
used at time t, its sense is that of a description which tells us
just what Socrates is doing at t. When "Socrates" is used at a la¬
ter time, u, when Socrates is doing something else, then its sense
is that of a description which tells us just what Socrates is doing
at u. Since what Socrates does at u differs from what Socrates does
at t, the sense of "Socrates" at u differs from the sense of "Soora-
tas" at t. But since, by hypothesis, the sense of "Socrates" is al-
wyas that of a complete description of its object, the sense of
"Socrates" at t must be that of a complete description of its ob¬
ject and the 3ense of "Socrates" at u must be that of a oomplete
description of its object. But since the sense of "Socrates" at t
differs from the sense of "Socrates" at u, the objects described by
the corresponding descriptions must be different. So Socrates at
t must be a different object from Socrates at u.
Such is my best attempt at making sense of Searle's paren¬
thetical remark. The idea that Socrates at one time is a different
object from Socrates at another time does not seem to me to be par¬
ticularly horrible. But a CD theorist does not need it anyway. If,
as I suggested before, we say that the sense of "Socrates", at any
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time at which it is used, is that of a description which contains a
large list of 'eternalized' predicate expressions, expressing all
the properties which Socrates has, had had, or ever will have, then
we need not worry about the sense of "Socrates" changing, and so,
need not worry about Socrates becoming a different object every
time he undergoes change.
We shall, from now on, be concerned only with a CD theory
which avoids claiming that the sense of "Socrates" changes every
time Socrates changes. When I give examples of predicate expres¬
sions which would go into a complete description of Socrates, I
shall, for the sake of brevity, not bother to include time referen¬
ces. But we shall assume that they are there.
Let us now turn to Searle's (i), i.e.: "that any true state¬
ment about the object using the name as subject would be analytic".
In one sense of "analytic", (I) would be a harmless consequence of
a CD theory. Consider the sentence:
(l) The pediatrician who loves her is a doctor who loves her.
Now obviously, the statement one would make by means of sentence,
(l), is not necessarily true. If no pediatrician loves her, then
it is false that the pediatrician who loves her is a doctor who
loves her. And it is not a necessary truth that some pediatrician
loves her. But there is no reason why we should have to say that,
since (l) is contingent, (l) is not analytic. According to Katz,
("Analyticity and Contradiction in Natural Language", p. 531), (l)
is analytic. But (l) is analytic only according to one sort of
idea of analyticity. Analyticity, Katz says in his complicated
fashion, "is the predicative vacuity that results from the failure
of the path associated with the predicate to contribute semantic
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elements to the path associated with the subject when these paths
are amalgamated to produce a reading for the sentence," (loc. cit.).
In more familiar terms, we might say that, since the concept ex¬
pressed by the predicate of (l) is among the concepts expressed
by the subject of (l), (l) is analytic.'*' But, although one may de¬
fine "analyticity" any way he pleases, we have to recognize that,
if we accept a Kata-like notion of analyticity, then we have to ad-
o
mit that something can be both analytic and contingent.
Let us now turn toi
(2) Socrates philosophises.
Given a Katz-like notion of analytioity, (2), on a CD theory of
proper names, is undoubtedly analytic. What is expressed by "phi¬
losophizes" is already expressed by part of the description which
corresponds to the sense of "Socrates". As Katz would have it,
were he to accept a CD theory, philosophizes would be among the
•semantic markers' assigned to "Socrates". But what we have to
ask is whether the statement which one makes by means of sentence
(2) would, on a CD theory, turn out, if true, to be neoessarily
true. I do not think that a CD theory has to have this oonsequence.
Here is how a CD theorist might treat (2). In accordance with
our treatment of "Cerberus" in Ceotion VII, we treat "Jocrates" as
the description* "(?x) (x Socratizes)". (2), now, may be analyzed
1. Katz draws & parallel between his notion of analytioity and that
of Kant, (of. Katz, The Philosophy of Language, pp. 189ff.)
2. I find it hard to understand how it is that Katz takes himself
to be providing an answer to Quine's scepticism over analytioity,
(cf. "Analyticity and Contradiction in Natural Language", p. 519
and pp. 530ff.) Katz's criterion allows something to be both
analytio and contingent. But it seams pretty clear that when
Quine, in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", attacked the analytic-
synthetic distinction, he was attacking a distinction between
necessary and contingent truths.
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as: "(3 x) ((x Socratizes) & ((y) (y Socratizes y = x)) & x phi¬
losophizes)", or, more briefly as:
(3) (3 y) (y - (?x) (x Socratizes) & y philosophizes).*
We now say that "x Socratizes" is an abbreviation for a complex pre¬
dicate of the form: "Fx & Gx & Hx...etc.", where "F", "G", "H", etc.,
express all of Socrates's properties. Since philosophizes is one
among Socratea's properties, (3), i.e., (2), becomes:
(4) (3 y) (y » (u) (Fx &...& x philosphizes) & y philosophizes),
with "Fx &..." as an abbreviation for an extremely long predicate
expression, expressing all of Socrates's properties with the excep¬
tion of that which is expressed by "x philosophizes". The upshot,
now, is that although (2), as interpreted by a CD theory, might be
regarded by some people as analytic, the statement which one makes
by means of sentence (2) need not, on a CD theory, turn out to be
a necessary truth. (4)» the CD theorist's analysis of (2), con¬
tains the contingent existential conjunct:
(5) (3 y) (y " 0 x) (Fx &•••& x philosophizes)).
Although there may be at least as many CD theories of proper
names as there are philosphers who wish to invent them, I shall,
henceforth, refer to the theory which analyzes (2) as (4) as "the
CD theory". Although it does follow from the CD theory that, if
anything is Soorates, then it philosophizes, i.e., that:
(6) (y) (y « (7x) (Fx &...& x philosophizes)) y philosophizes,
1. My motive for using (3) here, rather than the longer sentence
which precedes it is just brevity. An even briefer way of ex¬
pressing the same idea would, of course, be: "(?x) (x Socra¬
tizes) philosophizes ". But (3) has the advantage of bringing
the existential claim into prominence.
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it does not follow from the CD theory that something is Socrates,
i*©•, that (5)»
Although (4) does not express a necessary truth, it is a bit
pleonastic. For (4)» it appears, is logically equivalent to (5)*1
And, if (4) is the analysis of (2), then (2) is logically equiva¬
lent to (5). To say that Socrates philosophizes is just to 3ay
that Socrates exists. But sentence (2) does not turn out to be
quite so pleonastic as sentence (4)> Whereas the word, "philoso¬
phizes", has two explicit occurrences in sentence (4)> it appears
explicitly just once in sentence (2). The point of uttering sen¬
tence (2) might be to make explicit what is already implicit in
the meaning of "Socrates". For example, if the set of properties
which I have in mind when I think of Socrates includes philoso¬
phizes, and if the set of properties which you have in mind does
not include philosophizes, then the point of my uttering! "Soc¬
rates philosophizes" in your presence might be to help you to
learn more than you knew before about the meaning of "Socrates",
In a similar way, the sentence! "All triangles have angles equal
to 180 degrees", might be said to help us aoquire information
about the meaning of "triangle".
We need not think, however, that the CD theorist must say
that the only point there can be in uttering (2) would be to help
someone to improve his knowledge of the meaning of "Socrates". If
you think of Socrates as, for example, J&ft husfrafld ja£ .Ziaa&liffl&ftt
and do not know that the husband of Xanthippe philosophizes, then,
if I sayt "Socrates philosophizes", to you, although I shall say
no more than I should have said had I uttered! "Socrates exists",
1. cf. Whitehead and Russell, Principia. Kathematica, *14.23:
"l-:E! (u) (fx . 'f x) .W. {(u) \(j>x 7~f x)} ".
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I shall help you to acquire the information that the husband of
Xanthippe philosophizes.
Let us turn now to Searle'3 (il). Does it turn out, on the
CD theory, that any false statement, with "Socrates" as subject,
is self-contradictory? The CD theorist might begin by arguing
that, although it might be the case that some such statements are
self-contradictory, it is not clear that all of them are. Let us
suppose, for simplicity's sake, that Socrates has just three pro¬
perties, those expressed by "F", "G", and "H". Let us suppose,
moreover, that flies is not one among Socrates's properties. We
should now analyze the falsehoodi
(7) Socrates flies,
ass
(8) (3 y) (y « (7x) (Fx & Gx & Hx) & y flies).
There is no contradiction here. By means of sentence (8), one
states, of Socrates, that he has some property which, in fact, he
does not happen to have. But by no part of sentence (8) does one
state that he does not have that property. Although* by hypothe¬
sis, one who utters sentence (8) enumerates all of Socrates's pro¬
perties, one does not state that these are all of Socrates's pro¬
perties. So the statement one makes by means of sentence (8) is
just false, not a contradiction.
Someone concerned to refute the CD theory might argue that,
if flies is not one among Socrates's properties, then does not fly
oust be one among them. (7), if false, would turn out to be a
contradiction on the CD theory. For one who utters (7) would state,
in part, that something flies and does not fly.
The CD theorist might counter either by denying that there
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are negative properties or by distinguishing between positive and
negative properties and claiming that the only properties which are
to bs listed in a complete description of Doorates are his positive
ones. His antagonist might then reply by insisting that there are
negativo properties and by challenging the CD theorist to cone up
with a general method for distinguishing between positive and nega¬
tive properties.
But we shall not continue this imagined dispute. For to con¬
tinue it is just to put off the inevitable. The CD theorist must
admit that there are some statements, made by means of sentences
with "Soorates" as subject, which many people would not regard as
contradictory, but which, on the CD theory, are contradictory.
For consideri
(9) Socrates does not philosophize,
which, on the CD theory, will become1
(10) (3 y) (y « (7 x) (Fx &...& x philosophizes) & ~(y philoso¬
phizes)).
Even if the CD theorist can avoid saying that (7) is contradictory,
he must admit that (9) is contradictory. Moreover, since many
philosophers would probably deny that (9) is contradictory, one
must, I suppose, admit that the CD theory has at least one odd con¬
sequence.
But even if we admit that this consequence is odd, we still
have to ask whether it is unacceptable. On® reason why this con¬
sequence might seem unacceptable is that we have a feeling that
doorates might, had circumstances been different, taken up some
profession other than the one for which he is famous, and that he
might have never had a philosophical thought in his head. In other
words, we have a feeling thati
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(11) Possibly, Socrates does not philosophize,
is true. So, sinoe the CD theory seems to make (ll) false, the CD
theory appears unacceptable.
But let us see what the CD theorist can say in favour of his
theory. In the first place, although when the CD theorist analy¬
zes (9) as (10) he makes (9) out to be a contradiction, he does
not have to claim that it is always contradictory to deny that Soc¬
rates philosophizes. When I said that (9), on the CD theory, would
be analyzed as (10), I was assuming that "Socrates", in (9), has
what Russell would call "primary occurrence". Since, as I suggested
in Section II, most people would regard an expression such as "Soc¬
rates" as having primary occurrence in a sentence such as (9), it is
best to swim with the current and to assume that "Socrates" has pri¬
mary occurrence in (9). But uttering (9) is not the only way we
have to deny that Socrates philosophizes. We may also says
(12) Nots Socrates philosophizes,
ors "It is not the case that Socrates philosophizes". And (12), on
the CD theory, becomess
(13) ~ (3 y) (y - (n) (Fx &...& x philosophizes) & y philoso¬
phizes).
And (13) is not a contradiction. The 0D theorist, now, might just
say that, although (ll) is false,
(14) Possibly not1 Socrates philosophizes.
is true. So one can, without contradiction, deny that Soorates
philosophizes.
Someone concerned to refute the CD theory might reply that the
CD theorist has missed the point. What is at issue is not whether
or not one can, without contradiction, deny that Socrates philoso-
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phizes. lHhat is at issue is whether or not (ll) is true, i.e.,
whether or not (9)» with "Soorates" having primary occurrence, is
a contradiction. And (9), so understood, (the antagonist will say),
is obviously not a contradiction* Socrates might have never philo¬
sophized.
Faced with such an objection, the CD theorist can reply by
challenging his antagonist to state just what he means by 3aying
that (ll) is true. What sort of possible world doe3 he envisage,
in which Socrates does not philosophizes Would it be a world in
which the man who teaches philosophy to Plato does not philoso¬
phize? Obviously not. For how can anyone teach philosophy with¬
out philosophizing? Or would it be a possible world in which the
man who invents the theory of forms does not philosophize? Obvi¬
ously not, again. For how can anyone invent the theory of forms
without philosophizing? Perhaps, then, the possible world which
he envisages is one in which the man who is called "Socrates", who
annoys Athenians, and who drinks hemlock does not philosophize.
But, if this is the possible world envisaged by the CD theorist's
antagonist, then what he must mean by (ll) is that the following
statement is not a contradiction*
(15) (3 y) (y • (?x) (x is called "Socrates" & x annoys Athenians
& x drinks hemlock) & ~ (y philosophizes)).
But with this the CD theorist may agree. (15)» obviously, is not
a contradiction. But it does not follow from the CD theory that
(15) is a contradiction. It just follows from the CD theory that
(9) is a contradiction. Turning back to (ll), now, the CD theorist
will say that, although the statement which one makes by means of
sentence (ll) is false, what one means, or has in mind, when he
makes this statement, may well be true.
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SECTION IXi REFERENTIAL OCCURRENCE
In Section I, I made the claim that we can use the same sen¬
tence-component to make identifying reference to an entity and to
state that that entity exists. This claim conflicts with the fre¬
quently held opinion that there is such an essential difference bet¬
ween referring and stating that one cannot use the same expression
to do both at once. In the present section, I shall say some things
which I hope will serve to indicate that my claim is the trivial and
innocuous claim which I think it is. My remarks will lead to a
general discussion of reference. We begin by considering the ex¬
pressions
(1) The President of the United States,
and reciting some points of common knowledge, (l) is an expression
of the sort which philosophers have called denoting phrases, or
definite descriptions, or definite singular terms, or referring
expressions. One of its most frequently noted fe&tureB is that it
may be used to perform the task of what Strawson calls identifying
reference. We might use a sentence likei
(2) The President of the United States is a Republican,
in order to perform the task of reporting the state of affairs that
the President of the United States is a Republican. And, in per¬
forming this task, we may be using the expression, (l) to perform
the sub-task of designating some particular historical item, i.e.,
the President of the United States, which the state of affairs
which is being reported involves, and which we are going to use the
rest of the sentence to say something about.
Let us now consider the expression!
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(3) Blah.
"A rose", so Juliet's theory of meaning goes, "by any other name
would, smell as sweet". The President of the United States, by any
other referring expression, may be just as easily designated. There
is no reason in logic — or anywhere else, for that matter — why
there should not exist a community of English speakers, somewhere,
whose dialect differs from ours only in that they use (3) in preci¬
sely the same way as we use (l). In the sentences "Blah is a Repub¬
lican", uttered by one of those speakers, (3) would be used to de¬
signate the President of the United States, and the rest of the sen¬
tence would be used to say that he is a Republican.
Consider now the expressions
(4) OneandonlyonethingisPresidentoftheUnitedStatesandthatthing.
Again, the President of the United States, by any other referring
expression, may be just as easily designated. Just as there may
exist a community of speakers who use (3) as we use (l), a communi¬
ty of speakers, somewhere, might very well use (4) as we use (l).
If a member of that community were to says
(5) OneandonlyonethingisPresidentoftheUnitedStatesandthatthing is
a Republican,
he would be using (4) to designate the President of the United
States, and he would he using the rest of the sentence to say some¬
thing about him.
I doubt that anyone will dispute anything I have said so far.
But now consider the expression1
(6) One and only one thing is President of the United States and
that thing.
Again, the President of the United States, by any other referring
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expression, may be just as easily designated. Just as there may be
a community of speakers who use (4) as we use (l), there may be a
community of speakers who use (6) as we use (l). If a member of
that community were to 3ay:
(7) One and only thing is President of the United States and that
thing is a Republican,
he would be using (6) to designate the President of the United
States, and he would be using the rest of the sentence to say some¬
thing about him.
I still doubt that anyone will dispute anything I have said
so far. But I do suspect that some philosophers might want to
try to remind me of something which they might think that I might
have overlooked. "While I agree", such a philosopher might say,
"that there may exist a community of speakers who use (6) as we
use (l), the use which the members of this community would make of
(6) would be quite different from the use which we should normally
make of (6). If a member of your imaginary community uttered sen¬
tence (7)» he would be using (6) to refer to an entity. But if we
were to make a normal use of sentence (7)» we should be using (6)
to say that there is something which satisfies a certain descrip¬
tion. There is an essential difference between referring to some¬
thing and stating that something has such-and-such characteris¬
tics. So, while I agree that if a speaker of some imaginary dia¬
lect were to utter (7), he would be using (6) as we use (l), I
warn you not to draw the conclusion that a speaker of our dialect
could make a normal use of sentence (7) and be using (6) as we
use (l)."
But that is the conclusion which I intend to draw. The
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dialect spoken by the members of the community of speakers who use
(6) as we use (l) is the only imaginary dialect which will interest
us from now on. So, when I speak of "the (or this) Dialect", I
shall be referring to the dialect spoken by the members of that
imaginary community. (I am not concerned, in the present work, to
explain the use I make of "referring" in the preceding sentence.)1
It is clear that our imaginary community's use of (6) would,
in some respects, be different from our use of (6), Since we use
(l) as a definite singular term, and since the speakers of this
Dialect use (6) a3 a definite singular term. Using (6) as a defi¬
nite singular term, the speakers of this Dialect may manipulate
(6) in the way in which definite singular terms may be manipulated.
Appealing to the symmetry of identity, for example, a speaker of
this Dialect might well say:
(8) If one and only one thing is President of the United States
and that thing is identical with Nixon, then Nixon is identical
with one and only one thing is President of the United States
and that thing.
But if one of us were to utter (8), we should be speaking nonsense.
It is clear that the speakers of this Dialect use (6) in a
different way from the way in which we use (6). But what is not
clear to me is that the use which a speaker of this Dialect would
make of (6) in uttering (7) is in any substantial way different
from the use which we should make of (6) in uttering (7). That is
1. But I shall comment briefly on that use. Sometimes, when we say,
"I am referring to A", we are not saying that there is an object,
i.e., A, to which we are referring. We are saying that we are
using such-and-such an expression in such and such a sense. If
I say» "Russell's treatment of Cantorian numbers is interesting.
I am referring, of course, to transfinite numbers", I am not say¬
ing that there exist transfinite numbers to which I am referring.
I may very well be a finitist. I am saying that I am using the
expression, "Cantorian numbers", in a sense which is elucidated
by the expression, "transfinite numbers".
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to say, I fail to see how the use which we should make of (6) as a
component of (7) is in any substantial way different from the use
which we should make of (l) as a component of (2).
Strawson saysi
So the wholly important distinction we are required to draw is bet¬
ween (1) using an expression to make a unique reference; and (2)
asserting that there is one and only one individual which has cer¬
tain characteristics...This is, in other words, the distinction
between (l) sentences containing an expression used to indicate or
mention or refer to a particular person or thing; and (2) uniquely
existential sentences. ("On Referring", p. 180).
But to argue that if one is using an expression to make a unique
reference, then he is not stating that one and only one individual
has oertain characteristics is like arguing, for example, that if
one is using a sentence to perform the act of underwriting some¬
one's statement, then one is not using that sentence to state that
that person's statement has a certain property. It might be con¬
cluded from such an argument that if someone saysi "John's state¬
ment is true", he is not ascribing a property to John's statements
he is rather performing the act of underwriting John's statement.
But if some philosopher, who believed, say, that truth is reflec¬
tion of the mind of God, were to sayi "John's statement has the
property of reflecting the mind of God", this philosopher would
both underwrite John's statement and ascribe a property to it.
Similarly, it neither follows from the fact that one is using an
expression to make a unique reference that he is not stating that
one and only one individual has certain characteristics, nor does
it follow from the faot that one is stating that one and only one
individual has certain characteristics that he is not using an ex¬
pression to make a unique reference. Just as our imaginary philo¬
sopher would be underwriting John's statement b^ stating that his
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statement has a certain property, we may very well make a unique
reference b^r stating that one and only one individual has certain
characteristics.
"Referring" is both an expression of everyday speech and a
philosopher's expression. To the best of my knowledge, the sense
which this expression most frequently has in everyday speech is the
sense which I made a stab at elucidating in the last footnote. But
I confess that the experience on which the best of my knowledge is
based is not as broad as I should like it to be. At any rate, the
sense of this expression with which philosophers appear to me to
be most frequently concerned is not the sense which I was ooncerned
to elucidate in the last footnote. But I am not going to try to
specify the sense of this expression with which philosophers appear
to me to be most frequently concerned. When one reads a piece of
philosophical writing, it is often difficult or impossible to dis¬
tinguish the remarks which serve to indicate the concept about
which the philosopher will theorize from the remarks which serve
to express the philosopher's theories about the concept. This may
be due to the fact that the remarks whioh serve to express the phi¬
losopher's theories about the concept may also serve to construct
the concept about which the philosopher is theorizing.
Two senses of "referring" interest me here. I think I can
pin the first sense on Strawson. The second sense — which is the
sense in which I am most interested — also has affinities with
Strawsonj but it is more closely connected with Russell's "deno¬
ting". In both of these senses of "referring", one who made a nor¬
mal use of the sentence (7) can both be using expression (6) to
state that one and only one thing has certain characteristics and
be using expression (6) to refer to the thing which has these cha-
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racteristies, i.e., to the President of the United States.
The first sense of "referring" is the sense in which to refer
to something is to draw one's audience's attention to the thing
about which one is going to say something. To refer to something,
in this sense, is to perform the task of forestalling the question:
"What (who, which one) are you talking about?" (of. Strawson, "On
Referring", p. 18l) We may speak of referring, in this sense, as
"Strawsonian referring".
Now it seems to me to be so obvious as to be hardly worth
arguing that one can, on a normal use of (7)» be using (6) to re¬
fer Strawsonianly to the President of the United States. If I
were to utter (7)» and if someone were to say to me: "I know that
you are saying that something is a Republican. But I do not know
what thing you are saying this about. What (who, which one) are
you talking about?", I should simply repeat (7) over again. For I
think that it is perfectly clear that, by my use of (6) as a com¬
ponent of (7)» I have done everything I need to do to let my audi¬
ence know what entity I am talking about. T.^y use of (6) as a com¬
ponent of (7) forestalls the question: "What (who, which one) are
you talking about?".
Similarly, it needs no arguing that one who makes a normal
use of (2) can be using (l), as a component of (2), to refer Straw¬
sonianly to the President of the United States. So insofar as the
use which we should normally make of (l), as a component of (2),
can be to refer Strawsonianly to the President of the United Sta¬
tes, and insofar as the use which we should normally make of (6),
as a component of (7)> can be to refer StrawBonianly to the Presi¬
dent of the United States, the use which we should normally make
of (6), as a ooraponent of (7)» oan be the same as the use which we
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should normally make of (l) as a component of (2).
We now turn to the second of the two senses of "referring."
We shall use a passage from Strawson to get us under way. This
sense of "referring" is hinted at in his definition of "identifying
reference" as "the sub-task of designating some particular histori¬
cal item or items which the state of affairs [which is being repor¬
ted] involves," ("Identifying Reference and Truth-Value", p. 96).
I say that the sense which concerns me is hinted at here. The defi¬
nition, (if it is a definition), does not provide much in the way
of clarification. Since "designating" either means the same as or
is no more clear than "referring", the definition, (if it is one),
does not help to explain referring. But what the definition, (if
I may call it one), suggests to me is something like this: 'We use
a sentence to report a state of affairs. The state of affairs which
we report involves some particular item. There is some special re¬
lationship between the sentence component which plays a referring
role and the fact that that particular item is involved in the state
of affairs which we are reporting.
I doubt that the reader has found that particularly pellucid.
But I think that we may have begun to go some way towards under¬
standing referring in this second sense, (henceforth just "refer¬
ring"). If someone were to utter (2), he would — or at least it
is likely that he would — be reporting a state of affairs. I
shall, (although perhaps not everyone does), interpret "state of
affairs" as "fact". Someone who uttered (2) would be reporting
the fact that the President of the United States is a Republican.
We shall say that the fact that the President of the United States
is a Republican 'involves' the President of the United States. The
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way in which a fact 'involves' a thing is not all that clear. Since
a fact is not a bunch of things in the sense in which a pile of po¬
tatoes is a bunch of things, facts do not 'involve' things in the
way in which piles of potatoes 'involve' potatoes. But, if we are
careful, our use of "involve" will not get us into too much trouble.
But now look at sentence:
(9) The President of the United States is a Scottish Nationalist.
Just as (l) is used in (2) to refer to the President of the United
States, (l) is used in (9) to refer to the President of the United
States. But we cannot explicate the referential use of (l) in (9)
by saying that the fact which one reports by means of (9) 'involves*
the President of the United States. There is no fact that the Pre¬
sident of the United States is a Scottish Nationalist. So one
would report no fact by uttering (9)« But (2) and (9) do have this
in common: if, on a normal use of either of these sentences, one
is reporting a fact, then one is reporting a fact which 'involves'
the President of the United States,
We may speak of a fact 'making' a statement true. Just what
constitutes this 'making true' is unclear. But insofar as it makes
sense to say: "That statement is true beoause it is a fact that p",
it makes sense to say: "The fact that p makes that statement true".
Speaking in this vein, we may say that the statements which one would
make by means of sentences (2) and (9) are such that if they are
true, then they are 'made true' by facts which 'involve' the Presi¬
dent of the United States.
But compare (2) and (9)» now, with:
(10) The Governor of New York is a Republican.
Speaking in the manner in which we are allowing ourselves to speak,
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we may say that the statement which one would normally make hy
means of sentence (10) is such that, if it is true, then the fact
which makes it true is the fact that the Governor of New York is a
Republican. Now whereas this fact, if it is a fact, involves the
Governor of New York, the facts, if they are facts, which make
statements (2) and (9) trie involve the President of the United
States. This points out an important difference between statement
(10), on the one hand, and statements (2) and (9) on the other.
If they are true, then they are made true by facts involving dif¬
ferent entities.
It is reasonable to suppose that what makes this difference
between these statements is simply thisi Where expression (l) is
used in (2) and (9)» expression!
(11) The Governor of New York,
is used in (10). Because expression (ll) is used in the way in
which it is used in sentence (lO), the statement one makes by means
of sentence (10) is such that, if it is true, then the fact which
makes it true involves the Governor of New York. Because expres¬
sion (l) is used in the way in which it is used in sentence (2),
the statement one makes by means of sentence (2) is such that, if
it is true, then the fact which makes it true involves the Presi¬
dent of the United States.
This suggests a preliminary definition of what it means to
say that an expression is being used to refer to something!
(12) Bxpression "e", in sentence "S", is being used to refer to X
just in oase the statement one makes by means of sentence "3" is
such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true
involves Xj and the statement one makes by means of "3" is such
that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true invol¬
ves X because of the way in which "e" is being used in "3".
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But now oonaider our old friends, the expression:
(13) The present King of France,
and the sentencet
(14) The present King of France is bald.
We shall suppose that (14) is being used, today, to make a state¬
ment. Are we to say that (13) is being used, in (14), to refer to
the present King of France? According to (12), it seems, we must
say that (13) is being used in (14) to refer to the present King of
France. But how can we say that someone is voting an expression to
refer to the present King of France when there is no present King
of France to refer to?
This question calls for a distinction. We must distinguish
between an expression's having a referring use and an expression's
actually referring. An expression can have a referring use, i.e.,
one can use that expression to refer, without that expression's ac¬
tually referring, i.e., without one's being successful in his refe¬
rential use of the expression. I think we can say, without getting
into trouble, that an expression, "e", is being used to refer to X,
even if X does not exist, if we make it clear that we are talking
about how the speaker is using the expression rather than about
the speaker's success in using the expression. Just as we might
truthfully says "Newton looked for tie philosopher's stone", even
though the philosopher's stone never existed, we may truthfully say:
(15) John is using expression (13) in sentence (14) to refer to the
present King of France,
even thou# the present King of France does not exist. But just as
we cannot truthfully say: "Newton found the philosopher's stone",
vuxless the philospher'a stone exists or has existed, we cannot truth-
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fully says
(16) By means of expression (13) in sentence (14)> John is refer¬
ring to the present King of France,
ori
(17) Expression (13) in sentence (14) refers to the present King of
France,
unless the present King of France exists. When we use sentence
(16) or sentence (17) f we are using expression (13) to refer to
the present King of France. But when we use sentence (l5)> we are
not using expression (13) to refer to the present King of France.
Our preliminary definition, (12), tells us when an expres¬
sion is being used to refer to X. We may say that someone is
referring to X just in case he is using an expression to refer to
X and X exists. We may say that an expression refers to X just in
case someone is using that expression to refer to X and X exists.
To save the reader some page-turning, I shall repeat some of
our examples!
(1) The President of the United States,
(2) The President of the United States is a Republican,
(6) One and only one thing is President of the United States and
that thing,
(7) One and only one thing is President of the United States and
that thing is a Republican.
We were asking whether the use which we should normally make of
expression (6) as a component of sentence (7) is, in any substan¬
tial way, different from the use which we should normally make of
expression (l) in sentence (2). We saw earlier that just as one
can use expression (l) in sentence (2) to refer Strawsonianly to
the President of the United States, one can use expression (6) in
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sentence (7) to refer Strawsonianly to the President of the United
States. I shall now point out that, in the sense of "referring"
which (12) is an attempt to capture, just as, on a normal use of
sentence (2), one would he using expression (l) to refer to the
President of the United States, on a normal use of sentence (?},
one would he using expression (6) to refer to the President, of the
United States. The statement on® makes by means of sentence (?)
is such that it cannot he true unless the fact which makes it true
involves the President of the United States? and the statement one
makes hy means of sentence (7) is such that it o&nnot he true un¬
less the fact which makes it true involves the President of the
United States because of the way in which expression (6) is used
in sentence (7).
It mi^it he objected here thata
(18) The fact that the President of the United States is a Repub¬
lican,
if it is a fact, is a different fact fromi
(19) The fact that one and only one thing is President of the Uni¬
ted States and that thing is a Republican,
if it is a fact. If some philosopher wants to set up hia criterion
for factual identity in such a way that (10) and (19) turn out to
be different facts, there is nothing I can say against this philo¬
sopher. But it seems to me that the most reasonable criterion for
faotual identity is simply this? The fact that p is identical to
the fact that q just in oasei it is a fact that p, and it is a fact
that q, and it cannot be a fact that p unless it is a fact that q,
and it cannot be a fact that q unless it is a fact that p. (The
affinity between this criterion and the criterion for propositions!
identity which will be discussed in Section XII should be evident.)
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On this criterion, (18) is the same fact as (19)* (assuming that
they are facts), and whatever (18) involves,(19) involves as well.
I drew the distinction between an expression's being used to
refer and an expression's actually referring in an attempt to cap¬
ture the distinction Russell drew between a denoting phrase and a
phrase which denotes something. "'Hie present King of England" and
"The present King of France" are both denoting phrases. But only
the former, (assuming that it is 1905)* denotes something, (cf.
"On Denoting", p. 41) Russell says, (loc. cit.), that "a phrase is
denoting Solely in virtue of it3 form". The context of this pas¬
sage makes it look as if Russell were saying that a phrase is de¬
noting solely in virtue of its grammatical form. But it is clear
that although (l) in (2) is denoting, i.e., used to refer, not
every phrase which has the grammatical appearanoe of (l) is, in
every context, denoting, (l) is not denoting, for example, in:
(20) John believes that the President of the United States is a
Republican.*
But I do not intend this point to be an objeotion against Russell.
By "solely in virtue of its form", it is not clear that Russell
meant: "solely in virtue of its grammatical form". He may have
been using "form" in the way in which we si^it expect him to use
it if he were to say that:
(21) He is hungry only if he is hungry,
is true solely in virtue of its form. What would be meant here is
not that every statement made by means of a sentence having the
grammatical for© of (21) is true. Clearly sentence (21) can bo
1. Or at least I would not call (l) denoting in (20). Russell,
perhaps, would.
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used to make a false statement. What is meant is that the state¬
ment which one is imagining (21) as being used to make is true re¬
gardless of what the facts may be. Expression (l) in sentence (2)
may be denoting, i.e., used to refer, regardless of what the facts
may be. That expression denotes something, i.e., actually refers
to something, however, only if it is denoting and a certain fact —
the fact that the President of the United states exists — obtains.
This leads to the question: since grammatical form does not
always give us evidence as to whether or not an expression is de¬
noting, i.e., used to refer, how can we tell whether or not an
expression is denoting?* (12) is a (preliminary) attempt to answer
that question.
It is possible to allow expressions like "standing-for" to
introduce confusion into accounts of Russell's Theory of descrip¬
tions. When Miss Anscombe says that Russell's "analysis of senten¬
ces containing definite descriptions and other 'denoting phrases'
excludes these from the class of signs that contribute to the mean¬
ing of sentences in which they occur by standing for their bearers,"
(An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Traotatus, p. 44), she is quite
right if what she means is that according to Russell a denoting
phrase need not actually denote anything in order for the sentence
in which it ocours to have a meaning. But she goes on to sayi
"The denoting phrases disappear, and only the predicates (and proper
names, if any) used in their construction play a part in the result
1. This question is suggested by Linsky, (cf. Referring, pp. 62f.)
But Linsky's account of the matter involves too many complica¬
tions for me to try to sort out. He apparently treats "denoting
phrase" as synonymous with "definite description", even though
Russell includes "a man", "some man", etc., in his list of de¬
noting phrases. This leads him to wonder what it means to say
that a phrase is a definite description and not, say, a name,
solely in virtue of its form.
of the analysis. In consequence, 'standing-for' is shewn to be
attributable only to simple signs." In saying this, she is wrong
if she means that, according to Russell, only simple signs, (predi¬
cates and proper names), denote. Although a denoting phrase need
not denote in order for this sentence to be meaningful, and although
not all denoting phrases denote, some denoting phrases do denote.
""The present King of England" denotes a certain man,"("On Reno-
ting", p. 41)» and "Scott is the denotation of "the author of
Waverley"", ("On Denoting", p. 51)• She is right, however, if what
she means is that, according to Russell, denoting phrases may not
be regarded as "standing for genuine constituents of the proposi¬
tions in whose verbal expression they occur," ("On Denoting", p.45)«
Although "the present King of England" denotes the present King of
England, (we are assuming it is 1905), the present King of England
is not a genuine constituent of the proposition in whose verbal ex¬
pression "the present King of England" occurs. Whatever the Russel-
lian propositions of 1905 may have been, they were such that "in
every proposition that we can apprehend...all the constituents are
really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance," ("On
Denoting", p. 56). We need not, Russell would say, have 'immediate
acquaintance' with what a denoting phrase denotes, (nor need the
denoting phrase actually denote), in order for us to 'apprehend'
the proposition in whose verbal expression the denoting phrase 00-
ours. But we cannot 'apprehend' the proposition unless all of its
"constituents are really entities with which we have immediate
acquaintance". These 'constituents' are "expressed by the several
words of the denoting phrase," ("On Denoting", pp. 55f«» undersco¬
ring mine). I think we may conclude that the notions of standing
for and expressing, as these notions are used in "On Denoting",
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differ from the notion of denoting, as this notion is used in "On
Denoting".
I see no reason to think that Anscombe actually is wrong. But
I found the passage from Anscombe handy as a vehicle fo refuting an
interpretation of Russell which many philosophers are inclined', to
give. These philosophers seem unaware of the fact that Russell vras
concerned to explain how it is that we know about things — such as
other people's minds and the centre of mass of the solar system at
the first instant of the twentieth century — with which we have no
'acquaintance'. His explanation was that "what we know about them
is obtained through denoting", ("On Denoting", p. 42). We "reach"
these things "by means of denoting phrases," ("On Denoting", p. 41).
I find it hard to decide just what to say about Strawson's
interpretation of Russell. He says, in Introduction to Logical
Theory, (p. 188)j
We have detected already the belief, underlying the Theory of Defi¬
nite Descriptions, that a genuine logical subject, a true referring
expression, can have a meaning only if there exists an object to
which it applies. "The King of Prance", which failed to satisfy
this condition, was degraded from the status of referring expres¬
sion.
It is clear, of course, that Russell did not demote "the present
King of France" from the status of denoting phrases. It is among
the examples of denoting phrases which he gives on page 41 of "On
Denoting". It is also clear that Russell would not have denied
that, if there were a king of France, at present, then "the present
King of France" would denote him. 80 what does Strawson mean when
he says that "the King of France" was degraded from the status of
referring expression? If all he means to say is that, according to
Russell, "the King of France" does not stand for a genuine consti¬
tuent of the proposition expressed by such a sentence ass "The King
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of Prance is bald", then Strawson is giving a correct interpretation
of Russell. If, on the other hand, he means that, according to
Russell, "the King of France" is net the sort of expression which,
even if there were a king of France, could refer, or be used to re¬
fer, to the King of France, (in Strawson's sense of "refer"), then
I am unable to understand why Strawson would want to say such a
thing. For I have never been able to find, in Russell's writings,
anything which should lead anyone to believe that, in any sense of
"refer" which I have ever discovered in Strawson's writings, Russell
would have denied that "the King of France" is the sort of expres¬
sion which, were there a king of France, could refer, or be used to
refer, to the King of France.
To return to (12) now, I said that it is a preliminary defi¬
nition of what it means to say that an expression is being used to
denote, or refer to, something. It seems to go some way towards
handling definite descriptions. But what about indefinite ones?
Russell says that "a man", "some man", "any man", "every man", and
"all men" are denoting phrases. I shall content myself with some
brief comments on the first two. Consider the expressions
(22) a man,
in the sentences
(23) I met a man.
The statement one makes by means of (23) cannot be true unless the
fact which makes it true involves a man. That is to say, this state¬
ment cannot be true unless the statements
(24) It is a fact that I met x, and x is a man,
is true, for some value of x And this seems to be because of the use
which is made of (22) in (23). do (12) allows us to say that (22)
is used, in (23), to refer to a man. But what man is (22) being used
to refer to? Not an indefinite or ambiguous man, surely! If the
statement I sake is true, then we may very well say that I am using
(22) to refer to the man I met. But if the statement I make is false,
then, in the first place, there is no man for me to succeed in refer¬
ring to, and, in the second place, there is no man for me to be using
the expression to refer to. Clearly, we need not be puzzled by the
fact that there is no man for me to succeed in referring to. We of¬
ten fail in our attempts at referring. But should we be bothered
by the fact that there is no man for me to use the expression to re¬
fer to? I think not. Just asi
(25) I am looking for an honest nan,
does not entail that there is an honest man for whom I am looking,
(26) I am using the expression to refer to a man,
does not entail that there is a man to whom I am using the expression
to refer.
If the statement I make by means of (23) is true, there is a
man whom I met. I nay not know his name, but there will be such a
man, nonetheless. But now consider»
(27) dvery woman love3 a man.
Assuming that "every woman", in (27), has existential import, the
statement one makes by means of (27) cannot be true unless it is a
fact that, aay, Mary loves Bam and Alice loves Bill and Betty loves
Horace find so forth. Since Sam is a man and Bill is a man and Horace
is a man, (27) cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true
involves a raan. 3o it appears that (22) is used to refer in (27).
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And it appears that, if (27) is true, then (22), in (27), refers to
a man. Miss Anscorabe would disagree with this conclusion. She
uses an example, similar to (27)» to reject a suggestion of Profes¬
sor Flaw's that "somebody" refers to somebody. (An Introduction to
tiilttftenatein's Tractatua, p. 85). Presented with (27)» and ny
claim that (22) refers to a man there, she would asks "Who is this
man whom every woman loves?"
I think the right thing to say is that not every expression
which is used to refer acts in the same way as every other expres¬
sion which is used to refer. It follows from (23) that there is a
man whom I met. It does not follow from (27) that there is a man
whom every woman loves. This only points out that "a man" does
funny things in some of the contexts in which it refers, not that
it does not refer in those contexts or that it nevo?refers at all.
We shall not, unfortunately, have the time to investigate
indefinite descriptions much further. It is definite descriptions
and proper name3 that we are most concerned with in the present
work, and X think that — while noting that there are problems —
we may ignore indefinite descriptions. One of the things to which
we axe, at present, building up is a disoussion of the prinoiple
which is known as "Leibniz's Law" or "The Principle of Substituti-
vity". This principle, as ,'iuine puts it, "provides that given a
true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted
for the other in any true statement and the result will be true",
(From a Logical Point of View, p. 139)» This principle, as we soon
shall see, causes philosophical headaches in non-extensional con¬
texts. But it is clear that, no matter how extensional the context,
indefinite descriptions do not obey Leibniz's Law. For considers
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(20) Socrates Is identical with some man,
which appears to be true, and:
(29) Some man wrote Wavarley«
which also appears to be true. But if indefinite descriptions
obeyed Leibniz's Law, then we oould substitute "Socrates" for "Some
man", in (29), and prove that Socrates wrote Y/averley.
It ought to be noted that Leibniz's Law is not the only prin¬
ciple of identity whioh breaks down when "is identical with" governs
an indefinite description. For consider transitivity. Can we argue
from (28) ands
(30) Some man is identical with Parmenides,
that Socrates is identical with Parmenides? Perhaps what we should
be saying here is that either (28) and (30) are 'bad English' or
"is identical with" in (28) and (30) does not mean what logicians
usually mean by Since analogous considerations apply to "some¬
thing", this would have the consequence of our not being allowed to
read: "(3x) (x =» a)" ast "Something is identical with a". Having
given myself permission to ignore indefinite descriptions, I shall
not follow up this train of thought.
A special feature which definite descriptions and proper names
have is that, if we know that an expression of either sort is being
used to refer, then we can find out what it is being used to refer
to by simply pulling the quotation marks off of the expression. If
"The King of France" is used to refer, then it i3 used to refer to
the King of France. If "Cicero" is used to refer, then it is used
to refer to Cicero. Someone may, of course, use "Cicero", in cer¬
tain circumstances, to refer Strawsonianly to the lamp post instead
of to Cicero. But it is not Strawsonian reference which we are
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talking about here. Expressions like (6), i.e.,
(6) One and only one thing is President of the United States and
that thing,
however, lack this special feature which belongs to definite des¬
criptions and proper names. It does not make sense to say:
(31) He is using the expression, "One and only one thing is Presi¬
dent of the United States and that thing", to refer to one and only
one thing is President of the United States and that thing.
But since we are now going to focus our interest on definite des¬
criptions and proper names, and ignore indefinite descriptions and
expressions like (6), perhaps this special feature will help us to
tighten up (12). We are getting ready to talk about the referen¬
tial occurrence of an expression. To say that an expression has
referential occurrence is just to say that it is used to refer, full
stop. (12) only tells us when an expression is used to refer to
such-and-such. But since, when definite descriptions and proper
names are used to refer, we may find out what they are used to re¬
fer to by pulling off their quotes, we may, I think, take a stab
at defining referential occurrence for such expressions as follows:
(32) Expression, "e", occurs referentially in sentence, "S", just
in case the statement one makes by means of "S" is 3uch that it
cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves ej and
the statement one makes by means of "S" is such that it cannot be
true unless the fact which makes it true involves e because of the
way in which "e" is being used in "3".
Thus, since the statement one makes by means of: "The Pre¬
sident of the United States is a Kepublican" cannot be true unless
the fact which makes it true involves the President of the United
States, and since the reason why this statement cannot be true un¬
less the fact which makes it true involves the President of the
United Etates is that the expression, "The President of the United
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States", is used in the way it is used in the sentence used to make
the statement, we may say that the expression, "The President of the
United States, occurs referantially in that sentence on that occasion.
[Even if the reader is willing to tolerate my talk about 'the
fact which makes it true' and my unexplained use of "because" in
(32), he may well want to object! How are we to understand ""e"",
""3"", and "e" in (32)? Are they variables? If so, how do you
propose to bind them? If not, they apply only to the expression,
"eH, (is that an expression?), the sentence, "S", (is that a sen¬
tence?), and the object, e, (who is that?), and (32) does not per¬
mit you to say anything at all about any other expressions, senten¬
ces, or objects.1
If we are pressed with such questions, then we may just drop
(32) and switch to!
(33) The statement the author is making by means of A is such that
it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves B|
and the statement the author is making by means of C i3 such that
it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves D
because of the way in which the author i3 using E in P.
(33) is a device for testing whether nor not a given expression,
(definite description or proper name), occurs referentially in a
given sentence on a particular occasion. The device may be opera¬
ted as follows# Suppose that you read a sentence in a book, and
that you want to find out whether or not an expression, (definite
description of proper name), which occurs in that sentence occurs
1. The reader might wonder why I bother to use quotes at all in
(32) and (12). The reason is that (32) is, at least, a crude
generalization of the idea that to say that"Cicero" occurs re¬
verentially is to say that "Cicero" is used to refer to Cicero.
Without the use of quotes, (32) would have no hope of conveying
such an idea. I use quotes in (12; only to preserve a resemb¬
lance between it and (32).
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referentially, i.e., whether or not the author of the book is using
the expression to refer. Here is what you do. Get a copy of the
present work and look up (33). Erase "A". Write the sentence,
within quotes, in the place of "A". Erase "B". Write the expres¬
sion, without quotes, in the place of "B". Erase "C". Write the
sentence, within quotes, in the place of "C". Erase "D". Write
the expression, without quotes, in the place of "D". Erase "E".
Write the expression, within quotes, in place of "£"• Erase "F".
Write the sentence, within quotes, in place of "F", Head the re¬
sult. Recite it aloud. Ask yourself whether or not you are making
a true statement. If you are making a true statement, then the
expression occurs referentially, the author is using the expression
to refer. If you are making a false statement, then the expression
does not occur referentxally, the author is not using the expression
to refer. Prospective users of this device are advised that cer¬
tain difficulties may be avoided if they secure a powerful micros¬
cope and a very fine pen.
Feeling confident that we may switch to (33) and such like in
case of objections, I see no reason why we should not go on making
use of (32) and such like, or why we should not speak loosely of
them as "definitions" or "criteria".]
I have no reason to expect the reader to be particularly
tolerant of ray talk about 'the fact which makes it true* and ay
unexplained use of "because". According to Russell, "the process
of sound philosophizing ... consists mainly in passing from those
obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we feel quite sure of, to
something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and analysis
we find is involved in the vague thing that we start from...,"
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("The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", pp. 179*"*). (32), my preli¬
minary definition of "referential occurrence", seems to me to he
correct. And it seems to me that it serves to express the intui¬
tive idea which I connect with such expressions as "reference" and
"referential occurrence". But it is vague, and it ought to be
made more precise. In Section XI, I shall present the results of
my best attempt, so far, at giving some precision to this idea.
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SECTION X: LINSKY AND 'PURE REFERENCE'
At the beginning of Chapter VIII, ("Reference and Modality"),
of From a Logical Point of View, Quine says:
One of the fundamental principles governing identity is that of sub-
atitutivity — or, as it might well be called, that of indiscernibi-
lity of identicals. It provides that, given a true statement of
identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in
any true statement and the result will be true, (p. 139)
He then says* "It is easy to find cases contrary to this prin¬
ciple".
Of the recaloitrant cases, Quine saysi
The principle of substitutivity should not be extended to con¬
texts in which the name to be supplanted occurs without referring
simply to the object. Failure of substitutivity reveals merely
that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely referential,
that is, that the statement depends not only on the object but on
the form of the name. (p. 140)
Linsky devotes Chapter VII, ("Pure Reference") of Referring
to an attempt to disoredit Quine. He begins by saying* "Quine,
Frege, and Russell approach problems connected with oratio obliqua
constructions determined to defend Leibniz's Law*, the principle
of substitutivity...," (Referring, p. 100). Following Quine's own
procedure, Linsky then cites a couple of examples which show how
easy it is to find cases contrary to this principle. He then says*
According to Quine, positions in sentences for which the principle
of substitutivity is not a valid mode of inference are 'referenti-
ally opaque' ones. They are positions such that expressions occupy¬
ing them do not succeed in referring to anything, although the very
same expressions will refer in other, referentially open, positions.
(Referring, p. 101)
1. I shall sometimes follow Linsky in his use of the expression
"Leibniz's Law" to refer to what Quine calls the principle of
"substitutivity". I voice no opinion as to whether or not the
principle which Quine states faithfully reflects any doctrine
ever held by Leibniz.
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He then suggests that Quine has not shown that Leibniz's Law has no
exceptions} and he suggests that Quine has only "given a characteri¬
zation of the exceptions". And he goes on to sayi
If he insists, nevertheless, that the principle of substitutivity
admits of no exceptions he must be defending it not as it is formu¬
lated above, but in another version which goes as followss "Given
a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substi¬
tuted for the other at any referentially open position in a true
statement, salva veritate." (loc. cit.)
He then points out that the only criterion we have for the referen¬
tial opacity of a position "is just that the principle of substitu¬
tivity in its first (unamended) form fails to be a valid mode of
inference with respect to that position". And he goes on to sayj
The principle in its revised form is just the principle in its
original form with the addition of a olause, which in effect tells
us that counter-examples do not count. Clearly there are no coun¬
ter examples to this principle, (loo. cit.)
Linaky then seysi
Let us accept, for the present, the ideas of pure reference and
impure reference as sufficiently clear for our purposes. Let us
suppose that is, that in virtue of our understanding of our
language w© possess the ability to distinguish oases in which
terras perform their purely referential function from oases in
which they fail to do so. (Referring, p. 102)
Armed with these intuitive ideas of pure and impure reference,
Linsky goes on to present a number of examples which are intended
to show that "Failure of substitutivity is therefore neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for non-pure reference,"
(Referring, p. 104).
I doubt that Quine will be troubled by Linsky's attack. It is
based upon a number of confusions. In the first place, it is not
clear that Quine ever considered himself to be engaged in a defense
of the principle of substitutivity. He does begin Chapter VIII of
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From a Logical Point of View by saying: "One of the fundamental
principles governing identity is that of substitutivity". But once
he states the principle, he says: "It is easy to find cases con¬
trary to this principle". If he had said: "It is easy to find
cases which appear to go contrary to this principle", we might have
understood him to be out to defend the principle. But since he
says what he does say, we can hardly understand him to be out to
defend the principle. In fact, it becomes quite clear in Word and
Object that Quine is not one of those philosophers who "approach
problems connected with oratio obliqua constructions determined to
defend Leibniz's Law". He says:
Failures of substitutivity of identity, moreover, were in Frege's
view unallowablej so he nominally rectified them by decreeing
that when a sentence or term occurs within a construction of pro-
positional attitude or the like it ceases to name a truth value,
class, or individual and comes to name a proposition, attribute,
or "individual concept". (In some ways this account better fits
Church, who has sharpened and elaborated the doctrine.) I make
none of these moves. I do not disallow failure of substitutivity,
but only take it as evidence of non-referential position; nor do
I envisage shifts of reference under opaque constructions. (Word
and Object, p. 151)
And his practice in Word and Object is clearly that of someone con¬
cerned to elucidate the functions which words have in various 'posi¬
tions' rather than that of someone who is out to defend a principle.
(See, e.g., his treatment of "The commissioner is looking for the
chairman of the hospital board", Word and Object, p. 142). This
seems no le3S true of "Reference and Modality", where he clearly
refers to aubstitutivity as a "criterion of referential occurrence,"
(From a Logical Point of View, p. 141), and where his practice is
to apply this criterion to various terms in order to see what kind
of occurrence they have. If Quine is concerned to do anything in
"Reference and Modality", he i3 concerned to oause trouble for
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quantified modal logic. Failure of substitutivity reveals referen¬
tial opacity. Referential opacity shows "symptoms in connection with
quantification as well as in connection with singular terms," (From
a Logical Point of View, p. 145). "Quantifiers outside a referenti-
ally opaque construction need have no bearing on variables inside
it," (p. 150). Modal contexts, such as "Necessarily..." and "Pos¬
sibly ..." are "found referentially opaque...by consideration of
the failure of substitutivity of identity as applied to singular
terms," (p. 149). Th© same contexts are found to lead to nonsense
when we attempt to quantify 'into* them, (pp. 148ff.). Hence, there
are difficulties for quantified modal logic. Quire's concern is
clearly to show the ways in which terms behave in certain kinds of
contexts: not to defend Leibniz's Law.
Not that the first sentence of Chapter VIII of From a Logical
Point of View is not misleading. Quine wa3 criticized on grounds
strikingly similar to Linsky's by Strawson in "Singular Terms, On¬
tology and Identity," p. 453. But although Strawson, writing back
in 1956, did not have the benefit of Quine's clarification of his
position in Word and Object, Linsky, (who, curiously, includes Word
and Ob.lect in his bibliography but makes no easily discoverable
mention of it in his text), did.
The next piece of confusion in Linsky's account comes out
when he says: "According to Quine, positions in sentences for which
the principle of substitutivity is not a valid mode of inference are
'referentially opaque' ones. They are positions such that expres¬
sions occupying them do not succeed in referring to anything..."
This is a misrepresentation of Quine. According to Quines "The
principle of substitutivity should not be extended to contexts in
which the name to be supplanted occurs without referring simply to
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the object. Failure of substitutivity reveals merely that the
occurrence to be supplanted is not purely referential, that is, that
the statement depends not only on the object but on the form of the
name,"1 (From a Logical Point of View, pp. 139f.) The expressions
to which substitutivity does not apply need not be expressions which
"do not succeed in referring to anything". Quine never denies that
they may be expressions which refer to an object but which do not
1. In fairness to Linsky, it should be said that Quine might have
made himself more dear if he had said: "Failure of substitu¬
tivity reveals that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely
referential, that is, that the statement either (i) depends not
on the object but only on the name, or (II) depends not only on
the object but also on the form of the name". ""Cicero" contains
six letters", which, according to Quine, "is not a statement
about the person Cicero but simply about the word "Cicero","
(From a Logical Point of View, p. 139)» is an example of the first
sort. "Giorgione was so-called because of his size", (cf. (4)
below), is an example of the second sort. In neither example is
the occurrence of the name, ("Cicero" or"Giorgione"), purely re¬
ferential ♦ But we might well say that, in the first example,
the occurrence of the name, "Cicero" is not purely referential
because not referential at all, and that, in the second example,
the occurrence of the name, "Giorgione", is referential but not
purely referential. What Linsky does not appreciate is that
when Quine says that an occurrence of an expression is "not purely
referential", he gives no indication that he means to deny that
the occurrence is referential, (cf: "Hence my cautious phrase
"not purely referential", designed to apply to all such cases
and to affirm no distinction among them," (Word and Object, p.142).
Among the cases to which the cautious phrase will apply are
those in which an expression "implicitly plays two roles, a re¬
ferential one and a non-referential one," (Word and Object, p.l53)«)
A man whose ancestry is not purely Aryan may be either a man
whose ancestry is not Aryan at all, (e.g., a pure-bred Australian
aborigine), or a man whose ancestry is somewhat, but not comple¬
tely, Aryan, (e.g., a German).
Quine'» expression, "referentially opaque", also seems to play a
role in Linsky's confusion. And Quine is, perhaps, somewhat at
fault. The expression carries the suggestion of "not referential
at all"; but Quine does not make it very clear whether he intends
it to carry this suggestion or whether he intends it to mean the
same as "not purely referential".
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refer simply to the object, expressions occurring referentially but
not purely referentially.
Let us now look at the examples which Linsky intends to show
that failure of substitutivity is neither a necessary nor a suffi¬
cient condition for "non-pure reference". He gives four examples
to show that failure of substitutivity is not a necessary condition
for "non-pure reference", find one example to show that failure of
substitutivity is not a sufficient condition for"non-pure reference".
We shall consider the latter example first. Linsky asks us to
suppose that Lyndon B. Johnson is the chairman of the Harvard Philo¬
sophy Department. On this supposition:
(1) The person who holds the office of president of the United
States » the person who holds the office of chairman of the Harvard
Philosophy Department,
is a true statement of identity. It is also true, Linsky says,
that:
(2) The person who holds the office of president of the United States
was administered the oath of the latter office by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court.
Linsky now says:
Surely, if there is such a thing as a relation of pure reference at
all, the term "the person who holds the office of president of the
United States" stands in [(2)]1 in that relation to Lyndon B. John¬
son.
But,he points out, if we substitute into (2) on the basis of (l),
then we get the false statement:
(3) The person who holds the office of chairman of the Harvard Philo¬
sophy Department was administered the oath of the latter office by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
And Linsky concludes: "Here we have failure of substitutivity to-
1. My numbers do not coinoidb with Linsky's.
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gether with pure reference," (Referring, p. 104).
Linsky's misunderstanding of Quine is betrayed when he says
that if there is such a relation as pure reference at all, "the
person who holds the office of president of the United States"
stands in (2) in that relation to Lyndon B« Johnson. Linsky seems
to think that, according to Quins, a term has pure reference just
in case it succeeds in referring to something, and 'impure refe¬
rence' just in case it fails to refer to anything,1 Linsky does
not appreciate that when Quine says that an occurrence of a term
is "not purely referential" he does not mean to deny that the term
succeeds in referring to an object; he means only to suggest that
both the object and the "form of the name" may be at issue, (cf.
From a Logical Point of View, p. I40). The occurrence of "The
person who holds the office of President of the United States",
in (2), is just the sort of occurrence which Quine would call "not
purely referential". In fact, for all (2)'a appearance of origi¬
nality, there is no interesting difference between (2) and Quine's
example1
(4) Giorgione was so-called beoause of his size,
(4)» Quine says, "is a statement about a man and not merely about
his name," (loc. cit.). But since we may not substitute "Barba-
relli" for "Giorgione" in (4) on the basis of the identity;
"Giorgione » Barbarelli", Quine concludes that "the failure of
substitutivity shows that the occurrence of the personal name in
[(4)] is not purely referential," (loc. cit., italics Quine's).
(4) is an example which Lineky does not mention.
Let us now look at the examples which are intended to show
that failure of substitutivity is not a necessaiy condition for
1. "Impure reference" appears to be an expression of Linsky's inven¬
tion.
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non-pure reference. Linsky cites Quins's statement in "Three
Grades of Modal Involvement" that "Quotation is the referentially
opaque context par excellance", and reasons that since "Cicero"
appears within quotes in:
(5) "Cicero" is a designation for Cicero,
""Cicero" doe3 not have pure reference in that occurrence," (Refer¬
ring, p. 103). He then points out that since substitution in (5)
on the basis of "Cicero is Tully" produces the true statement:
" "Tully" is a designation for Cicero," "Cicero" is open to substi-
tutivity in (5). And he concludes: "Failure of substitutivity,
then, is not a necessary condition for the non-purely referential
occurrence of a term," (Referring, p. 103). Linsky's mistake is
in taking Quine to be saying that whenever a term occurs within
quotes its occurrence is not purely referential. His quotation
from "Three Grades of Modal Involvement" tends to give the reader
the impression that this is Quins's doctrine. But he would not
have been able to give the reader this impression if he had bothered
to mention Quine's own use of the following examples in From a Logi¬
cal Point of View:
(6) "Giorgione played chess" is true,
(7) "Giorgione" named a chess player.
Each of these, Quine points out, "is true or false according as
the quotationle8s statement:
(8) Giorgione played chess,
is true or false," (From a Logical Point of View, p. 14l).
And Quine goes on to say:
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Our criterion of referential occurrence makes the occurrence of the
name "Giorgione" in (8) referential, and must make the occurrences
of "Giorgione" in (6) and (7) referential by the same token, despite
the presence of single quotes in (6) and (7). The point about quo¬
tation is not that it must destroy referential occurrence, but that
it can (and ordinarily does) destroy referential occurrence. The
examples (6) and (7) are exceptional in that the special predicates
"is true" and "named" have the effect of undoing the single quotes
— as is evident on comparison of (6) and (7) with (8). (loc. cit.)
Of the three remaining examples which Linsky intends to show
that failure of sub3titutivity is not a ncessary condition for the
non-purely referential occurrence of a term, one, (cf. Referring,
p. 103), need not detain us for long. It depends upon the assump¬
tion that i
(9) The king of France ■ the most frequently cited example of a
non-existent object,
is a "true identity". Perhaps it can be argued, (pace Russell,
cf. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. 102), that an ex¬
pression of the form, "the so-and-so", can be a term in a true
identity statement when the so-and-so doe3 not exist. But since
Linsky assumes this doctrine without, so far as I can tell, trying
to produce an argument in favour of it, I see no point in trying
to produce an argument against it.
We now turn to two ingenious examples. Considers
(10) "Cicero" / Cicero.
Linsky says that "Cicero", in (10), "may be replaced in its first
occurrence in the true statement [(10)] by any term at all salva
veritate. Yet "Cicero" paradigmatically lacks pure reference in
this occurrence," (Referring, p. 103). Again considers
(11) ~N (9 >7),
i.e., "it is not a necessary truth that 9 is not greater than 7"«
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"9", Linsky points out, lacks pure reference in (ll). But (ll) is
true, and remains true "under every replacement of "9" by any other
designation for 9"« "So here," Linsky says, "we have a case of
impure reference unaccompanied by failure of substitutivity(Re¬
ferring, p. 104).
These last two examples do seem to prove that 'impure refe¬
rence' is not a sufficient condition for failure of substitutivity.
It is doubtful that even Quine would want to say that the first
occurrence of "Cicero" in (10) and the occurrence of "9" in (ll)
are purely referential. And it is clear that these expressions,
in these occurrences, are open to substiutivity salva veritate.
But now one starts to wonder what the point of these examp¬
les can be. Let us pretend, with Linsky, that Quine is determined
to defend Leibniz's Law. Let us further imagine that Quine holds
the following doctrine*
. . of
(12) Given a true statement^Aidentity, one of its two terms may be
substituted for the other at any purely referential position in a
true statement, salva veritate,!
with "purely referential position", in (12), given some definition
which does not render (12) circular. Now there would be some
point in trying to refute Quine by arguing that failure of substi¬
tutivity is not a sufficient condition for the not purely referen¬
tial occurrence of a term, i.e., that substitutivity can fail to
apply to a term whose occurrence is purely referential. But what
1. (12) is modeled on Linsky's "principle in its revised form",
(cf. Referring, p. 101). Since we are working with an abun¬
dance of technical expressions already, ("purely referential",
"pure reference", "not purely referential", "impure reference",
"referential opacity", etc.), I substitute "purely referential"
for "referentially open". I propose that, at the next Interna¬
tional Congress of Philosophy, philosophers be made to sign an
agreement to drop some of these expressions from their vocabu¬
lary.
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is the point in arguing that failure of substitutivity is not a
necessary condition for the not purely referential occurrence of a
term, i.e., that there are terms whose occurrence is not purely re¬
ferential but for which the substitution of 'identicals1 will go
through salva veritate? The doctrine stated in (12) only 3ays that
all purely referential positions are open to substitutivity. It
does not say that all and only purely referential positions are
open to substiutivity. So even the imaginary Quine who is "deter¬
mined to defend Leibniz's Law" cannot be refuted by examples which
show that failure of substitutivity is not a necessarycondition
for the not purely referential occurrence of a term.
The only example which Linsky offers to show that failure of
substitutivity is not a sufficient condition for the not purely
referential occurrence of a term is (2). And we need not even
t
appeal to substiutivity to make it clear that the occurrence of
"The person who holds the office of president of the United States"
in (2) is not purely referential in Quins's sense of "not purely
referential". "The statement depends not only on the object but
on the form of the name," (From a Logical Point of View, p. 140 ),
or, to quote from Word and Object, (pp. 152f.), "a sentence whose
single grammatical subject implicitly plays two roles, a referen¬
tial one and a non-referential one"i these descriptions clearly
apply to (2), whose grammatical subject serves not only to refer
to the President, but also to determine a sense for the expression1
"the latter office".
Not only has Linsky failed to understand the real Quine. He
has also failed to refute a respectable imaginary Quine.
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SECTION XIi SOME MORE ABOUT REFERENTIAL OCCURRENCE
Although Lirisky's attack on Quins is flawed, an interesting
point comes to mind when one reads it. Quine never — so far as I
can tell — gives us a criterion which will allow us to mark the
difference between an expression whose occurrence, in a given sen¬
tence, is referential, and an expression whose occurrence, in a
given eentenoe, is not referential. The principle of substiutivity,
if it applies to an expression, reveals that the occurrence of that
expression is purely referential. But if that principle fails to
apply to a given expression, all we learn is that the occurrence is
no* Purely referential! we do not discover whether or not the
occurrence is referential. Quine's other criterion, existential
generalization, (cf. From a Logical Point of View, p. 145)» fares
similarly. Since, from the sentence! "Cicero denounced Catiline,"
we may infer! "(3 x) (x denounced Catiline)", we know that the
occurrence of "Cicero", in the first sentence, is purely referen¬
tial, When we try to apply this principle to "Giorgione" in "Gior-
gione was so-called because of his size", we get! "(3 x) (x was
so-called because of his siz^)"» which, according to Quine, "is
clearly meaningless", (loc. cit.). But all we discover here,
(Quine's misleading use of "irreferential", (loo. cit.), notwith¬
standing), is that the occurrence of "Giorgione", in "Giorgione
was so-called because of his size", is not purely referential. We
have no idea whether or not this occurrence is referential.
In Section IX, I attempted to explain referential occurrence
by giving definitions ofi
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(1) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "3",
and«
(2) Expression "e", in sentence "S", is being used to refer to X.
I stated my definitions in a deliberately vague manner. I shall
now attempt to make these definitions more precise, and to give
some relatively precise definitions of some related notions. We
begin with (l). My vague definition was:
(3) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence"S", just in
case the statement one makes by means of "S" is such that it cannot
be true unless the fact which makes it true involves e; and the
statement one makes by means of "S" is such that it cannot be true
unless the fact which makes it true involves e because of the way
in which "e" is being used in "3".
As we noted in Section IX, what I choose to call "definitions" in¬
vite trouble over quantification. We also noted that such trouble
can be avoided by switching to a 'device1 for testing whether or
not an expression has a certain function in a given sentence on a
particular occasion. Since such 'devices' are fairly easy to con¬
struct, I shall not usually bother to construct them, but shall
stick to what I call "definitions". In the case of (37) below,
however, since the appropriate device is a little more difficult
than usual to construct, I shall present it to the reader.
(3) states an equivalence with a conjunction for its right
hand side. We shall do well to take things one at a time. We
shall start by focusing our attention on the first conjunct:
(4) The statement one makes by means of "S" is such that it cannot
be true unless the fact which makes it true involves e.
And we shall assume, for the time being, that we have an intuitive
understanding of the "because" in the second conjunct.
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As my first step, now, in making (3) precise, I suggesti
(5) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence''^", just in case
the statement one makes by means of "3" entails that e exists? and
the statement one makes by means of "S" entails that e exists because
of the way in which "e" is being used in "S".
Assuming an tinderstanding of the "because" in the second conjunct
of the right hand side of the equivalence, and restricting the use
of "expression" to cover only definite descriptions and proper
names, I find (5) quite satisfactory. (5), with "exists" under¬
stood tenselessly marks just the distinction we should like to
mark between the occurrences of "Cicero", for example, ins
(6) Cicero denounced Catiline,
on the one hand, ands
(7) "Cicero" has six letters,
ands
(8) Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline,
on the other. (5), moreover, helps us to preserve the distinction
which Russell drew, in "On Denoting", between the 'primary' and
the 'secondary' occurrence of an expression in a negative sentence.
If a user of sentencei
(9) The present King of Prance is not bald,
is making a statement which can be true only if the present King
of France exists, then we may say that he is using the expression,
"the present King of France", to refer, (however unsuccessfully),
to the present King of France, and to say something, (i.e., that
he is not bald), about him. In this case, "the present King of
France" would have what Russell would call a "primary occurrence"
in (9). If, on the other hand, a user of sentence (9) is making
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a statement which can he true even if the present King of France does
not exist, then he is not using the expression to refer, (even un¬
successfully), to anything. In this latter case, "the present King
of France" would have what Russell would call a "secondary occurrence"
in (9).1
(5)» moreover, gives "Cicero" the place I think it deserves
in a sentence likes
(10) Philip knows that Cicero denounced Catiline.
Whereas (10) resembles (8) in that both statements are about Philip's
mental life, (10) differs from (3) in being about Cicero as well.
(10) also forces us to draw a Quine-like distinction between the
purely referential occurrence of an expression and the referential-
but-not-purely-referential occurrence of an expression. "Cicero"
occurs referentially in (6) and the truth of:
(11) Cicero - Tully,
allows us to deduce:
(12) Tully denounced Catiline,
from (6). But, although "Cicero" also occurs referentially in (10),
the truth of (ll) does not permit us to deduce:
(13) Philip knows that Tully denounced Catiline,
from (10). "Cicero", we may say, has a purely referential occur¬
rence in (6) and a referential, but not purely referential, occur¬
rence in (10). Taking a hint from Quine, who talks about a single
expression which "implicitly plays two roles, a referential one and
1. Although I do not have the time to follow this point up, one might
hazard the guess that future historians of philosophy will dis¬
cover a strong connection, (although not an identity of extension),
between Russell's concept of primary occurrence and Quine's con¬
cept of referential occurrence.
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a non-referential one"4 (Word and Object, pp. 152f.), we may
suggest that since "Cicero" occurs referentially, but not purely
referentially, in (10), "Cicero" is used, in (10), both to refer
to Cicero and to do something else. The question now suggests it¬
self 1 what else is "Cicero" used to do in (lO)t We may reply by
taking another hint from Quine. Considering:
(14) Giorgione was so-called because of his size,
Quine says: "It is easy in fact to translate [(14)] into another
statement which contains two occurrences of the name, one purely
referential and the other not," (From a Logical Point of View,
p. 140} of. Word and Object, p. 153). Quina's translation is:
(15) Giorgione was called "Giorgione" because of his size.
Given Quins's views concerning synonymy and analysis, we cannot
expect Quins to have been completely serious in his talk of trans¬
lation. But, since I do not share Quins's views on these subjects,
I shall be more serious myself. My hypothesis is this: if, b£ SZ
definition, (5). an expression oocurs referentially in a given sen¬
tence , and if the principle of subatitutlvity fails to apply to
that expression, (i.e., if its occurrence, in that sentence, is
referential, but net purely referential), then it is possible to
oonstruot another sentence, which expresses the same proposition
as the original sentence, and in which the expression ocours at
least twice: onoe purely rsferentially and once not referentially
at all. The several occurrences of the expression, in the new
sentence, will serve to illuminate the several roles which are
played by that expression in the old sentence.1 In (14)» may
1. This hypothesis will appear again as (13) of Section XII.
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now say,"Ciorgiona" does double duty. It is used to refer to
Giorgione, and it is also used in the way in which it is used in
its second occurrence in (15)» i.e. in the way in which expressions
are used when they occur within quotes.
Returning now to (10), an analysis which comes to mind is J
(16) Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline, and Philip's
belief is justified, and Cicero denounced Catiline.
Tt
Assuming that (16) expresses the same proposition as (10) , we may
say that it reveals the two roles which "Cicero" plays in (10).
The first occurrence of "Cicero" in (16) is non-referential. Phi¬
lip can believe that Cicero denounced Catiline even if Cicero does
not exist. Here, "Cicero" plays the same role as it plays in (8).
But the second occurrence of "Cicero" in (16) is purely referenti¬
al. Here, "Cicero" plays the same role as it plays in (6). In
(10), we now see, "Cicero" does double duty. At one and the same
time, it plays the role which it plays in (6), a purely referen¬
tial role, and the role which it plays in (8), the role whioh a
singular term plays when it occurs in a phrase in oratio obliqua
governed by the verb, "to believe".
Analyzing (14) as (15) and (10) as (16) helps us to make
some sense of what Quine calls "the basis of the principle of sub-
stitutivity"? "whatever can be said about the person Cicero (or
Giorgione) should be equally true of the person Tully (or Barba-
relli), this being the same person," (From a Logical Point of View,
p. 139). When we analyze (14) as (15), (or (10) as (16)), we see
1. Kot that this assumption is right, (of. Gettier, "Is Justified
True Belief Knowledge?"). But I find it right enough for my
present purposes. The seoond conjunct of (16) is probably either
wrong or inadequate. But the first and third oonjunots ought,
on any account, to go into an analysis of (10). Of the three
conjunots, only the first and third are of interest to us here.
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just what is being said by means of (14)» (or (10)), about Giorgione,
(or Cicero). If Barbarelli is the same person as Giorgione, then if
what is said of Giorgione by means of sentence (14) is true of Gior¬
gione, then this is also true of Barbarelli. In (15)» we are shown
what is said of Giorgione by means of sentence (14)* By means of
sentence (14)» one says, of Giorgione, that he was called "Giorgione"
because of his size. If this is true of Giorgione, then, since Bar¬
barelli is the same person as Giorgione, this is also true of Bar¬
barelli. Barbarelli was oalled "Giorgione" because of his size.
Correspondingly, (16) shows just what is said of Cicero by means of
sentence (lO). When one utters sentence (10), all he says of Cicero
is that he denounced Catiline. If this is true of Cicero, then,
since Tully is the same person as Cicero, this is also true of Tully.
Tully denounced Catiline. In (l6), where the roles are clear, we
may, of course, apply the principle of substitutivity to the purely
referential occurrence of "Cicero" and, together with (ll), deducei
(17) Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline and Philip's
belief is justified and Tully denounced Catiline.
The idea behind Quine's talk of the basis of the principle of Bub-
stitutivity is roughly the same idea as that which lies behind
Linsky's talk of the principle of the indiscernibility of identi¬
cals. Linsky, quite rightly", calls the principle of substitutivity
a false principle. But he is more friendly towards the principle
of the indiscernibility of identicals. "This principle", Linsky
says, "states that if x « y, then any property of x is a property
of y, and conversely," (Referring, p. 79)• Adapting ourselves to
Linsky's way of talking, we might suggest that sentences (15) and
(16) reveal just what properties are ascribed to Giorgione and
1. That is, it is right to say that the principle, as a general
principle, is false. This is not to deny that the principle
may be applied to particular occurrences of particular expressions.
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Cicero by means of sentences (14) and (10): the property of having
been called "Giorgione" because of one's size and the property of
having denounced Catiline. But I do not intend to try to follow up
this suggestion."1'
Let us return to (5) now. I said that, assuming an under¬
standing of the "because" in the second conjunct of the right hand
side of the equivalence, and restricting our use of "expression" to
cover only definite descriptions and proper names, I find (5) quite
satisfactory. In later pages of this Section, I shall be able to
go some way towards making the "because" more precise. But I am
unhappy with the restriction to definite descriptions and proper
names. I want to be able to talk about intensional entitites. I
have hopes of working up an account of reference which will help
us to make sense of the claim that in (8), for example, the ex¬
pression:
(18) that Cioero denounced Catiline,
refers to (the proposition) that Cioero denounced Catiline. In
1. I should like to take the opportuniy to point out an error in
the interpretation which Linsky gives of Russell on the page of
Referring to which I just referred. Having quoted Russell's
statement:
If a is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of
the other, and either may be substituted for the other in any
proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that pro¬
position, ("On Denoting", jb. 47)»
Linsky says that there is a "use-mention confusion in this for¬
mulation" because "what we substitute in a proposition is not a
for b (or conversely) but names (or other designations) for a
and b". What Linsky does not take account of is that, whatever
the Russellian propositions of 1905 may have been, they were things
in which entities could be constituents, (cf. "On Denoting", p.56).
Assuming that Russell's use of the word "proposition" makes sense,
it makes sense to say that we can substitute entities in proposi¬
tions. (One cannot reply that Russell was misusing the word"pro-
position". "Proposition" is a philosophers' word, and, provided
that he does not oontradict himself,a philosopher may use the word
in any way he pleases.) Ho doubt there is confusion in Russell's
formulation. But the oonfusion is not confusion of use and mention.
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other words, I want an account of reference which will do duty not
only for definite descriptions and proper names, hut also for ex¬
pressions like (18). But talk about the entailment of existence
will not help me to make sense of the idea that expression (18),
in sentence (8) refers to (the proposition) that Cicero denounced
Catiline. In the present work, I understand "entails" to mean
"strictly implies". But, although in this sense of "entails" one
might well says
(19) The statement one makes by means of sentence (8) entails that
(the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline exists,
we may also say, in this sense of "entails", that every statement
entails that (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline ex¬
ists. If propositions exist at all, then they exist necessarily,
and any statement that such-and-such a proposition exists is en¬
tailed by any statement whatever. So, although (19) is true, we
cannot say that it is because of the way in which expression (18)
is used in sentence (8) that the statement one makes by means of
(8) entails that (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline
exists. To anticipate an explication of "because" which will be
developed later on, if we take any expression, e.g.j
(30) that Scott wrote Waverley.
which is such that, when it is substituted for (18) in (8), re¬
sults in a grammatical sentence, the resulting sentence!
(21) Philip believes that Scott wrote Waverley,
will be such that the statement one makes by means of it also en¬
tails that (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline exists.
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So (5) does not help us to say that (18) occurs raferentially in
(8). I think, therefore, that there is something quite wrong with
the idea of trying to explain the referential occurrence of (18)
in (8) in terms of the entailment of existence.^
I shall not deny that some alternative definition of "entails"
can he given which will allow us to assert (19) without committing
ourselves to the view that the existence of the proposition that
Cicero denounced Catiline is entailed by any statement whatever.
The faot of the matter is that I do not yet know my way around the
subjects of entailment and the ontology of propositions well
enougji to make any pronouncements on this matter.
I am unable to produce a general account of referential
occurrence which will be more precise than (3) and which will cover
both definite descriptions and proper names, on the one hand, and
expressions such as (18) on the other. But since (3), although
vague, does cover expressions of both 3orts, my course will be to
let (3) stand as my general account of "referential occurrence" and
to recognize that a precise account — if such is possible — of
how expressions such as (18) refer must take a different form from
a precise account of how definite descriptions and proper names re¬
fer. With (5), I took a first step towards a precise definition of
1. Against the view that someone who admits that propositions ex¬
ist must admit that they exist necessarily, it might be argued
that, since the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline is
just a meaning of the sentenoe (6), i.e.: "Cicero denounced
Catiline", (and of the many other sentences which mean that
proposition) , and, since sentenoes do not exist neoessarily,
the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline does not exist
necessarily* if there were no sentences, then there would be
no propositions. But to argue in this way is to ignore the
point that propositions are what are either true or false. Even
if there were no sentences, the proposition that Cicero denoun¬
ced Catiline would still be either true or false; so, even if
there were no sentences, the proposition that Cicero denounced
Catiline would still exist.
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"referential occurrence" for definite descriptions and proper names.
I shall start to take some more steps in a moment. But first, I want
to say a bit more about (3) and such expressions as (18).
Although I admit that (3) is vague, I do not think that it is
completely unilluminating. Those who acoept propositions in their
ontology -.fill probably not have very much trouble making some in¬
tuitive sense of the idea that, if the statement which one makes by
means of (8) is true, then the fact which makes it true, (i.e., the
fact which one reports by means of that sentence), involves (the
proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline. If Philip believes
that Cicero denounced Catiline, then (the proposition) that Cicero
denounced Catiline is, somehow, involved in a faot. But how do
propositions get involved in facts? I think that the best way to
find out how propositions get involved in facts is to investigate
the phenomena which we are concerned to report when we use senten¬
ces containing verbs of prepositional attitude. We find out how a
proposition is involved in the fact that Philip believes that Ci¬
cero denounced Catiline, by investigating belief. We find out how
a proposition is involved in the fact that Philip said that Cicero
denounced Catiline by investigating statement making. By carrying
out suoh investigations, we oan go some way towards understanding
what it is to say that when one utters such sentences as; "Philip
believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" andi "Philip said that
Cicero denounced Catiline", one uses expression (18) to refer to
(the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline. Although I shall
not be able to give any further clarification to the notion of re¬
ference to propositions by means of general definitions, I shall
attempt, in Section XII, to clarify this notion by focusing my
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attention upon belief, statement making, and related phenomena.
For the remainder of this Section, we shall ignore reference
to propositions, and we shall use "expression" to cover only defi¬
nite descriptions and proper names. We may, therefore, forget
about (3) and focus our attention on (5), which is my first step
towards a precise definition of "referential occurrence". We still
must try to explain the "because" in the second conjunct of the
right hand side of the equivalence. It might be thought that we
have no need of "because", and that an adequate definition of "re¬
ferential occurrence" would bej
(22) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S", just in
case "e" occurs in "3" and the statement one makes by means of "3"
entails that e exists.
But consider the sentenoej
(23) One and only one thing is President of the United States and
Bill believes that the President of the United States is balding.
According to (22), "the President of the United States" occurs re¬
ferentially in sentence (23). But this is a consequence I prefer
not to accept. We need the idea that it is because of the use of
"e" in "3" that the statement one makes by means of "3" entails
that e exists. The statement one makes by means of (23) entails
that the President of the United States exists. But the use of
"the President of the United States" in (23) has nothing to do with
this entailment. Here is my first attempt at capturing the
"because"i
(24) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "3", just in
cases
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(i) "eM occurs in "3", and
(II) the statement one makes by means of "3" entails that e exists,
and
(III) there is an expression, "f", such that the substitution of
"f" for "a" in "SM results in a grammatical sentence, "T", and the
statement one makes by means of "T" does not entail that e exists.
Applying (24) to "the President of the United States" in sentence
(23), we find, to our satisfaction, that this expression does not
oocur referentially in (23). For it does appear that no matter
what expression, (say "the present King of France"), we substitute
for "the President of the United States" in (23), we get a sen¬
tence, (such a3:
(25) One and only one thing is President of the United States and
Bill believes that the present King of France is balding,
for example), the statement one makes by means of which does en¬
tail that the President of the United States exists. The reader
may verify that the application of (24) to the occurrences of
"Cicero" in such sentences as (7) and (8) happily fails to mark
these occurrences as referential, and that the application of (24)
to the occurrences of "Cicero" in such sentences as (6) and (12)
happily marks these occurrences as referential.
Now we must face such sentences as»
(15) Giorgione was called "Giorgione" because of his size,
and 1
(26) The President of the United States believes that the Presi¬
dent of the United States is a good fellow,
where the expression which interests us happens to occur more than
once. (24) may be extended to cover such cases by means of a slight
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alteration which I shall mark by underscoring in the following revi¬
sion of (24)1
(27) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S", just in
casei
(I) "e" occurs in "o", and
(II) the statement one makes by means of "3" entails that e exists,
and
(III) there is an expression, "f", such that the substitution of "f"
£°r Qvogv occurrence of "e" in "S" results in a grammatical sen¬
tence, "T", and the statement one makes by means of "T" does not
entail that e exists.
As the reader may verify, the application of (27) to "Giorgione in
(15) and to "the President of the United States" in (26) leads us
to say, quite rightly, that these expressions occur referentially
in these sentences. The reader may take (27) as ray official defi¬
nition of "expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "3"",
i.e., of (l).'*' We have got rid of the vague talk of facts and of
the vague use of "because" which bothered us in (3) and (5). As
I have already remarked, I am happy to interpret "entails" as
"strictly implies".
There is, however, (not 30much a defect as) a limitation to
(27). It tells us that "Giorgione" and "the President of the Uni¬
ted States" occur referentially in (15) and (26). But it does not
tell us which of the two occurrences which each of these expressi¬
ons has in its respective sentenoe is referential and which is not.
In order to handle this problem, we introduce the expression,
""e(n)"'l which we define as "the n-th occurrence of expression,
1. I use the expression, "official definition", to distinguish the
best definition I have yet been able to come up with for a cer¬
tain notion from definitions which are merely preliminary and
whioh I include for the sake of the exposition.
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'*e,l"» (counting from left to right in a sentence). In sentence
(15), for example, "Giorgione (2)" is the occurrence of "Giorgione"
within quotes. We now give the following official definition1
(28) "e(n)w is referential in sentence "S", just in case:
(i) By (27)» expression "a" occurs referentially in sentonoe "3",
and
(ll) There is no expression, "g", which is such that the substitu¬
tion of "g" for every "e (m fl n)", (i.e., for every occurrence of
"e" other than "e(n)"), in "3" results in a grammatical sentence,
"U", such that the statement one makes by means of "IP does not
entail that e exists.
Suppose, now, that w® want to find out whether or not "Giorgione
(l)M in (15) is referential. Sinoe "Giorgione", by (27), occurs
referentially in (15)» (28) (i) is satisfied. Since the result
of substituting any expression you please for every "Giorgione
(m £ 1)" in (15), i.e., for "Giorgione (2)", will be a sentence,
likei
(29) Giorgione was oalled "the capital of Rhode Island" because
of his size,
whioh is such that the statement one makes by means of it entails
that Giorgione exists, (20) (ll) is satisfied. We conclude that
"Giorgione (l)" is referential in sentence (15)« Turning now to
"Giorgione (2)", we find that (28) (l) is satisfied. But we are
able to find the oxpression, "the present King of France", which
is such that, if we substitute it for every "Giorgione (m / 2)" in
(15), i«®. for "Glorgione (l)"» the result will be the grammatical
sentence»
(30) The present King of France was called "Giorgione" because of
his size,
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which is such that the statement one makes by means of it does not
entail that Giorgione exists. We have failed, in this case, to
satisfy (28) (il). And we conclude that "Giorgione (2)" is not
referential in sentence (15)• Similar exercises will reveal that
"the President of the United States (l)" is referential in sentence
(27), that "the President of the United States (2)" is not referen¬
tial in sentence (27), and that both occurrences of "the President
of the United States" are referential in the following sentence:
(31) The President of the United States is a good friend of the
President of the United States.
We have been discussing whether or not certain expressions
occur referentially. Now we shall discuss what they are used to
refer to. By a slight revision of (27), we may give an official
definition of "expression "e", in sentence "S", is being used to
refer to X ", i.e., of (2).
(32) Expression "e", in sentence "S", is being used to refer to X,
just in case:
(i) "e" occurs in "S", and
(il) the statement one makes by means of "S" entails that X exists,
and
(III) there is an expression, "f", such that the substitution of "f"
for every occurrence of "e" in "S" results in a grammatical sentence,
"T", and the statement one makes by means of "T" does not entail that
X exists.
We find, by (32), that in the sentence:
(33) Bill believes that the President of the United States is
balding,
"the President of the United States" is not being used to refer to
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the President of the United States. We find that in:
(34) The President of the United States is balding,
"the President of the United States" is being used to refer to the
President of the United States. We also discover that, in (34)»
both "the United States" and "the President of the United States"
are being used to refer to the United States. It is also of in¬
terest that one who held that there could be no president of the
United States unless there existed such a thing as politics would
find help from (32) in maintaining that "the President of the Uni¬
ted States", in (34)» is being used to refer to politics.
If we wish to extend our use of "expression", in (32), to
cover such words as "balding", we might want to use (32) to argue
that, in (34)» the expression, "balding", is being used to refer
to hair. If we wish to extend our use of "expression", in (32),
to cover such strings of words as "one and only one thing is King
of Prance and that thing", we might want to use (32) to argue
that, int
(35) One and only one thing is King of France, and that thing is
bald.,
the expression, "one and only one thing is King of France and that
thing" is being used to refer to the King of France. To avoid com¬
plication in what follows, however, we shall continue to restrict
our use of "expression" to cover only definite descriptions and
proper names.
We have been talking about an expression's being used to re¬
fer to something. We now turn our attention to the idea of an ex¬
pression's being used, successfully, to refer to something, of an
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expression's actually referring to something. The following offi¬
cial definition is my attempt to capture that idea:
(36) Expression "e", in sentence "3", refers to Y just in casei
(i) 3y (32), expression, "e", in sentence "S", is being used to re¬
fer to X, and
(II) X exists, and
(III) X « Y1
Since the 'device* which goes with (36) is a little more difficult
to construct than are the devices which go with the previous defini¬
tions of this Section, I present this 'device' to the reader:
(37) A » B} and the statement the author is making by means of C
can be true only if B exists} and it can be true that D even if B
does not exist.
If you want to know whether or not a given expression, in a given
sentence, on a particular occasion, refers to a given object, you
may use (37)» Here are the five rules for its operation:
Rule 1: Find out whether or not the object exists. If it does not
exist, then give up. Ho expression can refer to an object which
does not exist.
Rule 2: If the object does exist, then find out its name, or some
definite description which it satisfies. Erase "A" and write that
name or description, without quotes, in place of "A".
Rule 3: Erase "C", and write the sentence which interests you,
within quotes, in place of "C".
Rule 4» Erase "D", and write the sentence which interests you,
without quotes, in place of "D". Now, in the inscription which you
have just produced, erase every instance of the expression which in¬
terests you. Write the letter "E", without quotes, in each of the
blank spaces.
1. Since "X - Y" entails "X exists", (il) is redundant. But I put
(ll) in for the sake of clarity.
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We ought to pause for examples now. Suppose that you want to know
whether or not the expression, "the President of the United States",
in sentences (33) and (34) refers to Richard Nixon. Following rules
1-4, we geti
(33) Richard Nixon « B; and the statement the author is making by
means of "Bill believes that the President of the United States is
halding" can be true only if B exists; and it can be true that Bill
believes that E is balding even if 3 does not exist.
ands
(39) Richard Nixon « Bj and the statement the author is making by
means of "The President of the United States is balding" can be
true only if B exists; and it can be true that E is balding even
if 3 does not exist.
We now turn tot
Rule 5* Try to find a pair of expressions, (x,y> , which is such
that y is not the same expression as the one which interests you,
(x may or may not be the same expression as the one whioh interests
you), and which is such that, if you go to the string of words
whioh you have just produced and erase every ocourranoe of "B" and
write x, without quotes, in the resulting blank spaces, and if you
erase MS" and write "y", without quotes, in the resulting blank
space, then the result will be a grammatical sentence such that,
if you read it aloud, then you will be making a true statement.
If the language contains such & pair of expressions, then the ex¬
pression whioh interests you, in the sentence which interests you,
refers to the object which interests you. If the language con¬
tains no such pair of expressions, then the expression which in¬
terests you, in the sentence which interests you, does not refer
to the objeot whioh interests you.
Assuming that Bill is not the same person as Richard Nixon,
there is no appropriate pair of expressions to substitute for "B"
and "E" in (38)# So we conclude that "the President of the United
States", in (33)» does not refer to Richard Nixon. There is, how¬
ever, a pair of expressions whose substitution for "B" and "E" in
(39) results in»
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(40) Richard Nixon = the President of the United States; and the
statement the author is making by means of "The President of the
United States is balding" can be true only if the President of the
United States exists; and it can be true that the present King of
France is balding even if the President of the United States does
not exist.
If we recite (40) aloud, then we shall make a true statement. So
we conclude that "the President of the United States", in (34),
refers to Richard Nixon. Similar reasoning will show that "the
President of the United States", in (34)» refers to the President
of the United States, to the man who was Vice-President under
Eisenhower, and to the United States. Similar reasoning will also
show that the expression, "the man who came in second in the 1968
Presidential Election", ini
(41) The man who came in seoond in the 1968 Presidential Election
is now on holiday,
refers both to the man who came in seoond in the 1968 Presidential
Election, (i.e., to Hubert Humphrey), and to the objeot which came
in first in the 1968 Presidential Election, (i.e., to Richard
Nixon). No man can come in second unless something comes in first.
This conclusion may seem paradoxical to those who hold the view
that a statement which is made by means of a sentence like (41) is
true just in case the entity referred to by the grammatical subject
of the sentence has the property expressed by the grammatical predi¬
cate of the sentence. We can avoid this appearance of paradox by
distinguishing, among the entities to which an expression refers,
the entity to which it mainly refers. We give the following official
definition*
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(42) Expression "e", in sentence "S", refers mainly to X, just in
cases
(i) By (27), expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "3",
and
(II) e exists, and
(III) e = X.
We now see that although "the man who came in second in the 1968
Presidential Election", in sentence (4l)» refers to quite a few
things, that expression refers mainly only to the man who came in
second in the 1968 Presidential Election, (i.e., only to Hubert
Humphrey).
It will be noticed that if an expression, by (42), refers
mainly to a given object, then that same expression, by (36), re¬
fers to that object. But it does not follow from the fact that
an expression, by (36), refers to a given object that that expres¬
sion, by (42), refers mainly to that object.
The statement one makes by means of sentence (4l)» we now
may say, is true just in case the entity mainly referred to by
the grammatical subject of the sentence has the property expressed
by the grammatical predicate of the sentence.
For the sake of the present paragraph alone, let us call
the kind of reference defined by (36) "subsidiary reference", and
let us call the kind of reference defined by (42) "main reference".
It might be thought that, when one talks about reference, he must
always be explicit about whether he means main or subsidiary re¬
ference. But this is not necessary. We may talk about.subsidiary
reference by sayings ""e" refers to X" or "X is a referent of
"e"". And we may talk about main reference by sayings "the refe¬
rent of "e" is X", "X is the thing to which he is referring by means
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of "e"", etc.
I shall have to conclude this Section by noting some problems
which my account of referential occurrence is unable to handle.
Consider the occurrence of the expression, "Cicero", in the
sentencei
(43) Either Cicero denounced Catiline or snow is white.
Obviously, the principle of substitutivity applies to "Cicero" in
(43). From (43) and the identity!
(11) Cicero « Tully,
we may deduce!
(44) Either Tully denounced Catiline or snow is white.
But, by (27), "Cicero" does not occur referentially in (43). We
might make either of two responses to this situation. Both of
them will require a notion of a "molecular compound", which we may
define, in a rough-and-ready fashion, as a sentence which is con¬
structed from other sentences by means of such logical words asi
"or", "if...then", "and", etc. We might, then, insist that "Ci¬
cero" does not occur referentially in (43), but say that it does
occur referentially in the left hand disjunct of (43). We might
theii say that, if an expression, "e", occurs in a sentence, "T",
which is a molecular compound of sentences in one of which "e",
(by (27)), occurs referentially, then the principle of substitu¬
tivity applies to "e" in "T". On the other hand, we might just ex¬
tend the notion of referential occurrence by saying that if an ex-
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pression, "e", (by (27))t oooura referentially in a sentence, "3",
and if a sentence, "T", is a molecular compound of "3", then "e"
occurs referentially in "T".1
The seoond of the two alternatives might be the more prefer¬
able. For consider the occurrence of the expression, "the Presi¬
dent of the United States", in the sentencei
(45) The President of the United States is balding and one and
only one thing is President of the United States.
We should want to say that "the President of the United States"
occurs referentially in (45)* Yet, by (27), "the President of
the United States" does not occur referentially in (45)• It would
seem that we can make that expression occur referentially in (45)
only if we extend the notion of referential occurrence in the way
just outlined.
I hesitate, however, to take either of the lines which I
have just mentioned. My reason is simply that I find it hard to
see how I can say, for example, that "Cicero" occurs referentially
in the left hand disjunct of (43)• Suppose that someone actually
utters (43) to make a statement. In uttering (43), he will utter
its left hand disjunct!
(46) Cicero denounced Catiline.
But I cannot say that the statement which the person makes by means
of (46) entails that Cicero exists. He does not make a statement
by means of (46). He makes a statement by means of the whole mole¬
cular compound, (43)• And the statement he makes does not, of course,
1. If we were to take this line, we should have to change the "just
in oase" in (27) to "if".
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entail that Cioero exists.
Another difficulty with my account involves such indicator
words as "I". Suppose that you utter the sentenoes
(47) I a® hungry.
Following (27)» I must say that the expression, "I", occurs referen-
tially in (47) Just in case the statement you make hy means of (47)
entails that I exist. But this, of course, is absurd.
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SECTION XIIi THE LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE CRITERION OF
PROPOSITIONAL IDENTITY
In Sections X and XI, we had occasion to notice three ways
in which an expression, (definite description or proper name), can
occur in a sentence. In»
(1) Cicero denounced Catiline,
the occurrence of "Cicero" is purely referential. In (l), "Cicero"
is being used to refer to Cicero, and the principle of substituti-
vity applies to "Cicero". Im
(2) Philip knows that Cicero denounoed Catiline,
however, the occurrence of "Cicero" is referential, but not purely
referential. In (2), "Cicero" ie being used to refer to Cicero;
but the principle of substitutivity does not apply to "Cicero".
.And ins
(3) Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline,
finally, the occurrence of "Cicero" is not referential at all.
"Cicero" is not being used to refer to Cioero. We should not, of
course, deny that the substitution of •identicals' will ever go
through (3) salva veritate. It might so happen thats
(4) Cicero « Tully,
is true, and thats
(5) Philip believes that Tully denounced Catiline,
is also true. But the truth of (5) does not follow from that of
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(4) and (3).1
Let us extend our use of "expression", now, to cover such
strings of words ass
(6) that Cioero denounced Catiline.
As we said in Section XI, expressions such as (6) can be used to
refer to propositions. It is natural, I think, to say that an ex¬
pression like (6) is, just like "Cicero", capable of occurring in
sentences in at least three different ways. There might, for ex¬
ample, be sentences of the form:
(7) Philip...that Cicero denounced Catiline,
in which the occurrence of (6) would be 'purely referential. (6)
would be used to refer to the proposition that Cicero denounced
Catiline. And the principle of substitutivity would apply to (6).
Given any other expression which refers to the proposition that
Cicero denounced Catiline, we should be able to substitute that
expression for (6), in (7)» salva veritate. If:
(6) Philip PR that Cicero denounced Catiline,
is such a sentence, and if it is true that:
(9) The proposition that Cioero denounced Catiline » the proposition
that Cicero and Catiline are related an denouncer to denounced,
1. I do not mean to deny that "believes" can ever have what Quine,
(cf. Word and Object, p. 145)» would call a "transparent sense".
I just do not happen to use the word in that sense. I ought also
to make it clear, here, that when, later on in the present Sec¬
tion, I call a verb a "PR verb of propositional attitude", I
shall not be talking about what Quins talks about when he talks
about a verb of propositional attitude "taken transparently".
I shell be talking about pure reference to a proposition, not
pure reference to an object of the more mundane sort.
165
then, if the statement one makes "by means of sentence (8) is true,
then it is also true that:
(10) Philip FR that Cicero and Catiline are related as denouncer
to denounced.
There might, on the other hand, be sentences of the form,
(7)» in which the occurrence of (6) is referential, but not purely
referential. (6), in suoh a sentence, would be used to refer to
the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. But the occurrence
of (6), in that sentence, would not be subject to the principle of
substitutivity. If:
(11) Philip RBNPR that Cicero denounced Catiline
is such a sentence, then, even if (9) is true, we cannot deduce:
(12) Philip R3NPR that Cicero and Catiline are related as denouncer
to denounced,
from the statement which one makes by means of sentence (ll).
I put forward the following hypothesis in Section XI:
(13) If an expression occurs referentially in a given sentence,
and if the principle of substitutivity fails to apply to that ex¬
pression, (i.e., if its occurrence, in that sentence, is referen¬
tial, but not purely referential), then it is possible to con¬
struct another sentence, which expresses the same propositioi±
as the original sentence, and in which the expression occurs at
least twice: once purely referentially and once not referentially
at all. The several occurrences of the expression, in the new sen¬
tence, will serve to illuminate the several roles which are played
by that expression in the old sentence.
Aocording to such an hypothesis, there will be such an analysis for
(11): an analysis in which (6) has at least one occurrence which
is subject to the prinoiple of substitutivity. We shall come back
to this hypothesis later.
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There might, finally, be sentences of the form, (7), in which
the occurrence of (6) is not referential at all. (6), in such a
sentence, would not be used to refer to the proposition that Cicero
denounced Catiline. It is easy to think of an example of such a
sentence. Just imagine a nominalist saying:
(14) There is no such thing as the proposition that Cicero denoun¬
ced Catiline,
ori
(15) The proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline does not exist.
In Section X, I complained about the abundance of technical expres¬
sions to be found in writings on reference. With apologies to the
reader, I must introduce some new jargon myself. Let us call a
verb of propositional attitude a "PR verb of propositional attitude"
just in case the occurrence of a "that"-clause which follows it is
purely referential. Let us call a verb of prepositional attitude a
"RBNPR verb of propositional attitude" just in case the occurrence
of a "that"-clause which follows it is referential, but not purely
referential. There is, I think, a tendency among philosophers to
think that, if there is such a thing as reference to propositions,
then all reference to propositions is pure reference, i.e., that
all verbs of propositional attitude are PR verbs of propositional
attitude. On page 169 of Word and Object, Q,uine gives one the im¬
pression that he thinks this. No philosopher has, to my knowledge,
ever drawn a distinction between PR verbs of propositional attitude
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and RBNPR verbs of propositional attitude.^ It seems to me, however,
that, if we draw this distinction, then we can go some way towards
showing that logical equivalence, as a criterion for propositional
identity, is not so horrible an idea as one might think.
One of the most frightening consequences of the view that, if
p and q are logically equivalent, then 'they' are the same proposi¬
tion, is that there is just one necessaz^y proposition and just one
impossible one. Mathematics becomes, (to borrow Russell's words),
"only the art of 3aying the same thing in different words," (The
Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1944-1967). (Vol. Ill), p. 222).
And true mathematical propositions will differ from false mathema¬
tical propositions only in that the former will all be identical
with the necessary proposition while the latter will all be identi¬
cal with the impossible proposition. Paced with this consequence
of the logical equivalence criterion, one may either accept the con¬
sequence, like Russell, or find it too frightening to accept. If,
1. Prom a Fregean point of view, (cf. "On Sense and Reference"),
(l), by itself, refers to the True, (l), in (3), refers to the
proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. And (l), ini "John
believes that Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline"
would refer to the sense which (l) has in (3). But, in none of
these cases do we have, on the Fregean theory, what I should
call reference but not pure reference to the proposition that
Cicero denounced Catiline. In "John believes that Philip be¬
lieves that Cicero denounced Catiline", nothing refers to the
proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. In (3), although
Prege would say that (l) refers to the proposition that Cicero
denounced Catiline, he would, I think, allow us to substitute,
for (l), in (3), any other expression which has the same 'custo¬
mary sense' as (l). So we do not have a case of reference but
not pure reference here either.
The reader may have noticed that, with my usage, I should say
that, in (3), for example, it is (6) which refers to the propo¬
sition that Cicero denounced Catiline. Prege, however, would
say that it is (l) which plays this role. Actually, I think
that my usage is preferable in an enquiry such as the present
one. With my usage, I can, if I wish, talk about the meaning
of (l) without bothering to tell the reader that I am imagining
(l) to be used in an extensional context.
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however, one does not want to hold that mathematics is only the art
of saying the same thing in different ways, one need not disown the
logical equivalence criterion completely. One might, instead,
choose to apply this oriterion only to contingent propositions and
to think up some new criterion for necessary and impossible ones.
This manoeuvre'*" would make out a fundamental difference between con¬
tingent propositions, on the one hand, and necessary and impossible
ones on the other. The difference would be great enough to render
the expression, "proposition", ambiguous, for would a difference
in kinds of entity, (in some quite strong sense of "kinds"), not
have to result from a difference in identity conditions? Those who
feel that there is a great difference between contingent and non-
contingent propositions would acclaim this manoeuvre. Those who
1. Discussing the question of synonymy and equipollence, (which,
since it is not a question about the identity of objects, is a
different question from the question of propositional identity),
Lewis took a similar line. "We shall be in conformity with good
usage", he says, "if we say that two expressions are synonymous or
equipollent, (l) if they have the same intension and that inten¬
sion is neither zero nor universal, or (2) if, their intension be¬
ing either zero or universal, they are equivalent in analytic
meaning," ("The Modes of Meaning", p. 246). Camap replied by
sayings "He applies this stronger relation [i.e., equivalence in
analytic meaning], only to the two extreme cases of intension,
for example, in the field of sentences, only to L-determinate and
not to factual sentences. This discrimination seems to me some¬
what arbitrary and inadvisable," (Meaning and Necessity, p. 6l).
Carnap then asks us to consider the sentences: (i) "Two is an even
prime number", (ii) "Two is between one and three", (iii) "The
number of books on this table is an even prime number", and (iv)
"The number of books on this table is between one and three". He
then says: "The sentences (i) and (ii) have the same intension
but are not equivalent in analytic meaning (intensionally isomor¬
phic). The same holds for (iii) and (iv). Now, according to
Lewis' definition, (i) and (ii) are not synonymous because they
are L-true, analytic} while (iii) and (iv) are synonymous because
they are factual, synthetic. It seems to me that it would be
more natural to regard (iii) and (iv) also as nonsynonymous, since
the difference between them is essentially the same as that bet¬
ween (i) and (ii). The logical operation which leads from (i)
to (ii) is the same as that which leads from (iii) to (iv); it is
the transformation of "n is an even prime number" into "n is (a
cardinal number) between one and three".
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feel that the edges between the two classes of propositions should
be blurred will oppose this manoeuvre. But this is a manoeuvre
which I shall not explore in any more detail. My purpose in this
Section is, instead, to see how far the logical equivalence criteri¬
on of prepositional identity — as a criterion which prescribes the
same identity conditions for all propositions — can be defended
against some of the objections which have been made against it. The
objections which I have been able to discover are of two sorts* the
old 3ort, which turns on the unargued-for assumption that "believes"
and "knows" are PR verbs of propositional attitude, and the new and
more interesting sort, put forward recently by L.R. Reinhardt.1
As a representative objector of the old sort, we shall consi¬
der Arthur Pap. But let me lead up to his objections by saying some
more things about PR and R3KPR. The lead-up will run for several
pages. In the present work, I use the following verbs as PR verbs
of propositional attitude, (and I happen to use them all with the
same meaning)t "said (that)", "made the statement (that)", "stated
2
the proposition (that)", "stated (that)". Thus, if a statement
of the formi
(16) A said that p,
is used to make a true statement, and if I happen to think that the
proposition that p « the proposition that q, then I shall consider
myself justified in saying!
(17) A said that q;
1. I shall oonsider Reinhardt's views towards the end of this Section.
2. I take the liberty of extending the use of the expression "verb",
to cover expressions of more than one word.
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and this no matter how much A should protest to the contrary. To
say that p is to utter a sentence which, in the context in which one
utters it, means that p. It is the sentence which does the meaning,
not the speaker. And, in a report of someone's statement, it is
the meaning of his sentence, i.e., the proposition which he stated,
which is at issue. I do not, of course, wish to prohibit other
philosophers from using the verbs which I just mentioned as BBNPR
verbs of propositional attitude, or, for that matter, from using
these verbs in any other way which should happen to please them.
A good example of a RBNPR verb of propositional attitude is
"said explicitly (that)". The truth of a statement made by means
of a sentence of the formi
(18) A said explicitly that p,
together with the identity of the proposition that p and the pro¬
position that q does not allow us to deducet
(19) A said explicitly that q.
If Philip said that Cicero denounced Catiline, then, by (9)> Philip
said that Cicero and Catiline are related as denouncer to denounced.
But, even granting (9)> Philip may have said explicitly that Cicero
denounoed Catiline without ever having said explicitly that Cicero
and Catiline are related as denouncer to denounoed.
What, now, of my hypothesis, (13)? It seems to me that a
perspicuous analysis of»
(20) Philip said explicitly that Cicero denounced Catiline,
would bet
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(21) Philip uttered the sentence: "Cicero denounced Catiline", in a
oontext in which that sentsnoe meant that Cioero denounced Catiline.
If (21) is taken as the analysis of (20), then my hypothesis, (13),
will be seen to have broker, down a bit. But let us ignore, for the
moment, the part of my hypothesis which breaks down and conoentrate
upon the part which we may regard as confirmed in the case of (20).
A'heroas the occurrence of the expression, (6), i.e., "that Cicero
denounced Catiline", in the sentence, (20), is referential but not
purely referential, the occurrence of (6) in (21) is purely referen¬
tial. From the truth of the statement which one makes by means of
sentence, (21), together with the truth of the identity, (9), we may
deduce:
(22) Philip uttered the sentence: "Cicero denounced Catiline", in a
context in which that sentence meant that Cicero and Catiline are
related as denouncer to denounced.
(Also, since the proposition expressed by (21) is, by hypotheis,
identical to the proposition expressed by (20), (22) follows from
(20) and (9).)
It might be thought that no mention of a proposition is needed
in the analysis of (20), that (20) may be analyzed as:
(23) Philip uttered the sentence: "Cicero denounced Catiline".
But this is wrong. In order for the statement I make, in present cir¬
cumstances, by means of sentence (20), to be true, Philip must have
uttered sentence, (l), (i.e., "Cioero denounoed Catiline"), in circum¬
stances in which (l) had the meaning which it would have, (i.e.,
meant the proposition which it would mean), if (l) were to be uttered
in present circumstances. An example will make this clear. Suppose
that the Secret Service uses "Cicero" as a code name for Mr Bixon and
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"Catiline" as a code name for Ho Chi Minh. If Philip, a Secret
Service agent, has uttered the sentence, (l), while talking to one
of his comrades in the course of their daily business, then I may,
in any circumstances^, use sentence (23) to make a true statement.
But, unless I take special steps to indicate a special meaning for
the words "Cicero" and "Catiline", the truth of (23) will not allow
me to make a true statement by means of sentence (20) in the pre¬
sence of a group of Latin scholars who are going about their daily
business. In order for me to make a true statement by means of
sentence, (20), the context of my utterance must be such as to
make the "that"-clause in (20) refer to the proposition which was
meant by sentence (l) when Philip uttered (l). This is why I
think that reference to a proposition is needed in the analysis of
(20).
These considerations lead to the view that reference to a
proposition is also needed in the analysis of:
(24) Philip said that Cicero denounced Catiline,
and:
(3) Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline.
What I say, in present circumstances, by means of sentence, (24),
cannot be true unless Philip has uttered some sentence, S, in cir¬
cumstances in which 3 had the meaning which (l) would have, (i.e.,
meant the proposition which (l) would mean), were (l) uttered in
1. I ignore the ambiguity of the word "Philip", the possible am¬
biguity of "uttered", "the", and "sentence", and the possibility
of a convention according to which ""Cicero denounced Catiline""
would be used to refer to some sentence other than "Cicero de¬
nounced Catiline".
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present circumstances. As for (3)* even if we adopt one of the
simplest theories of belief imaginable — that for Philip to be¬
lieve that Cicero denounced Catiline is for him to have performed
a physical or mental 'nodding of his head' towards the sentence,
(l) — we must say, nonetheless, that for the statement I make, by
means of sentence (3), in present circumstances, to be true, Philip
must have performed this piece of head-nodding in circumstances
where (l) had the meaning which (l) would have in present circum¬
stances .
Quine — whose motive is 'regimentation of theory', rather
than such a simple theory of belief as the one just outlined —
suggests that we analyze a sentence like (3) as a sentence like*
(25) Philip believes-true "Cicero denounced Catiline",
a sentence which expresses a relation between a man and a sentence,
(cf. word and Object, p, 212). viuine would get rid of problems of
ambiguity by 'eternalizing' the quoted sentence in (25)» (cf* «ord
and Object, Section 40). we might add a time reference to "de¬
nounced". and we might replace "Cicero" and "Catiline" with detailed
definite descriptions.^ But there still remains the possibility
that the quoted sentence, as Quina says, make3 "sense in another
language, and sense other than we intend," (Word and Ob.ieot. p.213)
A natural response to this difficulty, (cf. Word and Object, loc.
cit.)» would be to amend (25), (with the quoted sentence imagined
as 'eternalized'), tos
(26) Philip believes-true in English "Cicero denounced Catiline".
But IJuine would find this unsatisfactory. He says:
1. For some purposes, "philip" and "believes-true" might also be
•eternalized'.
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The underlying form of...[a sentence such as (26)] is "w believes-
true s in 1", relating a man, a linguistic form, and a language.
What are languages, and when do they count as identical or distinct?
Clearly such questions should be unconnected with the prepositional
attitudes. It would be better to refer here not to a language 1 but
to a speaker z, thus: "w believes-fcrue s in z's sense". We have
then an irreducibly triadic relative term "...believes-true...in...'s
sense", relating a man, a linguistic form, and a man...In practice
of course the appropriate substitute for "z" will regularly be the
indicator word "me", since "that" clauses are always given in our
own language, (Word and Object, p. 214).
But the new analysist
(27) Philip believes-true "Cicero denounced Catiline" in my sense,
makes just that reference to a proposition for which I have been
arguing. For what is a sense of a sentence if it isn't a meaning
of a sentence, i.e., a proposition? To say that the relative term
is "irreducibly triadic" is, I think, to obscure this point.''"
Let us now see how my hypothesis, (13), fails to get confirmed
by my analysis of (20)as (21). I repeat these sentences for easy
reference 1
(20) Philip said explicitly that Cicero denounced Catiline
(21) Philip uttered the sentencet "Cicero denounced Catiline" in a
context in which that sentence meant that Cicero denounced Catiline.
The expression which interests us here is (6), i.e.*
(6) that Cioero denounced Catiline.
Although (13) is partially confirmed by the fact that (6) has one
1. In fairness to Quine, it must be said that the suggestion, quoted
above, is not his offioial view. He makes the suggestion in the
course of considering various ways of handling the ontology of
propositional attitudes. But he eventually decides to ban re¬
ports of propositional attitudes altogether from the language of
science. "If we are limning the true and ultimate structure of
reality, the canonical scheme for us i3 the austere scheme that
knows no quotation but direct quotation and no propositional
attitudes but only the physical constitution and behavior of
organisms," (Word and Object, p. 22l).
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purely referential occurrence in (21), (13) breaks down because,
since (6)'s only occurrence in (21) is purely referential, (6) has
no occurrence in (2l) which is not referential at all. This is,
however, just a technical difficulty. Something very much like
(6), i.e.:
(l) Cicero denounced Catiline,
occurs in (2l) without being used to refer to the proposition that
Cicero denounced Catiline. And we may say that the occurrence of
(l) in (21) illuminates one of the two roles which (6) plays in
(20). So the spirit, if not the letter, of (13) is here confirmed.
An idea for making (13) technically air tight comes to mind. We
might say that the 'expression' which interests us in (20) is not
the "that"-clause, (6), but the sentence, (l). We might then re¬
strict our talk of the reference of a sentence to talk of reference
to intensional entities, (we should refuse to say that a sentence
in an extensional context refers at all). We could then say that
(l) occurs referentially, but not purely referentially, in (20),
and that it has two occurrences in (21): one purely referential
and one not referential at all. We should then be able to say
that the analysis of (20) as (21) oonfirms both the spirit and the
letter of (13). But this tactic is in vain. For there is something
wrong with its underlying assumption, i.e., that all sentences of
the form:
(18) A said explicitly that p,
are to be analyzed on the model of (21), i.e., in the form:
(28) A uttered the sentence: "p", in a context in which that sen¬
tence meant that p.
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Purely a statement made by means of the sentence:
(29) Hoover said explicitly that I am a Communist,
is not to be taken as entailing that Hoover uttered the sentence:
"I am a Communist"! A more likely analysis of (29) would be some¬
thing like:
(30) Hoover uttered a sentence of the form: "(Singular Term) is a
Communist", which, in the context in which he uttered it, meant
that I am a Communist.
At a time like this, one must decide whether his goal is technical
precision or eluoidation of his subject matter. I choose the
latter goal. Where definite descriptions and proper names are all
that ooncern us, we may, I think, keep (13). But for cases where
our interest is in "that"-clauses, I propose the following rough-
and-ready emendation of (13):
(31) If an expression, (i.e., a "that"-clause), occurs referentially
in a given sentence, and if the principle of substitutivity fails
to apply to that expression, (i.e., if the occurrence is referential,
but not purely referential), then it is possible to construct an¬
other sentence which expresses the same proposition as the original
sentence, and which has the following properties: (i) it contains
at least one purely referential occurrence of the expression in
question, and: (ll) it contains a string of words which bears an in¬
teresting resemblance to the expression in question.
The new sentence will serve to elucidate the roles which the ex¬
pression plays in the original sentence. The role which this ex¬
pression has of referring to its object, (in the case of a "that"-
olause, the object will, of course, be a proposition), will be elu¬
cidated by the purely referential occurrence of the expression in
the new sentence. The other role will be elucidated by the string
of words which bears an interesting resemblance to the expression
in question.
Thus, in (30), the string of words:
(32) uttered a sentence of the form: "(Singular Term) is a Communist'J
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helps to show that one of the roles of*
(33) that I am a Communist,
in (29), is to help to make it clear that, instead of saying some¬
thing like 1 "He is an advocate or supporter of an economic theory
or system of the ownership of all property by the community as a
whole," Hoover actually applied the expression, "is a Communist",
to me. The other role which (33) has in (29) is, of course, to re¬
fer to the proposition that I ain a Communist.
This has been a long, but unavoidable, digression from the
main issue of this Section: attacks which have been made on the
logical equivalence criterion of propositional identity. We are
now ready to return to it. Consider Pap's attack. He begins with
logically necessary statements, with which, he suggests, the logical
equivalence criterion cannot cope:
For, an obvious criterion of adequacy which an explication of "propo¬
sition" (via the explication of synonymy of declarative sentences)
should satisfy is that "A believes that p, and p ■ q" should entail
"A believes that q". Yet, any two logically necessary statements
are L-equivalent, but it could hardly be maintained that, where "p"
and "q" are logically necessary, "A believes that p" entails "A be¬
lieves that q". For example, anybody with a rudimentary knowledge
of the propositional calculus will believe a simple tautology like
"((poq) &-vq)r>^p", yet there are tautologies with respect to which
he could profess neither belief nor disbelief because he does not
recognize them as tautologies. In general, it is surely possible
that, being familiar with the semantic and syntactic rules for the
symbols of a logical system, one understands the sentences of the
system, i.e., knows what propositions they express, yet does not
know whether the propositions expressed are logically necessary. We
all understand the sentence "for n greater than 2, there are no so¬
lutions for the equation: x11 + y11 « zn , i.e., know what proposi¬
tion it expresses, but according to my information it is not yet known
whether the proposition is logically necessary. But according to the
L-equivalence criterion of propositional identity, we already believe
this proposition if it is logically necessary! ("Belief and Proposi¬
tions", p. 125)
But this objection clearly depends upon the view that "believes" is
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a PR verb of propositional attitude. Assuming that the sentence
about the equation expresses a truth of mathematics, and that the
sentence in propositional calculus expresses a truth of logic, it
follows from the logical equivalence criterion that:
(34) The proposition that ((p =>q) &~q)=>~p - the proposition that,
for n greater than 2, there are no solutions for the equation:
xn + yn _ zn#
But:
(35) Bill believes that for n greater than 2 there are no solutions
for the equation x11 + yn - zn.
may be said to follow from (34) and:
(36) Bill believes that ((p=>q) &~q)= ~ p,
only if we accept the dogma"'' that "A believes that p, and p = q"
1. An interesting example of how much of a dogma this has been, (here
as applied to "knows"), is G. Lewy's article, "Equivalence and
Identity". ; This article is filled with a host of
cautious turns of phrase, e.g.: "it seems to me that it is not
incorrect...", "that all this is true I feel reasonably certain",
"I feel inclined to 3ay", etc. But I feel reasonably certain that
it is not incorrect to say that one of the most confident remarks
to be found in the article is: "The only thing that does seem
to me to be quite certain is that it would be wrong to deny the
premiss that it is definitely incorrect so to use the sentence
"p and q are one and the same proposition" that what is expressed
by it does not entail "Anybody who knows that p must know that q
and anybody who knows that q must know that p"," (pp. 229f.).
One person who did not accept this dogma was Camap, who
clearly distinguished the problem of synonymy from the problem
of propositional identity. I am inclined to think that his
statement that "the whole belief-sentence ["John believes that
..."] is neither extensional nor intensional with respect to the
subsentence (Meaning and Necessity, p. 53), was an attempt
to get at the same idea as that at which I am trying to get when
I say that "believes" is a RBNPR verb of propositional attitude.
One of the ways in which I differ from Carnap is that whereas
Carnap says: "Consequently, an interpretation of belief-senten¬
ces as referring either to sentences or to propositions is not
quite satisfactory," (loo, cit.), I avail myself of a Ouine-like
notion of a referential, but not purely referential, occurrence
of an expression and say that "that"-clauses in belief-sentences
refer to propositions but do something else as well.
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entails "A believes that q", i.e., that "believes is a PR verb of
propositional attitude. If we reject this dogma, we may rejeot
Pap's statement that "according to the L-equivalence criterion of
propositional identity, we already believe this proposition".
My view, that "believes" is a RBNPR verb of propositional
attitude, allows me to accept the logical equivalence criterion
without accepting the frightful consequence which Pap draws from it.
But, according to my hypothesis, (31), I am required to suggest an
analysis for a sentence such as (36) which will illuminate the
roles played by the "that"-clause in such a sentence. I shall res¬
pond to this requirement before too long. In the meantime, I want
to say some more about some of Pap's remarks.
In the passage I quoted from Pap, there is a turn of phrase
which is likely to mislead. He says: "one understands the sen¬
tences of the system, i.e., knows what propositions they express
...," and again he sayss "We all understand the sentence...,i.e.,
know what proposition it expresses". Now although I should not
deny that to understand a sentenoe, (as it is being used on a par¬
ticular occassion, of course), is to know what proposition it ex¬
presses, or, in my more usual terminology, means, (on that occa¬
sion), the following argument is a bad one:
(37) Bill knows what proposition is expressed by the sentence, "p",
and
Bill knows what proposition is expressed by the sentence, "q", and
The proposition expressed by "p" « the proposition expressed by "q".
Therefore, Bill knows that the proposition expressed by "p" » the
proposition expressed by "q".
A similarly bad argument will help us to bring out the flaw in (37)*
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(38)George IV knows what man Scott is, and
George IV knows what man the author of Waverley is, and Scott =
the author of Waverley.
Therefore, George IV knows that Scott is the author of Waverley.
Supposing that George IV has never received an answer to his famous
question, the premisses of (38) may be true nonetheless. George IV
knows what man Scott is: he knows that he is Sir Walter, that he
is the Scottish nobleman who wears shepherd's plaid, and that he
is the man who organized the King's visit to Edinburgh in 1822.
Similarly, he knows what man the author of Waverley iss he knows,
let us suppose, that he is the author of Marmion, that he is the
author of The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border, and that he is the
man who caused a stir in Edinburgh by publishing an anonymous novel
on July 7th, 1814."*" But the King does not know enough about Scott
to know that he is the author of Waverley. Nor does he know enough
about the author of Waverley to know that he is Scott. The point
is that one can know what man the so-and-so is without knowing
everything there is to know about him. For us Bub-angelic creatures,
to know someone is not to know him perfectly.
The case is similar with propositions. I know what proposi¬
tion is expressed by the sentence:
(39 ) (( pa q) &*q):> ~p.
1. In fact, since it was already known on July 7th 1814, that Scott
was the author of Marmion and The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Bor¬
der, if George IV ahd known all these things about the author of
Waverley, he would have guessed the identity. But I fabricate
the example for my purposes. My authority for the definite des¬
criptions is Janet R. Glover, The Story of Scotland, London,
Faber and Faber, i960.
Incidentally, I use "A knows something about B" in such a way
that A can know something about B without knowing anything about
C even though A = G. That is to say, in "A knows something
about B", the occurrence of "3" is not purely referential.
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It is the proposition that if p is true only if q is true, and if q
is false, then p is false. I also know what proposition is expres¬
sed by the sentences
(40) For n greater than 2, there are no solutions for the equation:
xn + yn - zn.
It is the proposition that ((an) (ax) (3 y) (3») ((n>2)
& (xn + y11 « z11))). But I do not know enough about the proposi¬
tion expressed by (39) to know whether or not it is identical to the
proposition expressed by (40). Nor do I know enough about the pro¬
position expressed by (40) to know whether or not it is identical
to the proposition expressed by (39) • For us sub-angelic creatures,
to understand a sentence is not to understand it completely. As Pap
says: "Nobody, for example, would seriously doubt the identity of
Scott and the author of Waverley just because a king some time ago
was doubtful of this identity while being perfectly certain of
Scott's self-identity," ("Belief and Propositions", pp. 124f.). Simi¬
larly, it does not follow from the fact that I do not know whether or
not the proposition expressed by (39) is the proposition expressed
by (40), ('while being perfectly certain of their self-identity'),
that the proposition expressed by (39) is not the proposition ex¬
pressed by (40).
One can understand a sentence without understanding it com¬
pletely. Understanding comes in degrees."'" We can apply thi3 point
1. This point may be applied to the theory of proper names discussed
in Section VIII. According to this theory, the meaning, or sense,
of "Socrates", is that of a description of Socrates which enume¬
rates all of his properties. But it does not follow from this
theory that I cannot understand "Socrates" without knowing every¬
thing there is to know about Socrates. I cannot have perfect
understanding of "Socrates" unless I know everything there is to
know about Socrates. But perfect understanding is not what counts,
in everyday life, as understanding.
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to the 'paradox of analysis'. This paradox has been given many dif¬
ferent formulations. But I shall concentrate on Quine's. As he
puts iti
how can a correct analysis be informative, since to understand it we
must already know the meanings of its terms and hence already know
that the terms which it equates are synonymous? (Word and Object,
P. 259).
As we saw in Section III, analysis need not carry a synonymy claim.
But it ought to carry a claim of propositional identity. Here is
an example of a piece of analysis!
(41) The proposition that the present King of Prance does not
exist - the proposition that~-(3 y) (y • (1 x) (x is present King of
Prance))*
But, to rephrase Quine's question, how can (4l)» if true, be infor¬
mative, since to understand it we must already know what proposition
is expressed byi
(42) The present King of Franoe does not exist,
and what proposition is expressed bys
(43) A/ (3 y) (y " C^x) (x is present King of France)),
and hence already know what (41) is supposed to tell us? The answer
is that I can understand (42) and (43), i.e., know what they express,
without understanding them completely, i.e., without knowing every¬
thing there is to know about what they express. (41) is informative
in that it may help one to increase his knowledge of the meaning of
a sentence. One can have enough understanding of the sentence, (42),
for example, to react appropriately to it in an everyday situation
without knowing that the statement one makes by means of it can be
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true if there is no such thing as the present King of France. (41)
helps one to acquire this piece of knowledge, it helps one to a
better understanding of the sentence.
After having, in the passage we quoted, considered the truths
of mathematics and logic, Pap turns to contingent propositions,
saying:
The L-equivalence criterion does not 3eein to be satisfied by con¬
tingent propositions either. This can again be shown in terms of
the evident requirement that "A believes that p, and p » q" 3hould
entail "A believes that q". It will surely be granted that it is
impossible to have a propositional attitude, whether belief or dis¬
belief or doubt or any other, towards a proposition some of whose
constituent concepts one does not "have". A man who does not under-
the meanings of color predicates, e.g., cannot have a propositional
attitude^towards a proposition containing a color concept. ("Belief
and Propositions", p. 125).
Pap then lays down a criterion for whether or not a concept is a
"genuine constituent" of the proposition expressed by a sentence.
His criterion is in terms of whether or not the word which expres¬
ses the concept occurs "essentially" in the sentence, (i shall
not go into the details of 'essential occurrence'.) He then says:
"x is orange" is logically equivalent to "x is intermediate-in-
colour between Red and Yellow", but all the descriptive terms occur
essentially, hence we can argue that a man having a propositional
attitude towards the proposition expressed by the first sentence
might fail to have a propositional attitude towards the proposition
expressed by the second sentence, since he might, say, have a con¬
cept of the color Orange without having a concept of the color Red:
for the latter concept is a genuine constituent of the proposition
expressed by the second sentence. ("Belief and Propositions", p.126)
Pap would argue that although the proposition that this is orange
is logically equivalent to the proposition that this is intermediate
in color between red and yellow, these propositions are not identi¬
cal. And he would back up his argument by saying that if A has the
concept of orange and does not have the concept of red, then:
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(44) A "believes that this is orange,
and j
(45) A believes that this is intermediate in color between red and
yellow,
can differ in truth value. This argument against the logical equi¬
valence criterion of propositional identity depends upon the dogma
that "believes" is a PR verb of propositional attitude, and it may¬
be dismissed for this reason. I have another reason, however, for
quoting these new passages from Papi the very idea that proposi¬
tions should contain concepts as 'constituents'I If someone wants
to use the word, "proposition", in such a way as to make a propo¬
sition a mental container for ooncepts, then he has every right to
do so. But this use of "proposition" is not forced upon us.* We
do not have to treat propositions as mental entities. If someone
insists upon talking about concepts, it seems to me that a reason¬
able line to take would be the following one. First, we follow
Geach in defining a "concept" as a mental oapacity belonging to a
particular person. It will be a sufficient condition for one's
having a certain concept that he should have mastered the intelli¬
gent use of a word for that concept in some language, (cf. Mental
Acts, p. 12). Next, we say that to believe is to do something or
other with one's concepts. We might say that concepts are exerci¬
sed in "acts of judgment", which acts take place at least as often
1. I see no reason to think that Wittgenstein, to whose Tractatus
5.141 Lewy attributes the logical equivalence criterion of pro-
positional identity, (cf. "Equivalence and Identity", p. 223),
ever thought that a Satz was a container of concepts. Yet, when
discussing this criterion, Lewy constantly talks of propositions
as things which contain concepts.
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as one makes up his mind how to answer a question, (cf. Mental Acts,
p. 9). We could — this is to depart a hit from Geach — say that
to believe that p is to have recently judged that p, or to be ready
to judge that p, or to be disposed to judge that p. For simplicity's
sake, however, we can just use "judge" in the present tense and treat
"A judges that p" as equivalent to "A believes that p". This will
allow us to drop "judges" and stick to "believes". Next, we say
that to believe is to exercise one's concepts in such-and-such a
way. (cf. Mental Acts, Chapter 14). Thus, a man who believes what
A is said to believe in (44) would exercise his concepts: this, is,
and orange. And a man who believes what A is said to believe in
(45) would exercise his concepts: this, is, intermediate, in,
colour, between, red, and, and yellow. Thus, assuming that:
(46) Philip believes that this is orange,
and:
(47) Bill believes that this is intermediate in colour between red
and yellow,
we find Fhilip and Bill exercising different 3ets of concepts. Next,
to leave Geach finally, we introduce a new verb of propositional
attitude: "is committed to the truth of the proposition (that)".
This verb has five important properties. First, it is a PR verb
of propositions! attitude. That is to say, if p » q, then A is
committed to the truth of the proposition that p just in case A
is committed to the truth of the proposition that q. Second, it
is a sufficient, although not a necessary condition for one's be¬
ing committed to the truth of the proposition that p that one
should believe that p. Third, it is both a necessary and a suffi¬
cient condition for one to be committed to the truth of the pro-
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position that p that he should have a belief which entails, (i.e.,
strictly implies), the proposition that p. That is to say, if A
believes that q, and if the proposition that q entails the propo¬
sition that p, then A is committed to the truth of the proposition
that p; and if A is committed to the truth of the proposition that
p, then some statement made by means of a sentence of the form:
"A believes that q", such that the proposition that q entails the
proposition that p, is true.^ Fourth, (this follows from the third,
but I put it in for clarity), it is a sufficient condition for one's
being committed to the truth of the proposition that p that one
should have a belief which is logically equivalent to the proposi¬
tion that p. Fifth, one who is committed to the truth of the pro¬
position that p satisfies the intuitive notion of being committed
to the truth of a proposition which I think is conveyed by the
words: "is committed to the truth of the proposition that p".
We now find that whereas Philip and Bill, in (46) and (47)
exercise different sets of concepts, they commit themselves to the
truth of the same proposition. The upshot is that whereas a con¬
cept is a mental entity — or "capacity" as Geach would have it —
a proposition is not a mental thing but is what one commits oneself
to the truth of by exercising one's concepts.
I now want to suggest how someone who likes to talk about
concepts might respond to my hypothesis, (31). (46) and (47) will
get analyzed as:
1. The notion of being committed to the truth of the proposition that
p might be extended in suoh a way that someone who says that q
but who does not believe that q would, if the proposition that p
is entailed by the proposition that q, become committed to the
truth of the proposition that p. Were the notion extended in
this way, it would no longer be a necessary, but only a suffi¬
cient condition for one's being committed to the truth of the
proposition that p that he should have a belief which entails the
proposition that p. But I shall not bother, here, to extend the
notion in this way.
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(48) Philip is committed to the truth of the proposition that this
is orange by his exercise of the concepts* this, is, and orange*
(49) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that this is
intermediate in colour between red and yellow by his exercise of
the concepts* this, is, intermediate, in, colour, between, red,
and, and yellow.
Such analyses would confirm (31). The expressions*
(50) that this is orange,
and*
(51) that this is intermediate in colour between red and yellow,
occur referentially, but not purely referentailly, in (46) and
(47)• But, since "is committed to the truth of the proposition
(that)" is a PR verb of propositional attitude, these expressions
have purely referential occurrences in (48) and (49)* In (46) and
(47), these expressions play two roles at once. One role is the
role of referring to a proposition. The other role is illuminated
by strings of words, in (48) and (49)» which bear interesting re¬
semblances to the expressions, (50) and (5l)» This is the role of
indicating the concepts by the exercise of which Philip and Bill
commit themselves to the truth of this proposition, the concepts
in terms of which their beliefs are framed.
Since, by the logical equivalence criterion, the proposition
that this is orange - the proposition that this is intermediate in
colour between red and yellow*, and since "is committed to the truth
of the proposition (that)" is PR verb of propositional attitude, we
may deduce, from (48) and (49)t that*
1. I assume, of course, a unique reference for "this".
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(52) Philip is committed to the truth of the proposition that this
is intermediate in colour between red and yellow by his exercise of
the concepts: this, is, and orange,
and that :
(53) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that this is
orange by his exercise of the concepts: this, is, intermediate, in
colour, between, red, and, and .yellow.
If (48) and (49) are correct analyses of (46) and (47)» then, of
course, (52) and (53) follow from (46) and (47) together with the
appropriate statement of propositional identity. Incidentally, by
the third property of "is committed to the truth of the proposition
(that)", we may deduce from (48) and (49) that:
(54) Philip and Bill are committed to the truth of the proposition
that this is coloured.
Assuming that (48) and (49) are correct analyses of (46) and (47),
(54)» of course, follows from (46) and (47)* On an intuitive under¬
standing of "believes" and "is committed to the truth of the proposi¬
tion (that)", I think that all these entailments ought to be welcome.
We can give similar treatment, I think, to sentences of mathe¬
matics and logic.
(36) Bill believes that ((pr>q) &~q)z>~p,
would get analyzed as:
(55) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that ((p^q)
& ~q)r>~p by his exercise of the concepts: left hand bracket twice,
propositional variable "ja" twice, horseshoe twice, propositional
variable twice, right hand bracket twice, ampersand once, and
tilde twice.
We need not balk at the idea of a concept of left hand bracket, for
example, if we remember that we are following Geach in saying that
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a concept is a mental capacity. Here we have the mental capacity
to use and to react appropriately to a left hand bracket.
Given the logical equivalence criterion, we have the identity:
(56) The proposition that ((p^>q) & A*q) HD a/ p » the proposition that
(p & ~p).
And,since "is committed to the truth of the proposition (that)" is
a PR verb of propositional attitude, it follows from (55) and (56)
that:
(57) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that
~(p &~p) by his exercise of the concepts: left hand bracket
twice, propositional variable "jg" twice, horseshoe twice, proposi¬
tional variable "cl" twice, right hand bracket twice, ampersand
once, and tilde twice.
And, assuming that (55) is a correct analysis of (36),
(57) follows from (36) and (56). Similarly, we could deduce from:
(58) Bill believes that some object is both red all over and green
all over,
and:
(59) The proposition that some object is both red all over and green
all over ■ the proposition that p &~p,
that:
(60) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that p & ~ p
by his exercise of the ooncepts: some once, object once, i£j once,
both once, red once, all twice, over twice, and once, and green once.
It will be noticed that anyone who has any belief whatever
will be committed to the truth of the neoessary proposition, (al¬
though he need not believe it). Also, we should try to avoid be¬
lieving contradictions. Anyone who believes a contradiction is
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comitted to the truth of the impossible proposition, the necessary-
proposition, and all the contingent propositions there are.
Given an intuitive understanding of "believes" and "is com¬
mitted to the truth of the proposition (that)", these conclusions
should be welcome. But a problem arises with this way of appro¬
aching things. Given the identity:
(61) The proposition that ((pr>q) &~q):?~p ■ the proposition that
((p=q) & p) =q»
and the assumption that (55) is the correct analysis of (36), we
may deduce, from (36):
(62) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that
~ ~ ((p=>q) & p)r> q by his exercise of the concepts: left hand
bracket twice, propositional variable "jd" twice, horseshoe twice,
propoaitional variable twice, right hand braoket twice, ampersand
once, and tilde twice.
But (62) would be the analysis of:
(63) Bill believes that ~ ~ ( (p =>q) & p)r> q.
This turn of events would be unwelcome to someone who held that it
is possible, (for, say, a student who is just starting to learn the
propositional calculus), to believe that ((p^q) &~q)m~p without
believing that~ — ((p=q) & p) n q. We could try to salvage this
approach by introducing the notion of order into the list of con¬
cepts in the analysis of a belief sentence. Perhaps something along
the lines of Chapter 14 of Geach's Mental Acts would be appropriate.
But I shall not explore this any further. I have merely been trying
to indicate the sort of approach which might be taken by someone who
likes to talk about concepts.
An alternative way of approaching belief would be along the
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lines of the simple minded, theory which I hinted at, several pages
back, by suggesting that for Philip to believe that Cicero denounced
Catiline is for him to have performed a physical or mental 'nodding
of his head' towards the sentence» "Cicero denounced Catiline",
v.'e could make this theory a bit more sophisticated by saying that
to believe is to have performed, to be ready to perform, or to be
disposed to perform a judgment, and that to judge is to mentally or
physically 'nod one's head' towards a seen, heard, or imagined sen¬
tence.1 Then, using "performs a judgment", for simplicity's sake,
in the present tense'— we should analyze (46), i.e.!
(46) Bill believes that this i3 orange,
ass
(64) Bill, who performs a judgment involving th8 sentences "This
is orange", is committed to the truth of the proposition that this
is orange.
It will go without saying that, in order for (46) to be true, Bill
must perform his judgment in a context in which the sentence, "This
2
is orange", means that this is orange.
1. If we read "to nod one's head" as "to have a feeling of belief",
this theory would be not unlike the one offered by Russell in
Leoture X.U of The Analysis of Mind. Among the ways in which
the theories differ, however, is in that, whereas on the theory
we are considering, we nod our heads only to sentences, Russell's
belief-feelings exist in relation to "contents", whioh "may con¬
sist of words only, or of images only, or of a mixture of the
two, or of either or both together with one or more sensations,"
(The Analysis of Mind, p. 236). On the theory we are considering,
though, one might allow images and sensations to enter into the
context of the sentence towards which one nods his head.
2. The reader may imagine me to be pointing towards something on
my desk when I write the word, "this" without quotes, in (46),
(64)* and the marked sentence.
192
Again, my hypothesis, (31), would he confirmed. (64) would
show that, in (46), the expression, "that this is orange",plays two
roles. One of its roles is to refer to the proposition that this
is orange. And the other role is to indicate the words in terms of
which Bill's belief is formed.
On the theory we are now considering, "believes" is treated
much in the way in which we treated "said explicitly". Similar
playing-aqround with indicator words will be appropriate. For ex¬
amples
(65) Hoover believes that I am a Communist,
will be analyzed, not ass
(66) Hoover, who performs a judgment involving the sentences "I am
a Communist", is committed to the truth of the proposition that I am
a Communist,
but ass
(67) Hoover, who performs a judgment involving a sentence of the
forms "(Singular Term) is a Communist", is committed to the truth
of the proposition that I am a Communist.
This is not, of course, to deny that Hoover could come to believe
that I am a Communist by nodding his head towards the sentence, "I
am a Communist", while that sentence is uttered by me.
This theory would have what some would count as an advantage
over the one which talks of concepts.
(36) Bill believes that ((pr>q.) & ~ q)m>~p,
would becomes
(68) Bill, who performs a judgment involving the sentences n((poq)
&~q):o~p", is committed to the truth of the proposition that
((p m q) & ~ q)=>~p»
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which, together with (6l), would allow us to deduces
(69) Bill, who performs a judgment involving the sentences "((p^q)
& - q):>~p"» is committed to the truth of the proposition that
~ ~ ((poq) & p)aq.
But, since (69) is not the analysis of (63), we should avoid the
conclusion that one cannot believe that ((p:>q.) &~q)=>~p without
believing that ((poq) & p)oq, without bothering to introduce
the idea of order among concepts.
Another problem of order would also be affected. One who
believes that John loves Mary would, on the concept theory, exer¬
cise the concepts: John, loves, and Mary. But then, so would some-
one who believes that Mary loves John. How can we flake out the dif¬
ference between believing that John loves Mary and believing that
Mary loves John? Geach, (cf. Mental Acts, Chapter 14), proposes to
solve such a problem by introducing a special relation among one's
'exercises' of his concepts. But, on the theory we are now consi¬
dering, we need no such special relation. A man who believes that
John loves Mary nods his head towards the sentence: "John loves
Mary". A man who believes that Mary loves John nods his head to¬
wards the sentence: "Mary loves John". The question of how the
sentence: "John loves Mary", gets to mean that John loves Mary, and
how the sentence: "Mary loves John1gets to mean that Mary loves
John becomes a part of the general question of how any sentence
ever gets to mean anything. But, since the problem of the meaning
of sentences will exist no natter what theory of belief we adopt,
and since the theory of belief which talks of concepts leads to
the problem of order among concepts, the theory of belief which
talks of sentences has the advantage of leading to fewer problems.
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Someone who wants to hold that:
(7)) Bill believes that Hume is the precursor of modern empiricism,
can be true while:
(71) Bill believes that Hume is the forerunner of modern empiri¬
cism,
is false, might also find the present theory preferable to the one
which talks of concepts. For, presumably, the concept precursor
is identical to the concept forerunner. On the other hand, though,
a concept theorist might want to emphasize Geach's talk of subjec¬
tive mental capacities, and to say that, whereas my concept precur¬
sor might be identical to my concept forerunner, Bill's concept
precursor might not be identical to Bill's concept forerunner.
Let us now see how the theory which talks of sentences runs
into trouble.
(72) The Pope believes that God exists,
will become:
(73) The Pope, who performs a judgment involving the sentence:
"God exists", is committed to the truth of the proposition that God
exists.
But, if the Pope does not understand English, then it is hard to
see how (73) can be true. So we reach the conclusion that, if the
Pope does not understand English, then he is an agnostic.'1' We could
avoid this conclusion by introducing some kind of translation rela¬
tion, R, (perhaps something along the lines of Catnap's "intensional
1, cf. Church, Review of Quine's "Notes on Existence and Neoessity,"
for a similar point.
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isomorphism", of. Meaning and necessity. Chapter 14, would he in
order), which would allow us to treat (72) as something like:
(74) The Pope, who performs a judgment involving some sentence
which bears R to the English sentence, "God exists", is committed
to the truth of the proposition that God exists.
This would allow us to avoid the conclusion that Popes who do not
speak English are agnostics. But w© should have another problem.
It would be difficult to think up a translation relation which
holds between, say, "Deus est", and "God exists", but which does
not hold between the two English sentences: "Hume is the precur¬
sor of modem empiricism" and "Hume is the forerunner of modern
empiricism". So, if we take the approach exhibited by (74)» we
shall have to give up saying that (70) and (71) can differ in
truth value.
I am not going to come down in favour of either of the the¬
ories of belief which we have been considering. The important
point is what they have in oommoni that in a sentence of the form:
"A believes that p", what is at issue ia not just the proposition
that p. It is both the proposition that p and the features of A's
mental life in terms of which his belief is formed.
To just touoh upon some more verbs of prepositional attitude,
whereas I treat "says" and "is oommitted to the truth of the propo¬
sition (that)" as PR verbs of propositional attitude, I should
1. The relation of 'intensional isomorphism', as amended by Putnam,
(cf. "Synonymity and the Analysis of Belief Sentences"), would
not hold between1 "Bill believes that Hume is the precursor of
modern empiricism, but Bill does not believe that Hume is the
forerunner of modem empiricism" andi "Bill believes that Hume
is the precursor of modern empiricism, but Bill does not believe
that Hume is the precursor of modern empiricism". But it would
hold between: "Hume is the precursor of modern empiricism" and:
"Hume is the forerunner of modern empiricism". Most people would,
I think, just deny that (71) and (70) oan differ in truth value.
But I find this diffioult to deny.
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think that "asserts", "expresses the thought", and "intends to con-
would
vey the information'^be EBNPR verbs of propositional attitude, and
apt for analysis roughly along the lines of "believes". In general,
if a verb of proportional attitude has to do only with the meaning
of a sentence, then it is a PR verb of propositional attitude. But if
it has also to do with what is meant by, or what is thought by, or
what words are actually used by the person who has the propositional
attitude, then it is a HBNPR verb of propositional attitude.
I now want to say something about L.R. Reinhardt's attack on
the logical equivalence criterion of propositional identity. I
think it goes wrong in an interesting way. Reinhardt asks us to con¬
sider*
(75) Edinburgh is north of London,
and 1
(76) London is south of Edinburgh.
1
Then, reviving an argument of John Anderson's , Reinhardt says*
[(75) ancl (76)] entail each other. And, because of that, it will
often be natural to say that people who say them are saying the same
thing....Anderson points out reasons for regarding two such asser¬
tions as different. First of all, it is clear, to speak Fregean,
that the propositions are the results of assigning different values
to two different propositional functions, viz. "x is North of Lon¬
don" and "x is South of Edinburgh". It is obvious that the ranges
of these functions are not identical, which is only to say that
some cities north of London are not south of Edinburgh and some
cities south of Edinburgh are not north of London. ("Propositions
and Speech Acts", p. 177)
This argument, if I understand it correctly, is not enough to prove
1. Reinhardt's source is "Relational Arguments", pp. 143-161 of
John Anderson, Studies in Empirical Philosophy, Sydney, Angus
and Robertson, Ltd., 1963.
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that the proposition expressed by sentence (75) is not identical to
the proposition expressed hy sentence (76). In the first place,
Reinhardt begs the question by using "propositions" in the plural.
But let us ignore this point. On the only interpretation which I
can give to Reinhardt's argument, which does not make it out to be
a piece of question-begging, he is arguing that since the proposi¬
tion, (75)» is a result of assigning the value, Edinburgh} to the
functionj
(77) * is north of London,
and since the proposition, (76), is a result of assigning the
value, London, to the function*
(78) x is south of Edinburgh,
(75) and (76) are different propositions. The principle seems to
be that one proposition cannot be a value of two different func¬
tions. But, by parity of reasoning, I can argue that since the
proposition*
(79) John loves Mary,
is a result of assigning the value, John, to the function:
(80) x loves Mary,
and since the proposition*
(81) John loves Mary,
1. I am following Quins's convention of calling entities "values".
Hence the absence of quotes around "Edinburgh".
2. I lapse, here, into my practice of sometimes using "(n)" to mean
"the proposition which, I imagine, sentence (n) expresses".
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is a result of assigning the value, Mary, to the functions
(82) John loves x,
(79) and (81) are different propositions.
Perhaps, though, the following argument would be more in
Reinhardt's spirit. Since the propositions
(83) Bill loves Mary,
is a result of assigning the value, Bill, to the functions
(84) x loves Mary,
and since the propositions
(85 Mary is loved by Bill,
is a result of assigning the value, Mary, to the functions
(86) x is loved by Bill,
(83) and (85) are different propositions. Row many of us should
consider this argument to be just as preposterous as the argument
about (79) and (81). Obviously, we should say, the proposition
that Bill loves Mary is the same proposition as the proposition
that Mary is loved by Bill. But consider what Reinhardt goes on
to say about (75) and (76)s
Anderson goes on to say that the two assertions "raise the quite
distinct question of what is north of London and what is south of
Edinburgh". This point is more significant than it might look.
For it means that the two logically equivalent assertions will
normally be made in two different contexts of inquiry...This may
seem obsourej for just what is a context of inquiry?....If func¬
tions are to be kept down to earth and not to become as trouble¬
some as universals have been, I think it must be necessary to
introduce some notion such as a context of inquiry, a human activity
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of some kind. The questions to which "London is south of Edinburgh"
and "Edinburgh is north of London" would be the answers, would arise
in different situations, out of different concerns and interests.
...("Propositions and Speech Acts", pp. I'JJf,)
As a refutation of the view that (75) and (76) are the same propo¬
sition, this argument is as bad as the one we quoted earlier. For
we may simply reply by saying that it is not impossible for the
same proposition to be asserted now in one 'context of inquiiy',
now in another. But I did not quote Reinhardt in order to have
the pleasure of refuting him. I have had to take the reader through
these refutations in order to clear the way for a point which Rein¬
hardt suggests, and which, I think, he should be making. Although,
as I should say, the proposition that Edinburgh is north of London
is identical to the proposition that London is south of Edinburgh,
the sentenoes, (75) and (76) are likely to be used in different
circumstances. To use an example different from Reinhardt's, if we
are asked: "Where is Edinburgh?", it is more likely that we should
utter sentence (75) than that we should utter sentence (76). Simi¬
larly, it might be said that, if we are interested in Bill's love
life, then we are more likely to utter sentence (83) than we are to
utter sentence (85), and that, if we are interested in what ad¬
mirers Mary has, then we are more likely to utter sentence (85)
than we are to utter sentence (83). And, similarly again, I have
heard it argued by linguists that, if we utter sentence:
(87) John did not kill Tom,
with phonetic stress on the first word, then we are likely to be
suggesting that, although Tom was killed, it was not John who
killed him. If, however, we put the stress on the fourth word,
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then we are likely to be suggesting that, although John did harm
to Tom, he did not kill him. If, finally, we put the stress on
the fifth word, we are likely to be suggesting that, although John
killed someone, he killed someone other than Tom. Now, assuming
that all these statements of empirical linguistics are true, the
conclusion I should draw is not that we have a lot more proposi¬
tions than we thought we had, but that the stating of propositions,
although important, is a vary small part of our use of language.
I see no reason why we should not say that, although, if I utter
(87) with stress on one word, then I am suggesting one thing, and,
if I utter (87) with stress on another word, then I am suggesting
another thing, in either case I am stating the same proposition.
This is not to denigrate the role of phonetic stress in communica¬
tion, (as niy remarks would do were I to argue that the stating of
propositions is all that is important in language). I am merely
arguing for a careful distinction between the proposition one
states and the many other things which one does by means of the
sounds he makes when he states that proposition. To return to
(75) and (76)» to say that these sentences express the same propo¬
sition is not to play down Reinhardt's 'contexts of inquiry' and
'human activities'. It is rather, (to assume an intuitive under¬
standing of Reinhardt's expressions), to distinguish the questions
"What proposition is he stating by means of that sentenoe?" from
the questions "Within what context of inquiry, (or human activity),
is he using that sentence to state that proposition?".
Let us now turn to the truths of mathematics. Reinhardt asks
us to considers
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(88) The first even prime number is less than 5,
and i
(89) The sum of 1 plus 1 is less than 5»
and he saysi
Now why should we say that both of these say the same thing or ex¬
press the same proposition'? They are likely to occur in quite dif¬
ferent mathematical inquiries and the aims and interests of the
inquiries are likely to be different. ("Propositions and Speech
Acts", p. 176)
It seems to me that one reason which one might have for adopting
the logical equivalence criterion of propositional identity would
be to emphasize the importance of what Reinhardt would call the
"aims and interests" of a mathematical or logical inquiry. Con-
sideri
(75) Edinburgh is north of London,
again, and
(90) Inverness is north of Edinburgh.
The logical equivalence criterion marks a big difference between
sentence (75) and sentence (90). According to the logical equi¬
valence criterion, people who utter these sentences state different
propositions. For this reason, one might well be tempted to think
that, in this case, the difference of propositions stated is, among
the differences between the sentences, the most important one. But,
in the case of (88) and (89), there will be no such temptation.
According to the logical equivalence criterion, people who utter
(88), (89), and, for that matter;
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(91) ~(p & ~p),
all state the same proposition. So one who holds the logical equi¬
valence criterion, and who wants to find out what point there can
be in uttering such sentences as (88), (89)1 and (91) will lose in¬
terest in the proposition stated and will be forced to look else¬
where for an answer. (88), (89), and (91) just do not differ in
the salient way in which (75) and (90) differ. They differ in some
other way. Eut what other way? It seems reasonable to say that we
ought to look for an answer in terms of what Reinhardt would call
the "aims and interests" of the inquiries in the course of which we
utter these sentences. And, once our attention has been drawn to
"aims and interests", we shall be tempted to undertake an inquiry
into the "aims and interests" of people who utter such contingent
sentences as (75) and (90), (Perhaps some considerations such as
these were what led Wittgenstein to do some of his later work.)
Having adopted Reinhardt's talk of "aims and interests", I
now have a duty to embark upon a general discussion of aims and in¬
terests, to tell the reader, for example, what are the aims and in¬
terests of people who utter the sentences of logic and mathematics.
But I cannot respond to this duty just now. I have been trying to
get the reader to have some kindly feelings towards the idea that
we ought to distinguish the proposition one states from the many
other things which go on when one utters a sentence, and the propo¬
sition one commits oneself to the truth of from the many other things
which go on when one has a belief. But to explain in more detail
what these other things are would require work of the sort which I,
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at present, am only in a position to think about beginning. I hasten
to add that I have not made an explicit statement of what I mean by
"proposition" either. But perhaps some of my remarks will have ser¬
ved to give the reader and myself a rough idea of what I mean by that
expression.
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Section XIIIi CONCLUDING HEMARK
Although the preceding pages contain a number of flaws, I am
of the opinion that the work there embodied constitutes a foundation
for future work on problems of great importance. In order that the
reader may know the direction in which I consider this work to lead,
I shall list a number of these problems. They are all problems
which, had I not written the preceding pages, I should not have been
able to begin to consider.
What sort of thing, ontologically speaking, is a proposition?
What about the Strawson-Quine controversy concerning whether there
can be a language which has no singular tarm3? What would happen
to the theory of proper names, outlined in Section VIII, if, per¬
chance, there existed two things, eaoh of which having all of Soc¬
rates* s properties? What sort of *world view* should be adopted
by one who aocepts this theory of proper names? What are proper¬
ties? What, aside from stating the necessary proposition or the
impossible proposition, do we do when we utter a sentence of logic
or mathematics? What is it which gives a word its meaning? What
of the alternatives which have been offered to strict implication
as an explication of entailment? Are there two senses of "follows
from"? a logical one and an epistamologioal one? What of Quine1 s
refutation of two dogmas of empiricism? What of Quine's doctrine
of the "indeterminacy of translation"? Does talk about the 'nodding
of one's head* or the having of a 'belief-feeling* provide the best
explanation of the difference between believing that p and merely
considering what someone ssys when he says that p?
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By Frank J. Leavitt
VIRGIL C. ALDRICH asks whether 'telling you something youalready know [is] like giving you something you don't need or,
rather, like going through the motions of giving you something that
already belongs to you' ('Telling, Acknowledging and Asserting',
Analysis, 27.2). He concludes that it is like the latter, and that in cases
where the listener already has the information, the effort goes into
'going through the motions, not into the illocutionary act of telling'.
But he has begged the question by assuming that telling is like
giving. Telling appears to be like giving because in many, (but, as we
shall see, not in all) cases where we say that someone told something,
(that p, to do A, how to do A, etc.) to someone, we can equally well say
that someone gave something, (some information, an order, some instruc¬
tions, etc.) to someone.
But this should not lead us to ignore the differences between the two
activities. In the first place, giving material objects, like Volkswagens,
is quite different from giving more ethereal things like information
orders, and instructions. A necessary condition for my giving you a
material object is that this object be mine to give. I cannot give you the
Brooklyn Bridge. But I can give orders or instructions in cases where it
makes no sense to speak of these 'objects' being mine, and I can give
information in cases (as when I relay a message written in a code which
I do not understand, or when I unwittingly tip you off to the answer to a
problem) where I do not possess this information myself.
As Aldrich rightly points out, a necessary condition for the giving
of a material object is that the recipient does not already possess the
object. But this does not hold true for 'objects' like orders and instruc¬
tions. Hitler repeated several times the order to burn Paris. We surely
can't allow our theories to force us to say here that the successive orders
were not the same order or that none but the first were orders at all.
Where the 'object' is a piece of information, however, Aldrich's
principle holds good. It is impossible to give someone a piece of
information which he already has. But this is just what illuminates the
difference between telling someone that p and giving someone inform¬
ation to the effect that p. Your knowing that my home team is better
than yours need not stop me (logically or otherwise) from bombarding
you with this fact by telling it to you day after day. But only if you are
not aware of it already can I give you this information. Telling is certainly





On Strawson's revised position on identifying reference1
By Frank J. Leavitt (University of Edinburgh)
Consider the following well-worn questions:
(1) If someone, today, were to say, "The king of France is bald",
would that person be saying something false, or would he rather
be saying something which has no truth-value?
(2) If someone, today, were to say, "The king of France is bald",
would that person be stating that there exists at least and no
more than one entity which is king of France? (i.e., would he be
stating what I shall call an "existential-uniqueness proposition"?)
Russellians argue that of the alternatives presented by question
(1), the former is the correct one. They also argue that the
answer to question (2) is "yes". I shall call these the "Russellian
answers" to these questions.
Strawson, in "On Referring", {Mind, 1950), maintained that
the latter alternative presented by (1) is the correct one. He also
maintained that the answer to question (2) is "no". I shall call
these the "Strawsonian answers" to these questions.
In a more recent article, ("Identifying Reference and Truth-
Values", Tlieoria, XXX, 1964), Strawson presents his new views
on the matter. He now maintains, (p. 106), that it is not im¬
portant to come down on one side or the other in the dispute
presented by (1). He says that both sides emphasize different
kinds of philosophical interests, and that "each has its own
merits".
But he argues that it is important to disentangle (1) from (2).
He says that regardless of the position which one takes on ques-




tion (1), the Strawsonian position on question (2) "remains a
decisive objection" to Russell's Theory of Description, (p. 107).
There is at least the following truth in this: one can be a Straw¬
sonian on question (2) and, not inconsistently, take either side
on question (1).
Strawson further indicates, [p. 108), that if one takes the
Russellian position on (2), one is bound to accept the Russellian
position on (1). This is quite correct. If part of what one states
when he says, "The king of France is bald", is an existential-
uniqueness position, then if that existential-uniqueness proposi¬
tion is false, he is making a false statement. But Strawson does
not give much consideration to this way of being forced into
agreeing with Russell. He rather maintains that question (2) is
"uncontroversial", and that the Strawsonian answer to it is "un¬
deniable".
It is my intention to bring question (2) into controversy by
arguing that the Strawsonian answer to it is ill-founded. My aim
is not to prove the Russellian position. It would be extremely
difficult to prove that given that someone has produced a certain
utterance he has made a certain statement. Such a proof would
presuppose a quite sophisticated semantic theory which included
a rigorous procedure for deciding what illocutionary act someone
has performed on the basis of the utterance he has produced and
the linguistic and extra-linguistic context in which he produced
it. I am not prepared to present such a theory, for my aim is only
the modest one of establishing that Strawson's argument in favour
of his position on (2) is ill-founded.
Strawson's argument is contained in the following quotation:
Now one thing that is absolutely clear is that it can be no part of the
speaker's intention in the case of such utterances [as "The king of
France is bald"] to inform the audience of the existence of a particular
item bearing the name or answering to the description and distinguished
by that fact, or by that fact plus something else known to the audience,
from any other. On the contrary, the very task of identifying refer¬
ence, as described, can be undertaken only by a speaker who knows or
presumes his audience's existence and uniqueness as this. The task of
identifying reference is defined in terms of a type of speaker-intention




existence-and-uniqueness information in question .. . Thus, that there
exists a particular item to which the name or description is applicable
and which, if not unique in this respect, satisfies some uniqueness-
condition known to the hearer [and satisfies some uniqueness-condi¬
tion known to the speaker] is no part of what the speaker asserts in
an utterance in which the name or description is used to perform the
function of identifying reference; it is, rather, a pres:ipposition of his
asserting what he asserts, (pp. 101 f.]
Now it should be noticed that Strawson makes use of the word,
"asserts", in the above quotation. In so doing, he makes his posi¬
tion sound slightly more plausible than it ought to sound by
making [2] into a question not about whether certain proposi¬
tions are stated in certain circumstances, but rather about whether
these propositions are asserted in these circumstances. He does
this, by the way, notwithstanding the fact that by the use of the
expression, "falsity in statement", (p. 97], at the beginning of his
article, he has introduced the question as a question about state¬
ments and not as a question about assertions. Although I think
that, in the long run, Strawson's position is not made any stronger
by the shift from statements to assertions, I think that it will
make things less complicated if we delete assertion talk and in¬
sert statement talk in our formulation of his position.
It should also be noticed that Strawson is being at least mis¬
leading in saying, "the task of identifying reference is defined in
terms of a type of speaker-intention which rules out ascription to
the speaker of the intention to impart the. existence-and-unique¬
ness information in question." Actually, Strawson introduces the
notion of identifying reference at the beginning of his article by
defining it as "the sub-task of designating some particular histori¬
cal item or items which the state of affairs [which is being re¬
ported] involves", (p. 96]. And it is an open question whether
identifying reference, so defined, rules out such a speaker-inten¬
tion. Neither the question of the speaker's intentions nor the
question of what it is that the speaker is stating is answered by
the definition.




(3] A speaker can use an expression like "The king of France"
to make identifying reference to an individual only if he knows
or presumes that his audience already knows that the individual
to which identifying reference is made exists, i.e., that a certain
existential-uniqueness proposition, p, is true.
[4] If a speaker knows or presumes that his audience already
knows that a certain proposition is true, it cannot be his intention
to inform his audience of the truth of that proposition.
Therefore, [5], if a speaker uses an expression like "The king of
France" to make identifying reference to an individual, p can be
no part of what the speaker states.
Now in the first place, as I shall show later by example, (3) is
false. We can use expressions of the form, "the so-and-so", to
make identifying reference to individuals even when we know
that our audience does not know that the relevant existential-
uniqueness proposition is true. But let us, for the moment,
assume the truth of (3) in order to get Strawson's argument off
the ground.
[4) exhibits a conceptual truth, and we shall let it stand. Rus-
sellians believe that (5] is false. I shall not attempt to prove that
it is false, but I shall point out the flaw in the inference from
(3] and (4) to (5), showing that there is one less reason for be¬
lieving that (5) is true.
In the inference from (3) and (4) to (5], there is the sup¬
pressed premiss.
[6] If it is not the intention of a speaker to inform his audience
that p, by the use of an expression, e, then he cannot, by the use
of e, be stating that p.
(6) expresses a false assumption, often made by philosophers,
that the statement which a speaker makes by the use of an ex¬
pression is always a function of the information which the speaker
intends to convey to his audience. But although the concept of
what we state often coincides in extension with the concept of
what information we intend to convey, the two concepts are
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different and must not be confused. Giving information is only
one of several reasons for which one makes a statement. Others
are: reminding, repeating for emphasis, stating for the record,
telling someone something he already knows in order to bore or
annoy him, (cf. my "Telling and Giving", Analysis, June, 1967),
etc. Frequently, we intentionally make a false statement in order
to convey true information. Speaking of someone under the in¬
fluence of LSD, I might state the false proposition that he sees
God in order to convey the true information that he is having a
hallucinatory vision of God. And in sarcasm, sometimes, what
we state is a contrary or the contradictory of the information we
intend to convey.
Another purpose for which we sometimes make statements,
and which is relevant here, is to let the audience know what
entity some other statement is about, i.e., to perform the task of
identifying reference for that other statement. Suppose that you
and I both know that Britain has just one monarch. I might none¬
theless have occasion to say to you, "There is one and only one
monarch of Britain. She is a Windsor." In such a case, I use two
sentences to make two statements. What I state by means of the
second sentence happens to be identical with the information I
intend to convey to you. In the case of the first sentence, how¬
ever, I state something which I know you already know, and so,
do not intend to convey that information to you. My purpose,
instead, is to let you know what entity the second statement is
about.
If we transform the two sentences into one, i.e., "There is one
and only one monarch of Britain, and she is a Windsor", the ex¬
ample can be used to make a related anti-Strawsonian point,
namely, that we can use the same sentence-component to make
identifying reference to an entity and, at the same time, to state
that that entity exists. Here again, we tell someone something he
already knows in order to perform the task of identifying refer¬
ence.
It is a plausible suggestion that the same thing often happens
when we say, "The so-and-so is such-and-such", to someone who
we know already knows that there exists just one so and so. It is
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not unreasonable to think that in such cases we use one sentence
to make two statements: first, by our use of "The so-and-so", as
a part of the sentence, telling someone something he already
knows for the purpose of identifying reference, and then, by
means of the rest of the sentence, making a second statement for
the purpose of conveying information. I am not going to argue
here for the truth of this suggestion, but it should now be per¬
fectly clear that the suggestion is not vitiated by cases in which
the speaker knows that the audience already knows that there
exists just one so-and-so. Therefore, even if (3) is true, we have
no good reason to believe that if someone says, "The king of
France is bald", he is not stating an existential-uniqueness pro¬
position.
Let us now attack (3). As a matter of fact, we frequently use
sentences of the form, "The so-and-so is such-and-such", in order
not only to report some state of affairs but also to inform our
audience of the existence of some entity which that state of
affairs involves. Suppose, for example, that you do not know
that there are any Thaleans in existence nowadays. I happen to
know that there are several and that the foremost of them plays
chess. I might say to you,
(7] "The foremost living T.halean is a chess player.",
reporting a state of affairs to you, and, at the same time, inten¬
tionally informing you of the existence of some item which that
state of affairs essentially involves, and giving you this existential
information in order to make identifying reference to that item.
It follows from [4], which we are accepting, that it can be one's
intention to inform someone that p only if he believes that that
person does not already know that p. So (3) is false.
Someone concerned to defend Russell on (2} might be tempted
to make use of what has just been said to argue that since in
some cases a sentence of the form, "The so-and-so is such-and-
such", is used with the intent of informing one's audience of the
truth of an existential-uniqueness proposition, in some cases, at
least, such a sentence is used to state such a proposition. But
since, as we have seen, the statement one makes does not always
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coincide with the information one intends to convey, this line of
defense is not yet open. I am not denying that there is some im¬
portant relationship which connects a speaker's intention to in-
' form, the sentence he uses, and the statement he makes. But so
far as I know, this relationship has not yet been given an ade¬
quate explanation. A successful theory of how statements are
made will give less importance to speakers' intentions to inform
than philosophers have sometimes thought. We know this be¬
cause, as I have pointed out, we sometimes intentionally convey
something other than what we actually state, because we some¬
times, when we give hints or clues, intentionally convey more
than we actually state, and because we sometimes, as a result of
slips of the tongue and lack of facility with the language, un¬
intentionally fail to state what we intend to convey. Speakers'
intentions, on the other hand, are not entirely unimportant. When
someone uses an ambiguous sentence or a sentence containing
an indexical expression and we want to know what proposition
he is stating, and when the context fails to decide the issue, the
speaker's intentions are the court of last resort. A theory which
adequately accounts for these facts, plus many others, must be
developed before we can reasonably take sides on question [2],
Received on July 11, 1968.
